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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates the Korean capital market internationalisa-
tion and examines the efficiency of the Korean stock market
comprehensively. For this purpose this study is concentrated on
three main areas as follows.
First, this thesis evaluates the capital market liberalisation by
examining the internal market mechanism and conducting
geographical comparisons. The general structure of the Korean
securities market and disclosure system are described, and the
development of the capital market is reviewed. The liberalisation
plan is examined. It is found that the internationalisation plan
of the Korean capital market should be gradual and balanced with
general economic conditions. Several measures are recommended to
enhance the functions of the domestic capital markets. Also
comparative characteristics of capital market in the Far East are
described, including equity market, bond market, money market,
and foreign exchange market.
Second, this thesis examines the relationship between the macro
economic activities and the capital market in Korea. Using the
interest rate model for 14.5 years, the expected inflation is
uniformly positively related to inflation. The relations between
stock returns and expected inflation, and between stock returns
and unexpected inflation showed negative. Thus, the common stocks
in Korea are found not hedging against inflation. And real
variables influence to real stock returns as fundamental
determinants of equity values. However, these real stock return-
inflation relations are found varying over time. The results of
the recent five and half years period showed positive relation or
no relation between real stock return and inflation.
Third, this thesis examines the efficiency of the Korean stock
market at three different levels. In the weak form empirical
tests, the results manifest mixed behavior across samples. But
the average results by serial correlation analysis, runs
analysis, and spectral analysis do not show random walk behavior.
In the frequency distribution model, the average results indicate
relatively fat tails. In the semi-strong form test, the valuation
effects of bonus stock issue announcements are found to react to
share prices in a relatively short period. Investors on average
cannot get significant abnormal returns. In the strong form test,
the excess returns from following the 467 recommendations made by
the four Korean stockbrokers turned out to be significant before
deducting transactions costs. But considering transactions costs,
the abnormal gain is close to zero.
In summary, the results show that the Korean stock market in its
early stages did not have the ability to help investors to
'relatively correctly price' the shares. More recent evidence
shows improved efficiency which is likely to continue as the
capital market expands.
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CHAPTER I. OBJECTIVE AND ORGANIBATION.
i.i. Introduction.
The roles of the capital market in an economy may be viewed
from the following perspectives.
a. Financing capital for the goverrunent and corporate sectors,
etc.
b. Providing the investing public with a marketplace for
investing their financial assets, and
c. Contributing to an efficient management of the economy.
Corporate financing in Korea historically relied heavily on
external funding, especially on the banking sector. Also the
capital market itself was made up of many different kinds of
financial institutions which competed with each other within
often fairly narrow limits laid down by the government. These
limits included the areas of activity permitted for each
institution and the scale of interest rates and commissions
charged for various services. The capital market, however,
continued to evolve by diversifying its asset and liability mix,
offering more financial services, and upgrading its function as a
financial intermediary, concurrent with the modernisation and
industrialisation of the Korean economy. With improved financial
techniques and closer links with international financial markets,
the financial industry in Korea seems to have become modernised.
Especially during the last several years, the stock market
in Korea has undergone a process of expansion, liberalisation,
and internationaljsation. With a fairly short history, its market
value of total listed stocks has expanded from 916 billion won
(Us$ 2 billion) in 1975 to 70,804 billion won (US$ 110 billion)
in September 1989. The percentage of market value to NP
increased from 9.1% in 1975 to 13.2% in 1986, to 65.7% in
Seintember 1989. The Korea Composite Stock Price Index advanced
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from 89.73 as the end of 1975 to 163.37 as the end of 1985, and
to 920.20 as the end of October 1989. Also the listed value of
bonds increased over 16 times during the last nine years.
However, little research has been done on the Korean stock
market efficiency, even though enormous contributions on the
advanced markets have been made to the understanding of the
behavior of securities. Given that this field is one of the most
intensely researched areas of finance, the number of publications
which has to be reviewed is very large, clearly there are many
areas requiring further and better research. Conditions ,
 in the
market place change overtime. Intensive research in this area is
only possible with the advent of large high speed computers and
the setup of large computerised databases. Also the validity of
the Efficient Market Hypothesis(EMH) has not led to any consensus
wide acceptance among academics and wide dissemination of its
findings in the international capital market. Until now, the
central theme of EMH is still rejected by most practitioners and
disputed by some academics as well.
The idea that a stock market can be 'efficient' was first
propounded by Faina(1970). He defined an efficient stock market as
follows:
"The primary role of the capital market is the allocation of the
ownership of the economy's capital stock. In general terms, the
ideal is a market in which prices provide accurate signals for
resource allocation: that is, a market in which firms can make
production and investment decisions, and investors can choose
among the securities that represent ownership of the firms'
activities under the assumption that security prices at any time
'fully reflect' all the available information. A market in which
prices always 'fully reflect' available information is
efficient."
In a well organised stock market, the structure becomes more
complex, to the extent that it includes a whole range of
investors and institutions, and approximates closer the efficient
market.
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1.2 objectives of the research.
The objective of this research is to examine the pricing
efficiency of the Korean stock market comprehensively. For this
purpose this study concentrates on three main areas which are the
following:
a. The evaluation of the capital market internationalisation by
examining the internal market mechanism and conducting
geographical comparisons.
b. The effects of inflation / real variables on stock returns.
c. The ability of the stock market to help investors to
'correctly price' the shares that are offered in it.
This thesis is composed of ten chapters. Chapter 1 describes
the objectives and organisation of this research. The period
covered and the sources of data are explained.
Chapter 2 evaluates the Korean capital market liberali-
sation. The general structure of the Korean securities market and
disclosure system are described, and the development of capital
market is reviewed. The internationalisation, following a
original long-term plan for capital liberalisation laid out in
1981 and a revised plan in 1988, is examined.
Chapter 3 describes comparative aspects of capital market
characteristics in the Far East - Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong. These four countries illustrate a wide diversity of economy
and financial systems, ranging from a high degree of centrali-
sation and government control(Korea) to economies where market
mechanisms are the prevalent means of allocating resources (Hong
Kong). This chapter takes a deeper and more detailed look at the
current state of evolution of the local financial markets and
instruments. This includes the securities market, i.e., bond and
equity markets, and money market and foreign exchange market.
Chapter 4 analyses the role of financial markets in the
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savings process and the role of financial institutions in the
allocation of financial resources. The Korean financial system is
currently under extensive review to identify potential
institutional reforms. Several measures are recommended for
financial liberalisation in 1990s.
Chapter 5 examines the relationship between the macro
economic activities and the capital markets in Korea. Empirical
tests are carried out on the relations between stock returns and
inflation and(or) real variables. For this purpose, 12 variables
are regressed using monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual data for
173 months. To examine the consistency of the results, the most
recent 66 months'data are also analysed. There is much evidence
that common stock returns did not work as hedging against
inflation in the Korean economy during January 1975-June 1989.
The data for the Korean capital market test the hypothesis that a
negative relation exists between stock returns and inflation and
a positive relation exists between stock returns and real
variables which are more fundamental determinants of equity
values.
Chapter 6 deals with the literature connected with research
on the subject of capital market efficiency. For many years a
considerable volume of research activity has been devoted to
testing the validity of the Efficient Market Hypothesis as an
explanatory model of pricing behaviour in various speculative
markets in the large and developed capital markets. However,
little research has been devoted to those of developing
countries, even though their markets have grown rapidly in the
1980s.
Chapters 7-9 examine the Korean Stock market efficiency,
which is the main topic of this thesis, in three different forms;
that is, its weak form, semi-strong form, and strong form.
Chapter 7 is a comprehensive investigation of the weak form of
the efficient market hypothesis. The actual test is carried out
by serial correlation analysis, runs test, and spectral analysis.
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With these tests, the efficiency characteristics of two different
periods are compared with each other. Also to check the effect of
price limit system, the trimmed data are applied for the same
model. Before doing them, frequency distributions are analysed.
Chapter 8 analyses an empirical test of the semi-strong form
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The valuation effects of
bonus stock issue announcements are examined in two different
ways. First, ex-right day opening prices are compared with
theoretical opening prices. In addition, the magnitude of the
overnight price adjustment is analysed using the prior day
closing to ex-day closing stock returns. Second, announcement
effects are examined using the closing prices around the
announcement dates and adjusting for the payment of the dividend.
Chapter 9 tests the strong form Efficient Market Hypothesis
in Korea. The value of verbal recommendations, using the
unpublished, confidential lists of approved stocks which are
produced each week, is investigated. In this empirical test, 467
recommendations by four major Korean stockbrokers are examined
for any degree of forecasting ability.
Finally chapter 10 suminarises and concludes this thesis.
1.3 The period covered.
The intention has been to use as long a period of data as
possible. However, given that the socio-political conditions
affect the operation of the capital market, the period covered
for this research is from January 1975 to June 1989. For the
examination of the relation of stock returns to inflation / real
variables, two different time periods are used: long-term of 173
months and short-term of 66 months. For the efficient market
empirical tests, several different periods are covered. Also
recent period data were more frequently used, considering the
17
abrupt development of capital market more recently.
1.4 The sources of Data.
The data used in this study were obtained from the following
sources:
a. Share prices and bond index on the Korean market: Dongsuh
Securities Co., Ltd., Daewoo Securities Co., Ltd., The Korea
Stock Exchange, The Korea Securities Supervisory Board, and The
Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Korea.
b. Economic variables in Korea: The Bank of Korea, Economic
Planning Board.
c. Recommendation lists: Five leading Korean securities houses.
d. Economic and capital market data on Japan, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan: The World Bank, IMF, The Bank of Japan, The Tokyo Stock
Exchange, The Hong Kong Government, The Central Bank of China,
The Taiwan Stock Exchange.
1.5 Limitations of the research.
There were some limitations to this study, which were raised
by the type of information available. They are as follows:
a. The stock market in Korea has developed in a quite short time.
Thus, the period covered for this study is relatively short
compared with other research on the advanced markets.
b. The bond market in Korea is very simple in product. The listed
amount and trading volume have expanded enormously in recent
years. The bond market yield has been reported only since 1974.
c. In the absence of monthly data on the GNP growth rate,
Industrial Production Index(IPI) was used. We assume that the IPI
is closely related with the GNP growth rate.
d. The Korean stockbrokers do not keep the unpublished
recommendation lists for a long time. Thus, the period covered
for the strong form empirical test is relatively short.
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CHAPTER II. EVALUATION OF THE KOREAN SECURITIES MARKET LIBERALI-
BAT ION.
2.1 introduction.
During the last several years the financial sector in Korea
has expanded tremendously, following the precedent of the real
sector. Trade and foreign exchange transactions have been
liberalised to a great extent and the domestic capital market is
opening to internationalisation. At the end of 1988, the import
liberalisation ratio reached 95.4% and it is expected to increase
further in the coming years. With the recent acceptance by the
IMF's Board, in November 1988 Korea became an IMF Article VIII
country, within the context of the now necessary overall
liberalisation of the foreign exchange control system. As for the
capital market, following a long-term plan for capital market
liberalisation laid out in 1981 and a plan for stimulating
capital market liberalisation in 1987, the government announced a
long-awaited plan in December 1988 detailing the steps for
completion of the process of liberalising the Korean securities
market.
In this chapter, liberalisation of the Korean capital market
will be evaluated. The general structure and the development of
Korean securities market will be reviewed.
2.2 The structure of the Korean securities market.
2.2.1 Sources of regulation and administration.
In order to supervise the overall operations of the
securities market, several laws and internal regulations are
principally applied. The principal source of Korean securities
law is the Securities and Exchange Law ('SEL') of 1962 (as last
amended as of 28th November 1987). The SEL was largely based on
its Japanese counterpart, which was in turn modelled on the U.S.
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securities statutes, including the Securities Act of 1933 and the
securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The SEL regulates both the
issuing and the secondary markets. The Presidential Decree and
the Ministry of Finance Regulations promulgated under the SEL,
supplement the SEL with more detailed regulations (Shin 1983, Kim
& Chang 1988, Korea Stock Exchange 1988).
A variety of special statutes also constitute part of the
system of securities regulation. They include the Capital Market
promotion Law of 1968, which was substantially amended in 1987,
and the Securities Investment Trust Business Law of 1969 which
was amended on 31st December 1976. The Commercial Code, the basic
law on commercial and corporate matters, is also applicable in
the absence of a relevent provision in the SEL or any other
special statute.
In Korea, the Ministry of Finance(MOF) plans the basic
policies for and supervises the overall operations of the
securities market. The major regulatory bodies under the MOF are
the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) and its executive
organ, the Securities Supervisory Board (SSB). Composed now of
nine commissioners who are under the control and influence of the
MOF, the SEC is the policy making body in the area of securities
regulation. The SSB, acting as the executive body of the SEC,
implements the policies established by the SEC. Both the SEC and
the SSB enact rules within the power delegated them by the SEL,
the Decree and the MOF regulations. In addition, the Korea Stock
Exchange(KSE) and the Korea Securities Dealers Association also
have their own charters, rules, and regulations governing various
aspects of their business operations as self-regulatory bodies.
The KSE is authorjsed under the Securities and Exchange Law to
exercise supervision over the member firms and to take
appropriate measures to operate the securities market
efficiently.
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(Chart 2.1) The structure of securities administration
Ministr of Finance
Korea Stock Exchange
Securities and Exchangc
Commission
Securities Super isory
Board
Korea Securities
Member Firms(a)	
Dealers Association
Korea Securities	 Securities	 Investment Trust
Settlement Corporation	 Companies(z)	 Companles(3)
Korea Securities	 Korea Sci.uriues
Computer Corporation	 Finance Corporation
Transfer Agents(3)
(Source) Korea Stock Exchange, Oct. 1988, p.9
2.2.2 Market operations.
(1) Listing of new issues: The SEL addresses the issuance of
securities and the disclosure of corporate information. Financial
institutions that have received special underwriting licences
from the Ministry of Finance and have at least 0.5 billion won in
paid-in capital are allowed to participate in an underwriting
organisation. At the end of June 1989 there are four types of
securities - equity shares, warrants, debt securities, and
beneficiary certificates - that are permitted to be listed on the
Exchange. Although there are three types of underwriting systems
available, most underwriting in Korea is done on a firm
underwriting basis, meaning that underwriters make outwright
purchases from the issuer of securities to be offered to the
public. When a corporation intends to delist its securities, it
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must submit a delisting application to the KSE with the minutes
of the general shareholders meeting reflecting the resolution to
delist. The KSE may, however, reject an application for delisting
in cases where the corporation does not fall under the delisting
criteria. At the same time, the KSE may delist the securities of
a listed corporation without an application at anytime the
corporation falls under one or more of the delisting criteria. If
the KSE intends to delist securities, it must first apply for an
approval from the SEC.
(2) Trading system: There are two secondary markets in Korea, the
Over The Counter (OTC) market and the KSE. The KSE market is
conceptually divided into three areas of stock market, investment
trust market and bond market. Equities listed on the KSE are
divided into two major sections. A new using is always initially
assigned to the second section. The main difference between the
first and the second section is that margin trading is not
allowed in the latter. When equity shares in the second section
meet some requirements, they are transfered to the first section,
but if a listed company fails to maintain all the criteria, its
shares will be transfered back to the second section.
The Entrust Contract Rules of the Exchange stipulated under
the SEL provides items with which member firms are obligated to
comply in the opening of accounts and receiving orders from their
customers. All orders are transmitted directly and individually
to the floor of the KSE through the Computerised Order-routing
System. The Stock Market Automated Trading System(SMATS) was
introduced on 3rd March 1988, following a pilot run. The system,
developed to cope with the ever-increasing number of listed
companies and trading volume, is designed to replace the
traditional manual handling of orders by the electronic execution
of orders. When a member firm keys an order into the order-
routing terminal in its offices, the order is fed directly into
and recorded in the files of the system by issue, price, and time
of order. Then, a table of orders per issue is generated on the
screen of the system monitor for order-execution installed at the
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trading post on the floor of the KSE. If
executed in accordance with trading rules,
presses the appropriate funtion key and
automatically matched. When the transaction is
system automatically feeds the result back to
firm.
the order can be
Ln KSE employee
the order is
consummated, the
the originating
(3) OTC market: Securities are transacted not only on the Stock
Exchange, but also on the Over-The-Counter market. The Article
194 of the SEL regulates transactions, methods of payments, and
other requirements of the OTC market. The OTC market has no
special organisation. Since it has no designated place or
facility, transactions can be done anywhere. As a result,
individual investors have difficulty obtaining detailed data and
information owing to a variety of obstacles in and finding their
partners.
Most of the stocks transacted at the OTC market are unlisted
stocks which do not meet the listing requirements of the
Exchange, and take on high risk for the investment. The
differences between the Exchange and the OTC market can be
summarised as follows.
(Table 2.1) Comparisons between the OTC market and the Exchange.
OTC market	 Stock Exchange
1.Place of transaction Sponsoring companies KSE
2.Method of transaction Relative bargain 	 Auction
3.Price of transaction Multi-prices 	 Single price
4.Objects of transaction Registered stocks	 Listed stocks
5.Participants of
	 Investors, &	 Securities co.s
transaction	 securities companies
6.Perjod of settlement One working day	 Three days
7.Entrustment deposit
	 100%	 40%
8.Brokerage commission 0.4% 	 0.4% or less
9.Securitjes transaction 0.5% 	 0.5%
tax
(Source) Daewoo, May 1989.
(4) Stock Index: The KSE publishes the Korea Composite Stock
Price Index(KCSPI) daily, which is an index of all equities
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listed on the KSE. On 4th January 1983, the method of computing
the index was changed from the Dow Jones method to the aggregate
value method. In the new method, the market capitalisation of all
listed companies is aggregated and this aggregate is expressed as
a percentage of the aggregate market capita].isations of all
listed companies as at the base date (the first trading day of
1980). The computation formula for the index is as follows:
Current aggregate market value
Index =	 x 100
Base aggregate market value
The KCSPI is supplemented by section indexes, 34 industrial
sub-group indexes, and indexes based on capital stock size. The
section indexes are composed of the first and the second section
index. The indexes based on capital stock include three indexes
for small companies, medium-sized companies, and large companies.
All indexes are calculated and published every 20 minutes each
trading session (KSE 1989).
(5) Brokerage commission: The KSE discontinued fixed commission
schedule and introduced a negotiable commission system on 11th
July 1988. However, all brokers currently apply similar rates,
ranging from 0.2% to 0.4%, depending on the total trading value
on the same day for the same issue for the same client. The
commission rate for odd lots of less than ten shares is in the
0.6% range and determined by the same way. The commission for
bonds is applied by the securities company in the range of 0.3%
of the sales value.
(6) Daily price change limit: The KSE relies on the daily price
change limit based on the previous day's closing price to
counteract temporary imbalances in supply and demand and to avoid
a sudden wide fluctuation of the share prices. The daily limit,
however, does not apply on the first day of shares going ex-
dividend or ex-rights or being newly listed. The daily price
limits in 1970s were between 5%-13%, scaled on the previous
closing prices. After revising this limit scale several times,
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the current daily price change limit of shares is divided into
thirteen grades, except for issues designated as 'supervised' or
'administered' (as of October 1989). The limit is halved for
supervised issues while administered issues are subject to their
own price limits of 50 won if the market price is less than 5,000
won and 100 won if 5,000 or more. The daily price limit does not
apply to bond trading, except for those of convertible bonds and
bonds with warrants.
(Table 2.2) Daily share price change limit (Oct. 1989)
Previous Close	 Limit	 Previous Close	 Limit
	
less than 3,000	 100	 30,000 - 39,999 	 1,300
	
3,000 - 4,999	 200	 40,000 - 49,999	 1,600
	
5,000 - 6,999	 300	 50,000 - 69,999	 2,000
	
7,000 - 9,999	 400	 70,000 - 99,999	 2,500
	
10,000 - 14,999	 600	 100,000 -149,999 	 3,000
	
15,000 - 19,999	 800	 150,000 or more
	 4,000
20,000 - 29,999 1,000
(7) Securities taxation: Under the provisions of the Income Tax
Law, securities taxation is related only to interest and dividend
incomes as there are no taxes on capital gains which accrued from
the Korean securities market for resident-investors. The taxation
of non-residents depends on whether they have so-called
'permanent establishments' in Korea. According to the Foreign
Exchange Control Act, non-residents must have operated or worked
in Korea for more than six months to obtain permanent
establishment.
Investors must include dividends and interests received in
principle, regardless of the type, in their gross income.
However, the government gave tax previleges to small
shareholders, shareholders of listed companies, small investors
using their real names to encourage savings and the development
of the securities market. These tax beneficiaries are exempted or
subject only to a 10% final withholding tax, whereas the others
are subject to gross income tax at the end of a tax year as well
25
as 25% withholding tax. A corporation (individual) who is liable
for corporate tax (income tax) in Korea is subject to a residence
tax at the rate of 7.5% of its corporate tax (income tax). In
addition there are two temporary special taxes of defence tax and
education tax which are due to expire in 1990 and 1991
respectively. Education tax is 5% of interest income and dividend
income which are liable to a final withholding tax off 10%.
Corporations are exempted from education tax. A corporation with
a chargeable income of of less (more) than 500 million won in a
business year is subject to the defence tax at the rate of 20%
(25%) of its payable corporation tax. An individual with an
income of less (more) than 8.4million won in a tax year is
subject to defence tax at the rate of 10% (20%) of his income.
Effective from 1979, a securities transfer tax is levied
on the seller of securities at the base rate of 0.5% of the sales
value. There are some exemptions as follows.
- all the listed shares whose market value is lower than par
value of 5,000 won,
- the government or local government entity,
- underwriters involved in transfer of shares resulting from
their underwriting within six months from the date thereof,
- investment trusts management companies,
- securities companies transferring shares to securities savings,
- foreign investment institutions under the Foreign Exchange
Control Act (KF, KEF).
(Table 2.3) Interest, dividend income tax on minority share-
holders or minority corporate bondholders
Real name
Income tax
	 10%
Education tax
	
5
Defence tax
	
1(2)
Residents' tax
	
0.75
Street name
20%
5
2(4)
1.5
Total	 16.75(l7.75)%	 28.5(30.5)%
(Note) Figures in parenthesis indicate the case where interest,
dividend income taxes go over 8.4million won.
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2.2 • 3 Shareownership.
The KSE publishes the shareownership biannually on the
record book basis by type of investors and size of shareholdings.
During the last three years, the number of individual investors
increased over six times to 8.51 million, or about 20% of the
total population, at the end of 1988. The number of shares held
by individual investors increased to 71.8% of total listed
shares from 52.49% in 1985. This sharp gain was mainly due to
the increase in new listings, public offerings of government-
owned enterprises, and employee share owner scheme.
(Table 2.4) Percentage of ownership by shareholders
	1985 	 1986	 1987	 1988
a.Government & Gov't owned corp. 	 0.42	 0.16	 0.12	 1.39
b.Banking institutions	 7.10	 7.41	 6.00	 6.89
c.Securities companies	 7.35	 6.72	 2.63	 3.14
d.Insurance companies & others	 30.01	 30.27	 25.59	 14.14
e.Foreigners	 2.63	 3.01	 3.31	 2.65
f.Individuals	 52.49	 52.43	 62.35	 71.79
Total	 100.00	 100.00	 100.00	 100.00
(Source) KSE 1989.
2.3 Disclosure system.
Corporate disclosure provides the general public investors
with complete and precise information on the relevant company's
business performance and financial conditions to let them make
the right investment dicisions. It enables fair price formation
through the rationalisation of investment decision-making by
providing proper information to the investors. In order for the
disclosure system to function efficiently disclosure materials
should be complete and precise, up-to-date, and easy for the
investors to use. And for it to be easy to use they should be
easily accessible to them and easy to understand. Also they must
be widely dispersed (KSDA 1988).
27
According to the Securities and Exchange Law, the required
disclosure materials are registration statements and prospectus
in the new issues market, and the annual report, semi-annual
report, and non-periodic report (when necessary) in the trading
market.
2.3.1 Disclosure in the New Issues Market.
The registration statement and the prospectus are important
basic means of disclosure in the new issues market. The
registration statement which is submitted to the SEC includes a
wide spectrum of indispensable information about a company
wishing to make a public offering, for example, the outlook for
the company, description of the public offering, proposed use of
the funds raised, CPA'S audit opinion, and other matters related
to financial statements. The prospectus, which is provided to
the public, is designed to prevent securities brokers and dealers
from the fraudulent practice of selling shares by giving
investors faulty information.
2.3.2 Disclosure in the Trading Market.
The continuous disclosure in the trading market provides the
public with information about corporate action or development
affecting share price, investment decision, or other matters of
significant interest to shareholders. It is indispensable for
the protection of investors and enables the Exchange to
efficiently perform its function of maintaining a fair and
orderly market.
(1) Periodic Reports.
In accordance with the Securities and Exchange Law, a listed
company shall submit to the Exchange and the SEC an annual report
within 90 days following the close of the business year and a
semiannual report within 45 days following the first half of the
business year. These reports include the general condition and a
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brief history of the company, business conditions, and financial
statements with a CPA audit opinion. The Exchange must keep and
make all such reports available to the public for a period of two
years.
(2) Contingent Disclosures.
Contingent disclosures can be classified into three
categories, direct disclosure, indirect disclosure, and
disclosure by inquiry.
A direct disclosure means that a listed company provides
corporate information directly to the investing public through
the broadcasting facilities for the dissemination of market
information. In this method, the Exchange may tape-record the
details of information given to the Exchange by telephone and
announce them on behalf of the company.
An indirect disclosure is the dissemination of reported
information through the means of the daily official list or the
Market Information Service System. This information can be
reported to the Exchange either by telephone or in writing.
A disclosure by inquiry results when news or rumors about a
listed company cause or might cause unusual market activity or a
substantial price change in the securities concerned. In such
cases, The Exchange request the company concerned to provide de
facto information about the news or rumor.
2.4 The development of the Korean securities market.
The Korean securities market has matured and expanded
Considerably over the past several years. Among the major driving
forces have been the excellent performance of the Korean economy
and the expected internationalisation of the securities market.
As a result, a growing number of international investors view it
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as one of the most attractive markets around the world.
The Korea Stock Exchange was established in 1956, but
initially it was mainly a market for government bonds, rather
than for corporate stocks. However, the Securities and Exchange
Law was enacted in 1962 and the Korea Stock Exchange was
reorganised as a corporation because the government sought to
foster trading in corporate shares and bonds. Since then the
government has taken a number of policy measures to develop the
capital market. This effort was aimed at expanding corporate
financing through the capital market and at providing high
quality corporate securities to investors.
In spite of these policy measures, the development of the
securities market in the past has lagged behind the country's
rapid economic development. The reasons for this lethargy include
a) poor corporate performance during the economic recession
following the second oil shock,
b) the volatility of stock prices, and
c) the fact that other financial assets and property investment
have been more attractive as a result of the deregulation of the
financial institutions and the high inflation until 1983. In
1983, the government released 'Measures for the Reinforcement of
Capital Market Function'. This was intended to revitalise the
market which had down-trended since 1979. Since then, public
offerings, in addition to secondary offering by listed companies,
have shown increasing strength. Helped by high economic growth
and measures to encourage corporations going public, the number
and market value of listed companies have increased rapidly since
1983.
Virmani(l985) examined the pattern of the proportion of
stocks issued and held by corporations from 1975-82. The former
was 75% and 79% at the two end points while the latter was 17% at
both points. The proportions of stocks held by individuals a1s
shows similar patterns, but increased from 58% in 1975 to 63% in
1982. However, the importance of stocks in the individual
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portfolio declined from 25% of total assets in 1975 to 16% in
1982.
However, huge increases in the demand from individual and
institutional investors and the supply of new shares during past
several years have led to a substantial increase in market
capitalisation. The number of listed companies increased from 48
in 1970, to 502 in 1988 and the total market value as a
percentage of GNP was 9.0% in 1985; it increased to 26.3% in 1987
and 57.8% in 1988.
One hundred and thirteen firms went to the public in 1988,
raising aggregate funds of W1,049bn. Total funds of W7,770bn
were raised through new issues, including rights offerings in
1988. This was over four times the amount raised in 1987. The
privatisation plan, which included the Pohang Steel & Iron
Company (Posco), contributed a huge increase in funds through the
stock market. The Korea Electric Power Corporation (Kepco),
floated in June 1989, advanced the total market value further.
By the end of August 1989, the Korean stovk market
capitalisation amounted to 94 trillion won or US$ 141 billion,
and a total of 567 firms were listed on the KSE. The ivarkt has
already joined in the world's ten largest markets, and seems
destined to become the second largest market in Asia, in terms of
market cap italisation.
The total amount of public and corporate bonds listed on the
Korea Stock Exchange increased sharply from W26.7bn in 1970 to
W2,5447bn in 1980 and reached W33,680bn at the end of 1988.
Trading value increased from W890bn in 1980 to W8,545bn in 1988.
However, the private sector suffered considerable difficulties in
raising funds through the issuance of corporate bonds from 1987,
due to the massive flotation of government bonds to absorb excess
liquidity. The overloaded underwriting of Monetary Stabilisation
Bonds by non-bank financial institutions, which are major
corporate bond buyers, reduced their capacity to underwrite
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corporate debt securities in the capital market.
(Table 2.5) Corporate funds raised through securities market
(in mil.won)
Year	 Stocks	 Corporate bonds	 Total
New Outstand Of fering
1976	 40.559	 33,445	 101,941	 86,280	 262,225
1978	 23,777	 17,744	 285,201	 326,340	 653,062
1980	 345	 -	 170,803	 963,700	 1,134,848
1981	 3,045	 -	 302,996	 1,036,148	 1,342,189
1982	 -	 -	 274,242	 2,093,186	 2,367,429
1983	 20,800	 1,000	 431,769	 1,426,524	 1,889,093
1984	 81,190	 200	 397,672	 1,804,063	 2,283,125
1985	 33,860	 1,200	 259,528	 3,176,744	 3,471,332
1986	 33,360	 9,700	 797,705	 2,728,871	 3,569,636
1987	 197,714	 46,049	 1,654,950	 3,189,617	 5,088,330
1988	 554,115	 495,316	 6,720,644	 4,244,320	 12,014,395
	
1989 July 527,149	 1,402,876	 6,634,883	 3,831,640	 12,396,548
(Note)
New: Public offerings of new securities before listing.
Outstand: Public offerings of outstand securities before listing.
Of fering: Offerings by listed companies.
(Source) KSE, Yearbook, various issues.
Reflecting the active securities market during several
years, the securities industry has enjoyed exceptional
profitability and capital growth, and witnessed significant
deregulation. Due to the amendment of the SEL in November 1987,
25 investment management companies were established during 1988.
By the end of September 1989 the number of branch offices of the
securities firms had increased to 601 from 231 in 1983, and
manpower had grown up to 19,280 from 4,816 in 1980. Under such
favorable conditions, fiscal year 1988 (the end of March 1989)
saw total profits for 25 member firms climbed to over 1.96
trillion won, increasing 78.3% over the year before(KSE 1989).
Against such stunning growth, non-resident investors or
securities houses have been eager to participate in the locaj
bourse, but with no winning causes. However, under the new plan
of securities market internationalisation which was announced in
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December 1988, foreign securities houses will be authoriseci to
establish branch offices in Korea, or to set up brokerage houses
jointly with Korean entities in 1991. Starting in 1991, proceeds
from the sale of underlying shares of Korean overseas convertible
bonds can be used to purchase domestic shares. Then in 1992,
foreign investors will be allowed to invest directly in Korean
securities on a limited basis.
(Table 2.6) Key statistics of Korea Stock Exchange, 1963-89
Year	 NC	 NSH	 MV	 %GNP	 Turnover	 Index
1963	 15	 15	 10	
-	 259	 -
1965	 17	 15	 15	 -	 165	 -
1970	 48	 76	 98	 3.6	 46	 -
1975	 189	 291	 916	 9.1	 48	 89.73
1978	 356	 963	 2,893	 12.1	 66	 144.86
1980	 352	 753	 2,527	 6.9	 44	 106.87
1981	 343	 696	 2,959	 6.6	 86	 131.37
1982	 334	 682	 3,300	 6.5	 66	 127.71
1983	 328	 708	 3,490	 5.9	 54	 121.11
1984	 336	 723	 5,148	 7.8	 74	 142.46
1985	 342	 772	 5,570	 9.0	 66	 163.37
1986	 355	 1,411	 11,995	 13.2	 107	 272.61
1987	 389	 3,102	 26,172	 26.3	 105	 525.11
1988	 502	 8,541	 64,544	 57.8	 124	 907.20
1989 July547	 -	 70,804	 65.7*	 126*	 895.66
(Notes)
NC: Number of listed companies.
NSH: Number of shareholders (l,000s).
MV: Total market value (billion won).
%GNP: Total market value as a percentage of GNP.
Turnover: Turnover as percentage of market value.
Index: Korea Composite Stock Price Index (4th Jan. 1980=100).
*: Annualised ratios.
(Table 2.7) Key statistics for listed bonds (* in million won)
Year	 No	 Listed Amount* Sales .Volume* Sales-Value*
1968	 6	 740	 32	 26
1970	 35	 26,714	 4,216	 3,579
1975	 344	 220,033	 16,658	 13,518
1980	 1,234	 2,544,669	 910,701	 889,876
1985	 3,728	 12,001,032	 3,778,913	 3,578,092
1986	 4,408	 17,112,567	 3,221,722	 3,166,853
1987	 5,167	 25,006,704	 7,595,466	 7,238,335
1988	 5,089	 33,680,051	 8,994,110	 8,545,305
1989 July 5,399
	
41,299,074	 3,360,316	 3,212,288
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2.5 internationalisation of the capital market.
The Korean capital market is undergoing a process of
expansion, liberalisation and internationalisation. A formal
liberalisation plan of the Korean capital market was started in
1981. In January 1981, the Korean Government announced its
Capital Market Liberalisation Plan, which specified four stages
of gradual movement toward full integration of the domestic and
international capital market. However, the economic environment
surrounding Korea has changed substantially. In December 1988,
therefore, the government unveiled its revised plan for
liberalising the capital market.
The original purpose of Korea's revised liberalisation plan
was to open the capital market gradually to international
investors, specifically designed for its economic conditions, and
to avoid any kind of rapid opening which would completely expose
a vulnerable, immature and fragile securities market. This case
was observed in the Southern Cone countries of Latin America
(Uruguay, Chile and Argentina).
Up to 1985, Korea experienced chronic deficits in its balance
of trade account. When the capital market liberalisation was
announced, Korea was experiencing an extraordinarily high current
account deficit, almost entirely financed by reliance on
borrowing from foreign banks. However, supported by three
consecutive surplus years from 1986, Korea no longer needed to
open capital markets radically in order to induce foreign capital
inflow. Moreover, high domestic interest rates and continuing
currency appreciation facilitated the capital influx from abroad,
fuelling fears of inflation. These lessons were learned over
several years and induced the government to revise the original
plan (Daewoo 1989b, Koh and Res 1989).
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2.5.1 The original plan in 1981.
(1) stage 1 (1981-84): Preparatory phase
International investors were allowed to invest indirectly in
Korean Securities, such as a closed-end fund and domestically
managed unit trusts. In addition, foreign securities houses
were given the licences to set up representative offices in Korea
and domestic securities houses were encouraged to implement
reciprocal advancements in the major international financial
centres. For the upcoming market opening, the groundwork has
already been established by the legal framework, personnel
training and cornputerised trading system.
(2) Stage 2 (from 1985): Limited liberalisation
The limited allowance of direct portfolio investment by
international investors and the issuance and listing of Korean
securities in international capital markets.
(3) stage 3 (late 1980s): Further liberalisation
The relaxation of limits on direct foreign investment in
domestic securities allowed domestic corporations to raise equity
funds in external markets with the prior approval of the Ministry
of Finance. It also permitted foreign securities houses to
conduct capital market business in Korea, and domestic securities
houses to conduct overseas business.
(4) stage 4 (early 1990s): Complete liberalisation
This stage will implement the full liberalisation of the
Korean capital market by allowing Korean investors to invest in
international capital markets and by permitting international
securities to be listed in the Korea stock Exchange.
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2.5.2 Recent progress.
In line with capital market liberalisation, foreign trade
and foreign exchange transactions have been substantially
liberalised to make the economy more competitive. As McKinnon
and Shaw suggest, financial liberalisation could produce the
optimal result of inaximising investment and raising the average
efficiency of capital investment (Koh and Res 1989).
(Table 2.8) Progress in capital market internationalisation
Year Month	 Remarks	 Amount(US$mil.)
1981 November Korea International Trust
	 25
Korea Trust	 25
1984 May	 Korea Fund	 60
1985 March	 Korea Growth Trust	 30
April	 Seoul International Trust	 30
Seoul Trust	 30
December Korea Small Companies Trust	 2
Samsung Electronics CB issued 	 20
1986 March	 Korea Emerging Companies Trust 	 3
May	 Daewoo Heavy Industry CB issued 	 40
June	 Korea Fund capital base increased 	 40
July	 Yukong CB issued	 30
1987 March	 Korea Europe Fund	 30
August	 Gold Star CB issued	 30
1988 June
	
Korea Europe Fund capital base increased 	 30
October	 Saehan Media CB issued	 30
1989 August	 Korea Fund capital base increased 	 60
October	 Sammi Steel BW issued	 50
1989 December Suhtong CB expected	 30
1990 January	 Dong-Ah Construction Industial CB expected 50
Total	 645
(Source) Ministry of Finance, Dongsuh Securities.
Permitting foreign portfolio investment in Korea was
expected to boost the demand for domestic securities, which had
remained sluggish during 1979-80.
Since the liberalisatiOn plan was set forth, seven
investment trusts, two closed-end funds, six convertible bonds,
arid one bond with warrant issue were launched. The seven
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investment trusts are managed by domestic investment trust
companies, but the size of the trust cannot be increased without
approval from the government. The closed-end funds (Korea Fund
and Korea Europe Fund) are listed on the New York and London
Stock Exchanges respectively. The Korea fund is managed by
Scudder, Stevens and Clark and the Korea Europe Fund is managed
by Korea Schroder Fund Management Ltd. All the Korean issues
have been very successful and they are now traded with large
premiums. It reflects the combined effect of the increasing
interest of foreign investors in the Korean market at present,
the higher expected profits of Korean companies in the future, as
well as an expectation that the market will remain closed to
foreign direct portfolio investment for a considerable period.
(Table 2.8) Investment in Korean securities from abroad
* (US$ni)
International trust funds (7)	 145
Korea Fund	 160
Korea Europe Fund	 60
CBS issued / expected abroad(7) 	 220
BW issued abroad(l)	 50
Total	 645
*Value of the initial offerings.
Source: Ministry of Finance
The methods of fund raising became increasingly diverse in
the domestic capital market. In addition, domestic corporations
were able to carry out mobile financing in the international
capital market. By the end of Sept. 1989, five convertible bonds
had been floated on the Euroinarket and were traded actively with
high premiums of 30 - 115%. The first equity warrant issue in
the international market was issued in October 1989 by Samini
Steel Corporation Ltd., with Dongsuh Securities Co Ltd. and
Merril Lynch acting as lead managers.
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(Table 2.10) Performance of Funds, Trusts, and CBS
NAV(US$) or CB price
	 %Change
31 August 1989 1 month 6 month 12 month Since issue
Korea Fund	 19.22	 16.7	 11.6	 57.8	 416.7(08/84)
Korea Europe Fund 27.56	 15.6	 10.3	 58.4	 165.0(04/87)
Korea Int'l Trust 66.37	 13.0	 9.0	 60.0	 709.9(11/81)
Korea Trust	 79.91	 12.3	 12.7	 69.6	 571.2(11/81)
Korea Growth Trust 46.27	 12.7	 12.9	 55.0	 406.6(03/85)
Seoul Int'l Trust 46.34	 9.5	 10.7	 56.8	 398.3(04/85)
Seoul Trust	 44.83	 7.2	 3.2	 56.4	 253.3(04/85)
Sarnsung Elec. CB	 970%	 15.5	 74.8	 203.1	 870(12/85)
Yukong CB	 350%	 15.7	 48.9	 118.8	 250(07/86)
Daewoo H.I. CB	 665%	 35.0	 72.7	 189.1	 565(05/86)
Goldstar CB	 195%	 17.1	 19.6	 85.7	 95(09/87)
Saehan Media CB	 185%	 23.3	 42.9	 -	 85(09/88)
KCSPI	 975.28p	 8.9	 6.3	 46.8
(Notes)
Adjusted to show % change in US dollars.
NAy : Net asset value.
CB price: All percentage growth rates are based on mid prices.
(Source) Daewoo Sept.1989
2.5.3 The revised plan in 1988.
The government revised the original plan of 1981 and stated
that by 1992 the domestic capital market would expand and be
mature enough to take on a massive inflow of foreign capital on a
limited basis. Before opening the market in the target year
1992, all the necessary preconditions for the capital market
liberal jsatjon could be met. The timetable for liberalisation is
as follows.
(1) Preparation for the eventual international market opening
(1989)
- Increase the number of listed companies in both the Korea Stock
Exchange and over-the-counter, promote the role of institutional
investors, and induce new investors from all strata of the
society.
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- Deregulate the securities industry and strengthen the role of
the Securities Supervisory Board.
- Diversify indirect investment vehicles and expand the size of
existing funds and trusts.
- Ease domestic firms' eligibility requirements for issuing
overseas securities and allow firms to use the proceeds
domestically
- Increase the maximum equity stakes of foreigners in domestic
securities companies.
(2) Preparation for the eventual international market opening
(1990).
- Continue to expand and develop the domestic securities market.
- Establish the so-called matching Fund, to be invested in both
foreign and domestic securities and to be sold to both domestic
and overseas investors.
- Allow Korean convertible bond holders to convert, sell, and
invest the bonds in the domestic securities market.
- Allow foreign brokers to upgrade the status of their
representative offices to branches and set up j9int-ventured
securities houses.
(3) The second year (1992).
- Allow foreigners to invest with capital other than the proceeds
from the sales of converted equity.
- Increase the number of domestic brokers participating in
international securities business.
- Allow individual domestic investors to purchase overseas
securities on a limited basis.
To make Korean equities more acceptable to the international
investors, they should be more acceptable domestically. Measures
which Korea ought to consider now to strengthen the domestic
capital market to facilitate greater foreign and domestic
portfolio investment include :
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a) Issue price should be determined by the level and quality of
earnings, not by par value. Since par value reference pricing has
no economic significance, the government should discourage it
(World Bank 1988). Even though issue-at-market price system was
introduced in the Korean stock market recently, the discount rate
is relatively high. Around 95% of the market price is
recommendable. Dividend should be determined flexibly on the
basis of corporate profits and investment needs.
b) For the preparation of opening the market, the overall size of
the market should be expanded and domestic demand should be
enhanced. The possibility of market volitility trend from large
capital flows should be reduced. For this purpose, more blue chip
shares should be listed. On the demand side, regulations
preventing domestic institutional investors from investing in
equities should be relaxed. The percentage of institutional
investor such as pension funds, insurance companies and
investment trust companies in Korea is low at under 30% in 1988.
Public education as to the role and advantages of securities can
also be useful in enhancing demand.
c) The securities industry should be released from the govern-
ment's interventions, and fair and rational trading rules should
be strengthened. Additional regulatory measures are necessary in
more standardised accounting practices, more competitive
underwriting procedures, and stronger investor protection
measures.
d) To alleviate the bias against equity further government
efforts are needed to promote the use of non-guaranteed bonds.
The use of credit ratings should also be promoted so as to bring
about more efficient pricing relative to risk and increasing
corporate financial discipline.
2.6 Conclusion.
It is worth emphasising here that the risks associated with
lifting restrictions on capital movements in and out of Korea in
40
order to facilitate foreign portfolio investment can be
increased. Thus complete or immediate liberalisation of capital
market will not be necessary to attract greater amounts of equity
inflows. Partial and selective liberalisation should suffice.
Moreover, the liberalisation plan of the Korean capital market
has to be balanced with the overall economic liberaljsatjon
policy, including trade and foreign exchange. As for general
financial deregulation, entry of new financial intermediaries
should be gradual and interest rates for loans could be freed
immediately. Many economists would agree that the capital market
should not be opened until current account transactions and
domestic financial markets are deregulated (Park 1987). Emphasis
and concern is also placed on the difference in the speed of
adjustment in the asset and commodity markets.
Portfolio investments are flexible and portfolio decisions
can be easily changed, whereas because of time lags, the
structure of production, investment and trade adjusts slowly
to new arrangements. If the capital market is opened first,
therefore, portfolio decisions are likely to be consistent with
the undistorted condition in the long-run, whereas, because of
trade restrictions, real investment decisions will be distorted.
In addition, the allocation of windfalls from the liberalisation
of the capital market has to be borne in mind.
Due to the considerable increase of share prices in the
process of capital market liberalisation, portfolio investors
receive disproportionate benefits and only eligible companies of
overseas fund raising have the opportunities to finance at the
cheaper rate than the domestic financing. It is desirable,
as Mah].er(].988) suggested, to introduce capital gains tax on
securities transactions gradually to parallel income distribution
nationwide, and the opportunities of financing in the
international financial market have to be expanded to additional
Corporations. The risk of losing control over domestic assets
through foreigners' portfolio investment can be removed by
restricting such investment to a class of non-voting shares or by
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imposing percentage ceilings by listed company or industry.
In summary, a major theme of this chapter has been that
internatioflalisation plan of the Korean capital market should be
gradual and balanced with general economic conditions. Several
measures were recommended to enhance the functions of domestic
securities market. In this way Korea would take a positive step
towards the model of capital market liberalisation.
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Chapter III. COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT
AND LIBERALISATION IN THE FAR EAST.
3.1 The changing world capital markets.
The world capital market has been transformed in important
ways due to a sharp acceleration in the pace of innovation,
deregulation and structural changes in recent years. Major new
financial instruments which are mostly taking the form of of f-
balance-sheet commitments have either been created or have
dramatically increased their role in the financial structure.
Traditional demarcation between different financial institutions
are steadily being eroded and in the process, the financial
systems are becoming less structured. Financial institutions are
broadening the range of services offered and a trend towards the
concept of financial conglomerates is emerging. International
credit flows have shifted away from loans through large
international financial institutions into direct credit markets.
The volume of daily transactions has multiplied. Capital markets
have become far more closely integrated worldwide(BIS 1986,
Becketti and Sellon 1989).
3.1.1 Deregulation and liberalisation.
Financial deregulation or liberalisation includes both
external and internal liberalisation. External liberalisation
generally entails opening up domestic financial markets to
international financial flows, removing exchange controls,
eliminating barriers to the entry of foreign financial
institutions, and so on. Internal financial liberalisation refers
to the reforms leading to a freer functioning of the domestic
credit controls relating to credit rationing, interest rate
ceilings, and differenciated reserve requirements. Also the
elimination of discriminating practices and capital requirements
that drastically curtail the free entry of local participants
into the domestic market is included (Blejer and Sagan 1988).
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The deregulation or liberalisation in financial markets
around the world has been advanced on an unprecedented scale.
Financial institutions and market structures have been reshaped
to lower the cost of serving customer demands for financial
services. And product lines of traditionally heterogeneous
financial institutions are rapidly fusing into a homogeneous
blend. New regulatory policies have been introduced gradually in
order to allow the various sectors of the financial system
sufficient time to adjust to the new financial market environment
as well as to changing macroeconomic conditions.
The result of financial deregulation was the weakening in
the competitive position of regulated financial institutions
relative to unregulated financial institutions and direct
financiers. This led simultaneously to a reduction in the ability
of the monetary authorities to control the growth of total
financing and a growing perception amongst regulated institutions
that the costs of regulated status outweighed the benefits. The
speed and spread of financial deregulation and liberalisation has
been different from country to country due to the differences in
the old statutory framework.
The relaxation of financial regulations from the standpoint
of legislation continues; movements within the scope of
regulations on the part of the banks into different areas of
business and aggressive moves into banking from other fields of
business have become apparent, and there has been a trend towards
homogeneity of the banks, securities houses, insurance companies,
retailers etc. as well as towards an ever-expanding grey area.
3.1.2 Securitisation.
The securitisation of the liabilities of households and
business is spreading very rapidly. The selling of whole loans
and participations dates back to before the l880s, but
securit j sation is a recent innovation in asset sales (Pavel
1986, 1989). It involves the direct issuance of securities or the
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packaging of 'conventional' loans by banks and other
intermediaries for sale to the market in the form of some kind of
a pass-through or other security. Like whole loan sales,
securitisation provides an additional funding source and may
eliminate assets from a loan orginators balance sheet. Unlike
whole loan sales, however, securitisation is often used to market
small loans that would be difficult to sell on a stand-alone
basis.
Since the debt crisis, international finance has been
transformed in a number of fundermental respects. Markets for
syndicated bank loans and international bonds have become
increasingly segmented for developed and developing country
borrowers, reflecting differences in their creditworthiness.
International bond markets have grown in stature relative to the
syndicated loan market as commercial banks slowed their
international lending to reduce concentrations of credits, and
industrialised country borrowers increasingly turned to bond
finance. Increased uncertainty and volatility in the current
economic environment and stiff competition in international
finance have encouraged the development of instruments that are
more liquid and flexible than traditional bank loans and whose
price is more stable than fixed-rate bond issues.
As a result, international financial markets have become
increasingly 'securitised' in the 1980s, in that a much wider
array of readily marketable instruments is now available and
being utilised. The sector experiencing the most rapid growth
has been Eurodollar floating-rate notes (FRNs) (Bank of England
1987). Floating-rate notes have been able to satisfy certain
needs of both lenders and borrowers during periods of high and
variable interest rates, unstable macroeconomic conditions, and
uncertainty about the future trends in interest rates and
inflation. Note Issuance Facilities and other backup credit
facilities have also been developed to attempt to combine some of
the charracterjstjcs of the traditional syndicated loan with
those of a floating rate note. Also the topic on debt-equity
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swaps is still actively discussed (Blackwell and Nocera 1988,
Helpman 1988, and Ramachandran 1988). However, after the market
crash in October 1987, the speed and spread of securitisation is
diminishing.
Domestically, securitisation is most fully developed in the
USA. It is a means to obtain finance at a lower cost, given the
downgrading of their own securities by the rating agencies. It
can also be seen as a response to tougher capital requirements on
the part of supervisors. The depth of securities markets in the
USA is also an important factor. In the absence of one or more of
these factors in domestic markets elsewhere-particularly a lack
of depth of securities markets - the trend towards securitisation
has been weaker. Also the commercial paper market has played a
major role in the process of securitisation in the USA.
Commercial paper markets are being established in other
countries, including UK, West Germany, France, Netherlands and
Japan. Internationally the trend toward securitisation is being
enhanced by the growth of the Euro-Commercial paper market (Pavel
1986)
The convertible bond, warrant and zero-coupon bond are
recent and successful additions. Also several types of loan-
backed securities have been introduced. Pass-throughs, mortgage-
backed bonds, pay-through, certificates of automobile
receivables (CARs), certificates of amortising revolving debts
(CARDs) are also new types of securitisation of bank loans.
Growth has also been marked in the area of options, futures and
swaps on financial and stock market instruments (Ayling 1986
p.110). Securitisation largely entails disintermediation, and
requires services supplied by investment banks, such as placing
and underwriting.
Securitisation has already begun to change the financial
services industry. It has enhanced the flow of credit, changed
the way firms manage their portfolios, and increased the number
of firms that compete for commercial and retail customer
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financing.
3.1.3 GlobalisatiOn.
The generic term 'globalisation' is used to refer to the
expansion of money and capital market 'without borders' which has
become clearly apparent since the beginning of the 1980s. Money
and capital markets first expand as domestic markets, but as the
internationalisation of the real economy proceeds, with
increasing trade transactions and direct investment abroad,
portfolio investments abroad also gradually become active. The
factors behind promotion of globalisation are as follows
(Llywellyn 1985, Ayling 1986, BIS 1986, Nikko 1988).
a. Expanding international payments imbalance.
b. Pursuit of more favourable sources of funds and targets of
investment.
c. Worldwide financial deregulation and internationalisation.
d. Progress of financial innovation.
e. Multinational clients.
f. Development of technology.
g. Increasing user sophistication.
The large banks and other financial institutions are
expanding their business areas towards globalisation. This has
been aided by improved communications, and merger and acquisition
activities. Increasingly these institutions want to be able to
serve all types of financial business in and out of every market
place, at all times. The benefits of global services arise in
more efficient allocation of available funds through the improved
operation of the market mechanism, and increased liquidity for
asset holders. But in the developing countries the market
institutions are relatively new and inexperienced, cost is high
and capital resources are low. Hence these developments may have
had harmful effects on the financial institutions, investors, and
even on the real economy.
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3.2 Financial development in the Far East.
3.2.1 Finance and real growth.
Over the past two decades, the market economies of the Far
East have experienced rapid development, together with even more
rapid growth in international trade flows and economic
interdependence. The market economies of Japan, Hong Kong,
Taiwan and Korea over the past two decades exhibit three common
characteristics: rapid economic growth, spectacular expansion of
exports, and substantial increases in the rates of savings and
investment. Commensurate with this strong economic performance
has been the increasing role of domestic and foreign finance, and
the accelerated development of financial institutions, markets
and instruments.
The theoretical case for the role of financial
intermediation in economic development generally is well
understood. (Patrick 1966; Gurley and Shaw 1955, 1960, 1967;
Goldsmith 1969; Khat]thate 1972; Shaw 1973; McKinnon 1973; Galbis
1977; Gupta 1984; and Dornbusch and Reynoso 1989). For most of
the Far East Economies, financial development has been documented
through national case studies, and also to some extent by cross
cotrntry comparisons utilising pooled cross-section and time-
series data. (The studies include: for Korea, Cole and Park 1983;
for Japan, Otto 1961, and Patrick 1967, 1987; for Taiwan, Lee
1985; for cross-country studies, Fry 1978, 1985). Real economic
growth goes hand in hand with an increasing amount and diversity
of activity of financial institutions, markets, and instruments.
Deepening of the financial structure, as measured by increases in
ratios of different types of recorded financial assets to total
assets or GNP (table 3.1) is a common, but not universal
tendency, at least until high levels of income are achieved (Cole
and Patrick 1986).
48
Table (3.1) Trands of FIRS in the Far East, 1970-1988
	Japan 	 Hong Kong
	 Taiwan	 Korea
1970	 3.69	 1.14*	 2.15	 1.79
1975	 4.00	 1.62	 2.84	 1.44
1980	 4.77	 3.18	 3.29	 3.10
198].	 4.93	 3.84	 3.23	 2.64
1982	 5.11	 4.63	 3.52	 3.02
1983	 5.48	 5.37	 3.66	 3.82
1984	 5.50	 5.11	 3.72	 3.98
1985	 5.75	 5.97	 3.88	 4.26
1986	 6.00	 6.11	 4.02	 4.22
1987	 6.8].	 6.28	 4.31	 4.35
FIR: Financial Interrelation Ratio = Financial Asset Balance/GNP
in current prices.
*Figure in 1971.
(Sources)BOJ; ECONOMIC STATISTICS ANNUAL, various issues.
The Central BOC;; FLOW OF FUNDS IN TAIWAN DISTRICT, various
issues.
Hong Kong Government: HONG KONG MONTHLY DIGEST OF STATISTICS,
variouls issues.
BOK, ECONOMIC STATISTICS YEARBOOK, various issues.
3.2.2 Financial structure.
The main determinants of the size and structure of a
financial system are the level of economic development, and the
extent to which the system is relied upon to intermediate between
savers and investors (Gurley and Shaw 1967). The financial
systems of the Far East have been much shaped by history. Japan
has a relatively wide range of financial intermediation covering
the spectrum of risk and maturity of primary security issues.
General financial development in Japan is not radically
different from, and in many respects similar to, that in the
United States. However, despite Japan's growing importance in
the industrial world and in international trade, the financial
system remains highly regulated (Eken 1984; Suzuki 1986, 1987).
Features of the system include,
a) a predominance of indirect finance through the banking system
over direct finance,
b) controls on the quantity and distribution of credit and on
49
interest rates, which are generally below market clearing rates,
c) a high degree of specialisation among financial institutions
due to regulatory or market segmentation.
At the end of 1988, the Japanese financial system consisted
of the Central Bank, 87 member banks of the Federation of Bankers
Associations of Japan, 81 foreign banks, financial institutions
for small-business, financial institutions for agriculture,
forestry and fishery, 213 Securities finance institutions, 47
insurance companies, and public financial institutions (Bank of
Japan 1989).
Hong Kong follows the British model of serving as an
international financial centre, offering banking services to
neighbouring countries. Foreign banks are very important. The
banking sector in Hong Kong, as well as other financial services,
consequently, are highly developed and produce a relatively large
fraction of GDP for financial, real estate, and business services
combined. At the end of 1988 Hong Kong's financial system
consisted of the Exchange Fund, 131 commercial banks, 343
registered deposit-taking companies or finance companies, and 115
representative offices of foreign banks, as well as insurance
companies, money brokers, and commodity, gold, and stock
exchanges. There is no central Bank. Bank notes are issued by
two of the commercial banks. The commercial banking systems in
Japan and Hong Kong are predominantly privately-owned.
In Korea, financial institutions consist of the central
bank, banking institutions, non-bank financial institutions and
the securities market. Domestic and foreign commercial banks and
7 specialised banks compose the banking institutions. Non-bank
financial institutions are 3 development institutions, 38
investment companies, many savings institutions and insurance
companies. Direction and control of the financial system has had
a significant role in the Government's development strategy in
Korea. In the l960s credit and interest rate policy was merely
one among a host of tax, tariff, and import concessions to
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exporting industries. With the reduction and elimination of some
of these concessions in the 1970s, and the perceived need to
change the structure of the economy, the financial system began
by the mid-1970s, to have a much more central role in development
strategy.
The structure of Korean financial regulation has three
elements: the creation of new public and private financial
institutions with specified limitations on the type of
activities, the control of the level and structure of interest
rates, and the direct and indirect credit allocation policies.
This strong government intervention has been quite distortive in
terms of allocation of credit; high leverage of firms and poor
development of the equity market; high industrial concentration;
and slow development of the financial sector (Wijnbergen 1983,
Anderson 1983, Virmani 1985).
Table (3.2) indicates ratios and monetary and financial
aggregates. M2 ratio is highest in Hong Kong, lowest in Korea.
Japan has a relatively high currency ratio for a developed
country because individuals and small businesses typically use
cash rather than cheques as means of payment.
Securities comprise the largest part of total financial
claims in Japan. The Taiwanese and Korean governments have made
some efforts to develop capital markets, but the value of the
securities outstanding still remains well under 55% of the GNP.
Table (3.2) Ratios of monetary and financial aggregates for the
Far East, 1987(%)
Currency	 Ml	 M2	 M3	 Securities
Japan	 8.7	 30.8	 108.7	 172.2	 134.7
Hong Kong
	 8.0	 22.7	 187.9	 206.4	 123.1
Taiwan
	 9.2	 50.7	 135.1	 n.a.	 50.7
Korea	 50	 10.4	 41.3	 94.4	 52.4
(Notes)
a. The denominator is GNP for Japan, Taiwan and Korea, and GDP
for Hong Kong.
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b. Securities consists of the current market value of bonds and
shares.
(Sources)
BOJ, Economic Statistics Monthly, June 1988
BOK, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, July 1988
CBOC,FiflanCial Statistics Monthly, May 1988
CSD, Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, April 1988.
3.2.3 Financial reform and liberalisation.
The Far Eastern nations had informal, unregulated,
traditional, market-determined financial systems before western
penetration (Gurley, Patrick and Shaw 1965; Otto 1961; Patrick
1967). Governments issued coins and currency and engaged in some
regulation, but financial activities, which in some countries
came to be quite sophisticated, were predominantly outside
regulatory control. On to this 'traditional' sector were grafted
inodern' financial institutions, predominantly through
colonisation except for Japan (Emery 1984, Cole and Park 1983).
Government policies to strengthen national economies, tighten
regulation of the organised financial sector, and direct finance
toward particular development objectives have had profound
consequences for the structure and performance of the financial
system in each country. Government owned specialised
institutions and preferential allocation of cheap credit created
segmented financial markets and market niches, especially in
Korea and Taiwan (Tan and Kapur 1986).
In contrast, Hong Kong simply allowed easy entry in a
competitive, market-oriented system. The Japanese government
successfully created a privately owned commercial banking system
very early in its modern development by providing government
deposits and endorsing private banknote issues. One important
feature of the financial system has been the emergence of large,
family-owned financial and industrial conglomerates: Zaibatsu in
Japan, Chaebo]. in Korea, and ethnic Chinese family networks in
Hong Kong and Taiwan (Johnes and sakong 1980, Cole and Park 1983,
Yung 1985, Yoo and Lee 1987).
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The unregulated financial market is large and still plays an
important financing role in Korea and Taiwan, and in Japan to a
lesser extent. The relative importance of the unregulated sector
is greater the less developed the economy and the more repressed
the regulated banking and financial system. There is little data
available on the unregulated sector and it is difficult to obtain
the exact size of the market and prevailing interest rates (for
Korea, Cole and Sakong(1985) or Cole and Park(l983), and for
Taiwan, Kohsaka(1984), and for Japan, Patrick(1966). As economic
development has brought financial deepening and a build-up of
financial assets, distortions in the credit markets due to
excessive regulation have become more apparent (in Korea, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong). Various policies have been introduced to
overcome the regulatory obstacles through financial
liberalisation and, more recently, deregulation.
Financial liberalisation was implemented in the 1950s
(Taiwan) and 1960s(Korea), defined and given academic
respectability by McKinnon and Shaw in the early l970s, and taken
up as the new orthodoxy by the IMF and World Bank in the 197 Os
and early 1980s. The newly emerging economic strength of these
nations has given rise to a wide range of changes '
 in their
financial systems (Royama 1985; Suzuki 1986). After the oil
shocks, the general economy in the Far East shifted to lower
growth. In the course of economic development, the old statutory
financial framework was no longer suitable for the changed
international environment. The new economic realities require
deregulation, following the US and UK example, and financial
structure in these countries has been shifting to liberalisation
of interest rates and foreign exchange.
This policy shift has blurred the boundaries of
institutional specialisation, narrowed the spreads between
interest rates of regulated and unregulated markets and led to
greater integration of previously segmented markets. It has
also led to greater competitiveness among financial institutions
and in some cases to higher risk of insolvency for individual
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institutions (Suzuki 1986, and BIS 1986).
3.3.2 CharacteristiCs of the capital markets in the Par East.
Along with rapid economic development and the liberalisation
of domestic financial systems, capital markets in the Far East
have undergone substantial changes. Capital markets in Japan
and Hong Kong are viable and active, and suffer little official
intervention. On the other hand, the still infant markets in
Taiwan and Korea have been influenced by their governments in
terms of prices and quantities of stocks, bonds and foreign
exchange (Koh and Res 1989).
The evolution of the stock, bond, and short-term money
markets in the Far East since the beginning of the 1970s are
briefly compared in two interrelated directions:
a) to obtain aggregate estimates of net securities issues,
govenment and private, in absolute amounts and relative to real
variables, such as gross domestic investment and GNP;
b) to obtain evidence on the size and functioi)s of capital
markets, particularly the amount of new issues, also absolutely
and relatively.
A brief description of the evolution of the foreign exchange
market is also included.
3.3.1 Securities markets.
Securities markets in the Far East exhibit different
performances and different stages of development according to
economic strength, government policies, and historical
background. In the Japanese financial structure of the high
growth period that favoured indirect finance, the securities
market had a tendency to be underdeveloped. But after 1975, the
securities market grew extremely rapidly under the influence of
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the large-scale flotations of Government bonds and
internatioflalisatiOn. To date Hong Kong has remained attractive
as a financial centre for foreigners owing to the laissez-faire
attitude of the government, which allows complete freedom of
funds into and out of the city, imposes no exchange controls, and
operates a simple, low tax system.
In Taiwan and Korea, the business of raising capital through
bond and share issues, and subsequently trading the securities so
created is growing fast but is still immature. Distortions and
unfair practices owing to inadequacies of transport,
communications and information are being fast eroded. The
introduction of sophisticated electronic data-processing is
narrowing areas of informational monopoly. There remains an
irreducible core of knowledge concerning financial transactors
based upon personal judgeinents of character and ability (Wai and
Patrick 1973, Kindleberger 1987).
A securities market requires three basic components: private
and public enterprises to issue securities; parties to subscribe
to the issues; and parties to trade confidently in the securities
created, so conferring on long-term financial instruments, bonds
and equities, the precious characteristics of liquidity. The
largely adequate demand for securities in the Far East where
economic and financial development has progressed beyond
rudimentary stages, stems from speculative interest and the
unsatisfied portfolio needs of certain financial institutions.
Demand for securities by pension and superannuation funds, life
insurance companies, unit trusts and similar financial
institutions is substantial and growing rapidly.
But the main obstacle to large-scale and rapid development
of securities markets in Taiwan and Korea is the chronic
deficiency in the supply of securities arising from the size and
forms of business organisations prevalent there. Local
enterprises, regardless of size and industry category, are
generally run by individuals, families or cohesive social groups;
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the corporation is not a favoured business form. Owners and
managers often have little need or desire to raise share capital
locally. First, bank credit has often been easy to obtain and
access to foreign-capital markets readily available for large
corporations. Second, debt finance has been the main vehicle to
fund growth and as a result many owners and managers in Taiwan
and Korea are not inclined to raise equity capital through local
securities markets. However, they may be obliged to issue shares
locally, in harmony with government policy to increase domestic
capital formation and to raise the share of local ownership
(Tsiang 1985, Tsai 1987, and Nam 1988).
The relative size of new securities issues and trading value
In the Far East can be appraised not only in intercountry
comparisons but also by comparison with the situation in
developed and developing countries. The total supply of
securities issues for both government and private sectors varies
among countries themselves in relation to GDP. Total market
values of securities in Taiwan and Korea are only 50.7%, 52.4%
of GNP respectively in 1987.
Table (3.3) Supply of new issues of securities -selected ratios
(1987, %)
Country	 M/Y	 NE/Y	 MB/Y	 *M/Y	 I/Y	 S/Y
Japan	 134.7	 100.2	 34.5	 4.2	 24.2	 28.1
Hong Kong 123.1
	 116.5	 6.6	 14.3	 21.5	 30.1
Taiwan	 50.7	 44.8	 5.9	 1.9	 19.6	 38.8
Korea	 52.4	 26.8	 25.6	 5.2	 37.2	 36.7
(Notes)
M: Total market value of equities and bonds oiutstanding
*M: New issues of equities and corporate bonds, excluding free
share distributions.
ME: Market value of equities.
14B: Listed bonds of outstanding
Y: GNP, but GDP for Hong Kong.
I: Total investment.
S: Savings.
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3.3.1.1 Bond market
The issuance of bonds, commercial paper and notes is an
activity related closely to loan syndication. The financial
institutions can meet the borrowers' demands for funds either by
lending from their own resources or by raising money from the
public on an ad hoc basis, on behalf of the borrowers. These two
related segments of the market - bonds and loans - complement and
often compete against each other. This, in turn, encourages the
development of innovative hybrid instruments and provides
flexible alternatives to satisfy the different needs of
disparate borrowers.
A bond can be issued either by a corporate borrower,
including a multi-national or a financial institution, for its
own internal funding or it can be issued by a sovereign borrower
to finance budgetary or balance of payment deficits. It can be
isssued by a government or a corporation either in the domestic
or overseas market.
The bond market in Japan has expanded rapidly during the
past decade in the domestic and overseas markets. The rapid
increase in government bond issues in the domestic market and
corporate bond issues in the overseas markets are major factors
contributing to the expansion of the market in terms of the
volume of issues and transactions. However, bond markets in
Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong are still substantially underdeve-
loped in terms of size, depth and scope compared with banking
loans and other financial instruments. The bond markets are
virtually nonexistent with the exception of government-guaranteed
bonds and bank-secured corporate bonds in Korea and Taiwan.
However, the governments of these countries have maintained low
yields on such bonds. They promoted sales of these bonds to the
market by imposing statutory holding requirements for banks,
insurance companies and pension funds.	 This resulted in an
inactive secondary market for government bonds.
57
Nevertheless, Korea and Taiwan are beginning to develop
bond markets to meet the need to finance rapidly growing business
activities and continuing investment by state and public
enterprises. Their bond markets are therefore expected to expand
at an accelerating pace over the next decade.
3.3.1.2 Equity market.
The equity market developments in the Far East span a
variety of markets exhibiting different performances and
different degrees of official involvement. The viable, active
and larger markets in Japan and Hong Kong involved less official
intervention. On the other hand, in Korea and Taiwan, governments
promote and influence the markets in various ways (Koh and Res
1989).
(Table 3.4) Stock Exchanges: features(1987)
Japan* Hong Kong Taiwan 	 Korea
1. No. 1)Domestic	 1,912	 276	 141	 389
2)Foreign	 52	 n.a.	 -	 -
2. Market Value.
l)Stocks	 2,288,771	 54,074	 48,549	 26,172
2)Bonds	 853,450	 3,070	 6,394	 25,007
3. Trading value.
l)Stocks	 1,960,997	 47,862	 93,472	 20,494
2)Bonds	 992,755	 66	 7,748	 7,238
4. Turnover Ratio
	 94.0	 83.9	 184.2	 54.2
5. Members	 118	 85	 28	 25
6. Restrictions	 Medium	 Low	 High	 High
(Notes)
1. No.: Number of listed companies.
2. Market Value: Total market value (US$ Mil.).
3. Trading Value: US$ Nil.
4. Turnover Ratio: percentage of trading value by market value.
5. Members: Number of member firms.
6. Restrictions: Level of restrictions on foreign investment.
7. * Tokyo Stock Exchange only.
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3.3.2 Money markets.
The money market is an integral and significant part of the
financial system. The financial instruments traded in the money
market usually have an original maturity of less than one year.
The minimum transaction is generally very large and is,
therefore, wholesale in nature. It is a very dynamic and
exciting market, in which banks, finance companies, brokers, and
dealers carry out their day today transactions. The significance
of the market lies in the fact that it is predominantly a free
and competitive market and responds to forces of supply and
demand in the most efficient way.
Terminology and availability may vary from market to market.
However, overdraft, commercial paper, trade bills, bankers
acceptances, and certificates of deposit are common debt
instruments found in major money markets.
A comparison of money markets in the Far East shows a
broadly similar grouping of participants and instruments. Some
variances are to be expected but major differences appear in the
different levels of development, control, liberalisation, and in
some cases due to inherent national characteristics. Hong Kong,
for example, has historically swung between "laissez faire" and
strict market control with the latter constraints especially
apparent during the years following involvement in global
conflicts when the economy was at its weakest.
In the Far East, Hong Kong todate is the only country to
have whole heartedly embraced all the ljbera].isation principles
(though they do form the core of the Japanese progranme) and it
is interesting to note again that theirs has historically been an
unfettered financial market. Taiwan's domestic money market
developed relatively unhindered and unsupervised but remains
limited and localised. Korea has in place many of the elements
of a good money market but is too closely supervised and
regulated at present to develop much further.
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(Table 3.5) Comparisons of the Far East money markets
Japan	 Hong Kong Taiwan
	 Korea
	
LVarieties of avail- medium	 limited	 limited limited
able instruments:
2. Secondary market: limited Very limited V-limited V-limited
3. Degree of regulation:
	
medium	 low	 high	 high
4. Demand for funds: medium 	 medium	 strong	 strong
5. Internationalisation
	
of local currency: medium 	 high	 none	 none
6. Sophistication of
the market (cash market
	
vs. futures market) :medium 	 efficient	 limited limited
7. Central bank's role:medium 	 low	 influential influen-
tial
3.3.3 Foreign exchange markets.
Government control over the price and the transaction of
foreign exchange in the Far East is as ubiquitous as government
control over interest rates. Foreign exchange is transacted
freely in Hong Kong. The governments of Taiwan and Korea have
liberalised exchange control. However, it is not freely traded
in Korea arid Taiwan. Japan shifted to a floating exchange rate
system since 1973.
The major participants of the foreign exchange transactions
are banking institutions. All foreign exchange transactions in
Taiwan and Korea must be executed by banks duly authorised by the
Ministry of Finance and Central Bank. Currently, nation-wide
banks and local branches of foreign banks are authorised to
engage in foreign exchange transactions in Taiwan and Korea. In
Hong Kong the major participants are banks, DTCs and large
Corporations.
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(Table 3.6) Characteristics of foreign exchange markets in the
Far East
Japan	 Hong Kong
	 Taiwan Korea
1.GoVerrimeflt control:	 medium	 low
2.Major participants: 	 LB	 FB
3.Foreign exch. system: floating 	 pegged
(US$)
(Notes) LB: local banks
FB: forein banks
high	 high
LB & FB LB & FB
managed floating
(basket)
Many observers hold that the currencies of the Far East have
been undervalued against major currencies (for Japanese yen, see
Bergsten 1982, Williamson 1983; for Korean won and new Taiwan
dollars, see Morgan Guaranty 1987). Although we question the
economic significance of overvaluation or undervaluation with
respect to exchange rates determined in free markets, we shall
nevertheless examine evidence as to whether the yen, won, NT$,
and HK$ were undervalued againste dollar.
The real (effective) exchange rate of the Korean Won vis-a-
vis to the US dollar appreciated by as much as 11.6% during 1975-
1979 and, despite substantial nominal depreciation in 1980-81,
appreciated further during 1981-82. This exchange rate
development seems to be one of the main causes for the
deceleration of Korean export growth during the latter half of
the 1970s. A second reason for the loss of competitiveness were
the development of structural abnormalities in the economy owing
to improper credit and resource allocation. In addition, other
factors include the second oil shock, poor harvests and political
instability surrounding the death of President Park chung-Hee.
The real effective exchange rates for Taiwan were much more
stable. Even though the Korean real exchange rate could have
been kept stable with faster nominal depreciation, such a
strategy would have accelerated already high inflation,
aggravating the imbalance in other sectors of the economy (Koh
and Res 1989).
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Rana(1981) examined whether exchange rate risk has increased
in the present system of generalised floating for eight Asian
developing countries, including Korea and Taiwan. In the pegged
period, since exchange rates do not respond to changes in prices
in the short run, the real effective exchange rate for each
country was more unstable than the nominal rate. In the
generalised floating period, however, the real effective exchange
rate was more stable. Also in the current float the third
country exchange rates of Taiwan and Korea might be offsetting
the differential inflation rates between the trading partners and
the pegged country rather than the differential between home and
trading partner's inflation used in his study.
3.4 Conclusion.
In this chapter, the most basic trends which have emergered
in recent decades in international finance and the comparative
aspects of the Far East capital markets have been reviewed. These
changing trends form the common global background for all
countries and regions of the world, particularly those that are
open to international trade and finance. Recent development
includes deregulation and liberalisation, securitisation, and
globalisatjon. This chapter also takes a deeper look at the
current state of evolution of financial markets in the Far East.
The market economies of the Far East have experienced rapid
development and growth in international trade flows. Korea,
Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have all experienced the nearest
thing to an economic miracle in the post-war period, emerging
from being the lesser developed of the 1950s to become the
industrial nations of the l980s. And yet, these four countries
illustrate a wide diversity of financial systems, ranging from a
high degree of centralisation and government control(Korea) to
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economies where market mechanisms are the prevalent means of
allocating resources(Hong Kong). The undergoing fundamental
changes of the world financial system have forced policy makers
in the Far East to review existing understandings and theories on
the issues related to financial liberalisation.
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CHAPTER IV. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN KOREA.
4.1 introduction.
Korea was successful in recovering from the severe economic
recession caused by the two major oil shocks and political unrest
during the 19705 and early 1980 g . In 1986, the Korean economy
experienced a historic turnabout in its current account, which
shifted to a surPlus of US$4.6 billion, combined with strong non-
inflationary growth. Among the conditions for such a growth, the
important role of the financial market cannot be ignored
(Dornbusch and Reynoso 1989). In the past, financial
intermediation in Korea has relied mostly on the flow of funds
through the banking sector and there has been little research
that deals with the securities market. However, during the recent
years, the Korean financial structure has drastically changed
with the support of a series of measures to promote investment in
securities, to encourage enterprises to go public, and to
strengthen their underwriting function. Thus, the role of the
securities market has rapidly become more important than before.
This chapter analyses the financial aspects of the more
general issue of transition from a centralised to a relatively
laissez faire system in Korea. The major argument is that
economic growth is not strictly an economic phenomenon. It is a
process which is manifested in the cource of wide-ranging social
transformation. Economic changes occur in close relation to the
general development of society. Even if economic growth was to
proceed in the short-term, ahead of the developments in other
fields, the latter would have to keep abreast of economic growth
in the long-term for the former to continue smoothly. Therefore,
the financial sector has to be parallel with the real sector. In
the long-term, one sector cannot develop with the other lagging
far behind.
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4.2 The engines of the high growth.
Korea has recently been in the limelight of the world
economy as a newly industrialising Country (NIC) along with Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. From a per capita income of barely
US$87 in 1962, when the first five year economic development plan
was launched, Korea has experienced a dramatic transformation in
its economy and society, with a per capita income exceeding US
$4,040. Real GNP growth has averaged 9.05% during 1962-1988. The
traditional, closed, agrarian economy of the early 1960's has
been replaced with a dynamic and vibrant industrial economy (Koh
and Res, 1989).
Prior to the early sixties, economic development was quite
slow, even stagnant, due to non-economic factors. In 1963, Korea
reached a turning point in its economic development. Since that
year,, it has sustained a high rate of growth in GNP. The sudden
increase in the growth of output was attributable to the change
in the development strategy adopted in the early 1960's, although
there were certain other economic and noneconomic factors that
cannot be easily quantified.
Kim(1985) divided the development of industrial policy in
the post-Korean War period(1953-1986) into four phases
corresponding with the evolution of Korea's industrial incentive
system. The first phase(1953-1960) was characterised by import
substitution. The second phase(1961-1965) marked the transition
to an export-oriented industrialisation strategy. In the third
phase (1966-1979), the export-oriented strategy became institu-
tionalised. Rapid economic growth was achieved through structural
change in export commodities with a significant diversification
in export markets. In the fourth phase(1980-present), a series of
Comprehensive institutional reforms were adopted to promote a
greater role for market mechanisms and to reduce government
intervention. To increase foreign competition in the lQcal
economy, liberalisation of imports and direct foreign investment
was carried out, and to promote more efficient allocation of
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resources, preferences for specific industries have been reduced,
competitiofl'limiting activities banned, and financial reform
carried out(Koo 1986).
The successful paths to industrialisation of the Korean
economy are as follows: ambitious and well-calculated government
policies, including strongly outward-oriented trade strategy; a
high level of investment; highly skilled and motivated human
resources; flexible policymaking and the significant role of
government; strong commitment to technology upgrading; a
reasonable-sized domestic market; and existence of a few large
conglomerates.
4.3 The role of financial markets in the savings process.
4.3.1 Trends in the financial and the non-financial sectors.
Korea's fast growth and its rapidly rising savings ratio
were accompanied by a remarkable monetisation of the economy.
The Marshallian k, the ratio of money to GNP (i.e., the inverse
of velocity), has increased continuously. Table 4.1 shows the
Marshallian k ratios for reserve money, Ml, M2, and N3 for Korea
during 1962-1988.
The reserve money/GNP ratio has declined and the M1/GNP has
remained remarkably stable. In contrast, the ratios of M2/GNP and
M3/GNP have almost continuously been rising. The sharp rise was
due to all these three factors working in the same direction:
overall asset intensity rose; asset distribution shifted toward
individuals, who tend to hold higher portfolio shares in quasi
money; and all sectors shifted portfolio composition in favour of
quasi money.
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(Table 4.1) The )farshalliau k ratios
	
iir	 RN/GNP	 Ml/GNP	 M2/GNP	 M3/GNP
	
1962	 8.4	 11.1	 14.5	 -
	
1965	 6.0	 8.1	 12.1	 -
	
1968	 9.5	 10.8	 26.4	 -
	
1970	 10.9	 11.2	 32.8	 -
	
1972	 10.3	 12.5	 35.0	 40.5
	
1974	 10.3	 12.6	 32.7	 40.5
	
1976	 10.4	 11.1	 30.3	 38.1
	
1978	 11.6	 11.2	 32.7	 42.2
	
1980	 8.7	 10.2	 33.7	 47.9
	
1981	 6.2	 8.8	 34.7	 51.5
	
1982	 7.5	 11.4	 39.2	 61.0
	
1983	 6.9	 11.5	 38.9	 63.8
	
1984	 6.4	 10.3	 41.9	 68.1
	
1985	 5.9	 10.4	 39.2	 75.2
	
1986	 5.5	 9.7	 37.4	 78.1
	
1987	 7.1	 9.6	 38.1	 87.1
	
1988	 7.9	 9.8	 39.6	 95.6
(Notes) RN = Reserve money = Bank notes & coins issued + Reserve
deposits of deposit money banks
Ml = Currency in circulation + Deposit money (Demand deposits of
monetary institutions)
M2 = Ml + Quasi - money (Time & savings deposits and resident's
foreign currency deposits at deposit money banks)
M3 = M2 + OFI deposits + Debentures issued + Commercial bills
sold +CD5
Deposit money banks = Commercial Banks and Specialised Banks
OFI = other financial institutions : Development institutions +
Investment institutions + Savings institutions + Insurance
institutions.
(Source) Bank of Korea, various issues.
However, financial deepening went with little
diversification of the financial system. The money flow remains
dominated by indirect financing in the corporate business sector.
Although the relative share of direct financing continued to rise
steadily helped by various measures taken to boost the role of
the securities market in business financing since the early
1970s, the indirect financial institutions which consisted of
banks and non-banking institutions were the most important fund
sources to meet growing demands of corporate enterprises in the
Course of rapid economic development.
Until the l970s, the development of financial institutions
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in Korea had not kept pace with the growth of the industrial and
commercial customers. Growth rates of financial institutions have
been lower than industrial and commercial companies, and
traditional financial services have not been diversified and
developed. The financial sector has been segmented into a large
number of financial institutions each with a different range of
often overlapping activities. Because of the fiduciary nature of
financial institutions, it was deemed especially essential to
limit their entry through licensing and to monitor their
operations by supervisory authorities. The business base of each
kind of institution was defined too narrowly to allow
profitability, and the institutions themselves pressed for
logical extensions of their business into related services. The
Government permitted the institutions to move into new lines of
financial services. The demarcation of activities between
different financial institutions has become less clear and the
result is a residual lack of coherence in the system.
4.3.2 Changing patterns of main sources of debt finance.
In 1960s and 1970s, three main sources were important in
debt finance. They were banks, the curb market, and foreign
capital. But in the 1980s direct financing through the
securities market and the indirect market through non-bank
financial institutions have increased continuously in the
composition of external financing by source.
Bank borrowing, the main source for indirect financing,
recorded 37.5% of total borrowing during 1965-1969 and 40.4%
during 1970-1974. Since then, its share has declined to 23.8%
during 1980-1984.
The curb market is an unregulated, semi-legal credit market
in which loan suppliers and demanders can transact freely using
Uncontrolled interest rates. The main features that spurred both
the demand for and supply of funds in the curb market are the
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policy of maintaining low official interest rates, the stringent
credit rationing in the regulated financial markets, and
insufficient short-term funds available through the regulated
banking system, which mainly provides term lending. The
existence of differentials in the interest rates charged to
borrowers is interpreted by McKiflflon(1973) and Wai(1975) to
introduce segmentation and the absence of market clearing. By
that criterion, the existence of differential rates within
Korea's curb market and between it and bank loans suggests that
it was not an efficient market.
However, as van Wijnbergen(1983) points out, in a market
where borrowers have different characteristics, differential
rates which reflect this indicate that interest rates are acting
as an efficient market-clearing mechanism. Estimates of the size
of the curb market in Korea vary greatly, from around 10-20% of
total loans to 40% at the most. Its interest rates have been
much higher than those on so-called 'policy loans' through the
banking system, which have amounted to roughly half of total bank
loans over the 1970s.
In 1972 the government took a series of measures designed to
channel the curb market money into the financial institutions and
to set up the money market. Since then the non-bank financial
market has been activated and the curb market has receded. Direct
financing remained only at 14.6% on the average during 1960-1964,
but rose steadily through the 1970s and went up sharply to 41.0%
during 1980-1984, owing to the expansion of the bond market by
Corporations and the increase in the demand for securities by
institutional investors such as investment trust companies.
Unlike some other developing countries which have achieved
growth with mostly domestic resources (e.g. Taiwan), Korea has
depended heavily on foreign resources for its development because
domestic financial sources have not been sufficient to meet the
ever growing fund demand. Until 1963, Korea had no foreign debt.
In 1964 and 1965, it received US$44 0 million and US$430 million
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of foreign loans respectively. After the financial reforms in
1965, foreign debt was increased to US $110 million in 1966 and
rose to Us$540 million by 1976. At the end of 1986, Korea's
total outstanding foreign debt amounted to US$45.5 billion,
making Korea one of the biggest borrowers in the international
capital market. However, the current account has changed
dramatically from a chronic deficit to succesive surpluses from
1986. The surpluses on current account were US$ 4,617 million in
1986, US$ 9,854 million in 1987, US$ 14,161 million in 1988, and
US$2, 449 million during January-June 1989. The Korean government
has been focusing on reducing the external debt, a major
hindrance to economic development, by the early repayment of
short-term loans and long-term loans whose conditions are
unfavorable. Thus Korea's total outstanding foreign debt was
reduced to under US$31.2 billion by the end of 1988, while the
debt service ratio had decreased to 7.6% in 1988 from 18.3% in
1985. On the other hand, the prevalence of direct foreign
investment has not been as great as in many Latin American
countries.
Numerous statistical studies of the relationships between
economic growth and capital inflow, between foreign finance
(especially aid) and domestic savings in developing countries
have been undertaken. The authors found that foreign capital
inflow generally gave a significant positive impact on savings,
but the results were not unambiguous, and should be treated with
caution. The studies can be divided into two groups:
a. Studies which investigate the relationship between foreign aid
and domestic savings ratio. Rahman(1968). Landau(1971), Weisskopf
(1972), Papenek(1973), and Gupta and Islam(1983) all found
negative relationships.
b. Studies which investigate the relationship between the rate of
growth and the inflow of foreign aid. Positive relationships
were found by Brecher and Abbas(l972) and Islam(1972) for
Pakistan, and Jacoby(1966) for Taiwan, Gulati(].978) and Mosley
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(1980) both obtained mixed results, suggesting a positive
relationship for poor countries and negative or insignificant
relationships in some advanced countries. These results are
conveniently summarised by Dowling and Hiemenz(l983), and
Kitchefl(1986). Studies of the role of foreign capital in
economic growth for Korea were analysed as a positive impact by
Frank, Kim and Westphal (1975), Krueger(1980), B. 'i. Koo(1981),
Barone(1983), and Stoever(1986).
Korea has been able to control and direct foreign capital to
its own advantage or diminish its impact on the economy. In
fact, the contribution of foreign saving is now much less
prominent. However, through loans, credits, subcontracting and
direct foreign investment, foreign capital played the major role
in shaping Korea's overall rate of growth and economic structure
during the past two decades.
4.4 The role of financial institutions in the allocation of
financial resources.
4.4.1 Monetary policy and selective credit control.
The Bank of Korea's monetary policy is divided into
quantitative and selective credit control. Quantitative credit
control is exercised to influence the demand and supply of funds
in financial markets, and, ultimately, to influence the aggregate
economic activities without distorting any specific sector.
Quantitative credit control consists of i)interest rate policy,
ii) rediscount policy, iii) open market operations. Direct or
Selective credit control is the placing of ceilings on loans from
financial institutions, to allocate credit through differential
intervention by facilitating or restraining the supply of funds
to a specific economic sector.
Financial policy, particularly selective credit control, has
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had a significant role in the process of high economic growth
observed during last two decades. Large volumes of funds have
been continually provided to key industries - the chemical
industry,, heavy industry, and industry that is export related -
at preferential, low interest rates. Optimum fund allocation
through the financial market mechanism, has yet to become a
reality, because strong government regulation of lending
activities, notably fund allocation, makes it much more
difficult for the commercial banks to change the volume and
conditions of credit in a way that makes credit more profitable
and efficient.
Until the 1970s the government (Ministry of Finance) played
the role of the banks under the assumption that, if left to
bankers, the allocation of financial resources would not be
carried out in the direction of the satisfactory fulfilment of
the economic plans. The government determined the budget of the
banking system, including the central bank (Bank of Korea),
controlled the appointment of most of the bank directors and
officers, and exercised the powers of bank supervision and
examination. The Temporary Act on Bank Administration, the
revised Bank of Korea Act in 1962, and the Presidential Decree
for Economic Stability and Growth in August 1972 were the main
legal means which gave official power to the government. The
commercial banks played a very limited role in the decision
making process of banking activities such as domestic loans,
guaranteeing repayment of foreign loans and policy preference
loans. Since March 1982, however, the government has relaxed the
guidelines for bank lending to some extent.
There were criticisms on the strict control of banking
activities by the government. x.c. Park(1982), B. K. Min(1985),
and U. C. chung(1987) suggest that in a complex economy, the
ability of the government to manage the economy in an efficient
manner is very limited and that in the future the allocation of
financial resources should to a large extent be left in the hands
of the private sector.
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4.4.2 Development finance and commercial bank behaviour.
As the supreme policy-making organ of the Bank of Korea, the
Monetary Board, within the purview of the Bank of Korea,
exercises other functions explicitly granted to it and has the
general directory, or regulatory and supervisory
responsibilities, over the activities of banking institutions as
well as the operations of the Bank of Korea.
The amended Bank of Korea Act in 1962 empowered the Minister
of Finance to request reconsideration of resolutions adopted by
the Monetary Board. And the Monetary Board laid down guidelines
in 1962 for efficient allocation of banking funds and govermuent
funds that required the specialised banks to finance preferential
sectors. The specialised banks were orginally established under
special laws and are dedicated to serving particular areas; small
and medium-size business, foreign exchange and international
financing, consumer financing, and the financing of farming and
fishing. The credit control policies also strongly influenced
commercial bank behavior.
Commercial banks have played a leading role in the financial
market. However their relative importance in the financial
system has gradually decreased as specialised banks and other
non-bank financial institutions have expanded their business.
Their share of total assets, according to the Financial Survey,
droped from 82.5% in 1975 to 61.9% in 1985. Seven specialised
banks' weight of total assets has advanced from 18.5% in 1975 to
35.0% in 1985. During 1970s many non bank financial
intermediaries were established such as development institutions,
savings institutions and investment companies.
As national income grew and the economic environment
changed, the non banking financial institutions and securities
companies have rapidly increased their share of the financial
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market. The various government restrictions on commercial bank
activities have led to a decline in commercial banking's share of
the market. As MCKinnon(1980), Ito(1984) and Fry(l985)
indicated, selective credit policy has produced a considerable
amount of financial layering that has increased the costs of
financial intermediation through commercial banks and development
financial institutions. Instead of raising funds from a common
pool of loanable funds, each group of financial institutions has
its own source of funds earmarked for special uses. This,
clearly, makes each institution's costs additive to the total
cost of intermediation between the saver and the ultimate
borrower.
Also the result is an extreme suppression of financial
institution profits, especially the profits of the commercial
banks. Financial intermediation is no longer the principal
source of profit for these banks. Foreign exchange and
international transactions have become more preponderant.
Commercial banks could receive interest on reserve requirements
and maintain profits.
4.4.3 Development of non-bank financial industry.
From the end of 1960s, the government reorganised the
existing banking system to diversify the sources of investment
funds by introducing various non-bank financial institutions and
by fostering the securities market. For this purpose three
development institutions, eleven short-term financing companies
to induce unorganised curb market funds into the organised
financial market, and five merchant banking corporations to
induce foreign capital and supply medium-and long-term funds for
business enterprises, were introduced between 1967-1977. However,
the financial interrelation ratio (the ratio of the balance of
domestic financial assets to GNP in current prices) declined over
the period ending in 1976 due to low interest rates and high
inflation. But from the second half of 1970s, this ratio began
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to rise. It increased from 1.23 in 1976 to 3.82 in 1983, and then
has kept more stable at 4.26 in 1985 and 4.35 in 1987.
The securities market, like commercial banking, has been
characterised by pervasive government control, with the terms and
conditions for the securities underwriting set by underwriters'
cartel. Since 1972, however, it has grown rapidly with the
support of a series of measures to promote investment in
securities, to encourage enterprises to go public, and to
strengthen their underwriting function. Due to the relatively
high interest rate and the great degree of autonomy in management
compared with monetary institutions, these non-monetary financial
intermediaries have grown considerably more rapidly than banks.
The market share of non-monetary financial intermediaries in
terms of assets increased rapidly from 18.3% in 1965 to 44.4% in
1986, and to 46% in 1987.
(Table 4.2) Comparison of assets for the monetary and nomonetary
institutions
Year	 TFA	 TAFS	 FMI/TAFS(%)	 FNMI/TAFS(%)
1970	 7,163	 1,900	 81.7	 18.3
1975	 27,471	 9,068	 78.8	 21.2
1980	 113,652	 42,919	 68.7	 31.3
1981	 148,214	 56,654	 65.6	 34.4
1982	 189,468	 73,434	 63.9	 36.1
1983	 225,118	 88,533	 61.0	 39.0
1984	 264,536	 107,120	 59.0	 41.0
1985	 311,958	 128,972	 57.5	 42.5
1986	 354,605	 149,046	 55.6	 44.4
1987	 415,918	 183,486	 54.0	 46.0
(Notes)
TFA : Total financial assets (Bil. Won)
TAFS : Total assets of financial sector (Bil. Won)
FMI : Financial assets of Monetary Institutions
FNMI : Financial assets of Non-financial Institutions
(Source) Bank of Korea, ECONOMIC STATISTICS YEARBOOK, 1972-1989.
75
45 pinancial liberalisation.
4.5.1 Financial regulation and the underdeveloped financial
industry.
Until the l970s the financial industry in Korea was tightly
regulated by the government under the categories of entry
restrictions, activity restrictions, pricing constraints, balance
sheet constraints and preferential loans. However, strong
financial intervention caused adverse effects in many
respects.	 Financial resource allocation was distorted
heavily in order to develop what is called the strategic
industries such as heavy and chemical industry through the
regulation of financial institutions by credit rationing and
ceilings on interest rates. The financial sector was fragmented
without any close Interrelationships.
Under the influence of inflation, financial institutions
couldn't be expected to make significant progress, since the
price mechanism was not free to allocate financial resources
efficiently and the evaluation of investment projects couldn't be
carried out effectively. Businesses have never hesitated to
incur debts at controlled low interest rate. Domestic saving was
of relatively little importance since the financing of the
economy depended largely on the creation of money and borrowing
of foreign capital.
Generally the financial sector and the real sector develop
side by side and one cannot go far if the other is left behind.
However, the pattern of development in Korea seems to have been
an exception, in the sense that the financial sector appears to
have been greatly lagging behind the real sector. The financial
interrelation ratio is far lower than those of advanced countries
and lower than that of Hong Kong (Table 4.3).
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(Table 4.3) Financial Interrelation Ratio
	
Korea	 Japan	 Hong Kong
	 Taiwan
1975	 1.44	 4.00	 1.62	 2.84
1980	 3.10	 4.77	 3.18	 3.29
1984	 3.98	 5.50	 5.11	 3.72
1987	 4.35	 6.81	 6.28	 4.31
FIR: Financial asset balance/GNP in current prices.
(Sources) Bank of Korea, Bank of Japan, Hong Kong Government,
The Central Bank of China.
For many years economists have argued that developing
countries should rely more heavily on the market mechanism and
should liberalise their economies to international trade and
capital movements.
McKinnon(1973) and Shaw(l973) analysed financial repression
in the developing countries including those of Brazil, Korea, and
Taiwan and provided a theoretical basis for the benefits from a
liberal financial regime. Eliminating financial repressions,
i.e., market determination of interest rates and lifting controls
over financial institutions in asset management and ownership,
are important factors for financial deregulation. They suggested
that full financial liberalisation could produce the optimal
result of maximising investment and further raising the average
efficiency of capital investment, if monetary reform could
succeed in mobilising domestic savings and allocating them to
efficient uses.
Monetary reform is a step toward a fully liberated financial
sector and should be distinguished from full financial
liberalisation. The experience of the Southern Cone countries of
Latin America (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) have generated a
great deal of research that extensive and radical economic
l iberalisation would result in renationalisation of banks,
reimposition of banking regulations and unstable financial
markets.
In view of many potential problems with financial
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liberalisatiOn in developing countries, what could be the most
effective way of liberalising domestic financial markets without
impairing the payments system? Park(1987) suggests that there
are certain institutional reforms developing countries should
undertake before moving to full financial liberalisatjon.
Keeping the linkages between large business groups and banks at
an arm's length in order to prevent the groups from dominating
the banking system, separating the monetary and intermediation
functions of banks, and developing non-bank financial
intermediaries such as mutual funds, pension funds, finance
companies, trust firms, and insurance companies which could be
subject to less government control.
4.5.2 Financial liberalisation in the 1990g.
Economic environmental changes from a government-led economy
to a private-led economy demanded financial liberalisation and
restoration of the market mechanism in the financial market. The
process of financial liberalisation and encouragement of
efficient markets by deepening and eliminating the fragmentation
of markets could improve the process of mobilising savings, as
well as the efficiency of investments. The reorganisation of
the financial system commenced in 1981, when the financial
liberalisatjon policy was adopted. This effort included several
goals a) to enhance financial autonomy, b) to rely on the market
mechanism, C) to deregulate financial services d) to
internationa].jse the securities market.
(a) The government has encouraged financial institutions
to diversify and offered more autonomy in decision-making to
promote competition and efficiency. Several state-owned banks
have been sold to the private sector. Overall intervention in
bank management has been reduced. The allocation of banks annual
budget, personnel management, and organisational structures are
no longer subject to approval by the government.
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(b) In the management of monetary policy, the government has
tried to rely on the market mechanism. The Central Bank
influences strongly the general level of interest rates.
However, market forces have become more important factors in the
determination of interest rates, and interest rate differencials
between general loan and preferencial policy loans of banks were
eliminated in 1982. As inflationary expectations recede with
continued price stability, the gap between official and free
market interest rates has continued to narrow. Moreover the
ceilings on inter-bank call rates and issuing rates of unsecured
corporate bonds were lifted. Different interest rates based on
borrowers' creditworthiness were introduced from Jan. 1984. To
increase efficiency, five nation-wide commercial banks were
privatised. Entry barriers were lowered in the financial sector.
Twelve investment and finance companies, fifty-seven mutual
savings companies, and two nationwide commercial banks were
permitted to open for business in 1982-1983. And a deposit
insurance scheme was introduced to protect depositors who have
accounts in these non-bank financial intermediaries.
(C) Integrating segmented financial markets and eliminating
restrictions on the demarcation of financial services are further
developments toward financial liberalisation. Since 1982, the
sale of commercial bills, credit card business, sales of
government and public bonds on repurchase agreements, factoring
business, trust business, mutual installment savings business and
negotiable certificate of deposit business were introduced to
diversify commercial banking. Some discriminatory regulations on
foreign banks have been lifted. Foreign banks were permitted to
join the National Banking Association in 1984 for the purpose of
exchanging business information with domestic banks and were
permitted to make use of the rediscount facilities from 1985.
Commercial paper was introduced for investment and finance
Companies and merchant banking corporations in 1981, and for
large securities companies in 1984. The Cash Management Account
for investment and finance companies and merchant banking
corporations was introduced in 1984, and the Bond Management Fund
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for investment trust companies and securities companies in
1987. MoreoVer, computerisation has enabled financial insti-
tutions to supply more sophisticated financial services such as
on-line systems, cash dispensers, and night depositories. The
distinction between different financial institutions is therefore
becoming blurred, and competition is increasing in financial
markets.
(d)Recently banking regulations were revised with the purpose of
establishing banks as the central institutions in the financial
industry, giving banks more autonomy in dealing in various areas
of financial services and in raising their profitability.
Furthermore, the central bank will also become more neutral and
independent in its monetary and banking policies. In line with
the global trend toward a more universal banking system, the
banking business will be extended to foreign exchange,
securities, long-term deposits and lending. Also the creation of
bank holding companies which can be involved in securities,
leasing, merchant banks, short-term finance, insurance and other
non-bank business areas are suggested.
Establishing new financial institutions will advance
the financial sector further to support the real sector. The
government has permitted the establishment of new financial
institutions. Between 1987-1988, fifteen capital management
companies were newly established. By 1990, five small and medium
sized industrial banks and five trust companies will be
established in the provinces for the equal development of local
areas. In addition, the establishment of twelve life insurance
companies, six provincial leasing firms, a nationwide commercial
bank and a second credit guarantee fund is on the agenda.
(e)Ljberalisatjon of the capital market is also in process. The
govere prepared a long-term blueprint in 1981 to develop the
securities market with the issue of guidelines detailing a four-
phase liberalisation programme to fully liberalise the capital
flow in an out of the country by the early 199 Os. However, the
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original plan was revised in 1988 due to the abrupt changes in
the current account from 1986. Portfolio investment abroad for
domestic investors was encouraged prior to Opening the domestic
capital market to international investors.
(f) The Government's commission on financial reform is winding up
six years labour with indications that policymakers are finally
serious about reforming the formerly moribund financial sector.
The reform plan is set to include a loosening of interest rate
controls, the lowering of barriers between bank and non-bank
financial institutions, and the giving of greater autonomy to the
central bank and the nationwide private banks. The Government
sought and obtained article eight status in the International
Monetary Fund as a first step in the liberalisation of foreign
exchange transaction and relaxed foreign exchange transaction to
some extent.
There are, however, a large number of future tasks to be
completed before full financial liberalisation in 1990s is
achieved. Interest rates should further be liberalised and
determined by market forces. Also the gap between official and
free market rates should continue to narrow. An enhancement of
the international financial capabilities of domestic financial
institutions is a prerequisite task for internationalisation of
financial services. And financial institutions need to grow as a
more competitive and integrated part of those markets by offering
diverisfied financing instruments for a wide range of customers.
4.6 Conclusion.
The financial policies implemented by the Korean government
have played a key role in Korea's economic development. The
governme, however, avoided financial policies based solely on
market mechanism, and instead, the government chose to manage the
financial system, using it to mobilise both domestic and foreign
8].
financial resources and allocate these resources in ways to
support its high-growth policies (Lee 1988, Koh and Res 1989).
Also financial intermediation in Korea has relied heavily On the
flow of funds through the banking sector and there has been
little research that deals with the capital market. Due to the
changing worldwide financial environment and domestic economic
conditions during the recent years, the domestic financial
structure has drastically changed.
In this chapter, the sources of the high growth of the
Korean economy were briefly reviewed. Also the role of financial
markets in the savings process and the role of financial
institutions in the allocation of financial resources were
analysed. The Korean financial system is currently under
extensive review to identify potential institutional reforms.
Several measures were recommended for financial liberalisation in
1980s. The financial market should be harmonised for integration
and specialisation of financial services in response to the needs
of the market rather than by legislation. Entry barriers should
be lowered further with institutional arrangements to prevent
excessive disruption and instability of the market. Thus the
internationaljsation of the Korean financial system should be
promoted not only for a sound development of the financial
market, but also for sustained economic growth.
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CHAPTER V. STOCK RETURNS, INFLATION, AND REAL ACTIVITY.
5.1 introduction.
Three different approaches have traditionally been discussed
in the theory of security analysis. They are fundamental
analysis, technical analysis, and the random walk hypothesis.
Fundamental analysis deals basically with security valuation. it
insists that the stock price of a firm is mainly determined by
financial factors such as the earnings stream, dividends and the
value of assets held, in addition to some external economic
factors. The technical analysis is a trend-tracing approach that
deals not with the matter of stock valuation but with the
forecasting of stock prices. Proponents of technical analysis
usually plot the trend of stock prices and trade volume to
forecast the future stock prices, because analysts believe that
stock prices have a propensity to repeat past behaviour.
The random walk hypothesis says that available data are not
useful in estimating the future stock prices, because the stock
market instantaneously reflects the new and relevant information.
According to this approach, the behaviour of stock prices is
totally random, thus, it is impossible to forecast stock prices.
Because technical analysis and the random walk hypothesis
place emphasis on the movement of stock prices, they do not
properly explain the factors that affect stock prices. In
addition, most of the studies which exploit fundamental analysis
were limited to the analysis of an individual security. In fact,
no comprehensive research has been found on the Korean capital
market which explains clearly the relationship between stock
market behaviour and overall economic movements.
As for the major factors affecting stock prices, several
Variables can be considered. They are money supply (N]., N2, and
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M3), interest rate, inflation, industrial production (or GNP
growth rate). Movements in earnings and dividends of firms may
also affect stock prices.
This chapter examines the relation between inflation and
real stock returns in Korea. The data will be tested for
consistency with the hypothesis that the negative relation
between real stock returns and inflation holds, caused by a
positive relation between real stock returns and real variables
which are more fundamental determinants of equity values.
The performance of equities, bonds, and other assets has
been widely researched in the United States. Empirical findings
usually support the theoretical hypothesis that equities are
riskier and thus have a higher yield than fixed income
instruments(Ibbotson and Sinquefield 1976, Ibbotson Associates
1986, Wydler 1989). There is much evidence that common stock
returns and inflation have been negatively related in the post-
war period. Bodie(1976), Jaffe and Mandelker(1976), Nelson(1976),
Faina and Schwert(1977), Fama(1981 1982), and Gultekin(1983b) have
shown that the relation between real stock returns and inflation
is negative in the US. Gultekin(1983a) and Solnik(1983) extend
the investigation of this relation to other advanced countries
and confirm that their results do not support the Fisher
Hypothesis. This evidence is surprising in the light of the view
that common stocks, as claims against real assets, should be a
good hedge against inflation (Fisher hypothesis). while expected
stock returns and expected inflation in the U.S. have been found
to be negatively related, Firth(1979) showed that in the United
Kingdom the results are just the opposite of those in the U.S.
The relation between normal stock returns and inflation has been
reliably positive which is consistent with the Fisher Hypothesis.
Fama and Gi.bbons(1984) compared the forecast power of different
inflation models. Interest rate models provide slightly better
monthly forecasts and substantially better eight- and fourteen-
month forecasts of inflation than a univariate time series model.
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Geske and Roll(1983) note Falna's prediction of a negative
inflation-real activity relation in the post-war period. They
argue that the central bank responds counter-cyclically to real
activity shocks. Specifically, a drop in real activity leads to
increased deficits which, in turn, lead to an increase in money
growth (to the extent that debt is monetised). An unanticipated
drop in stock prices signals this chain of events, leading to
negative relations between real stock returns and changes in
expected inflation. Geske and Roll, however, do not analyse the
money supply process completely, as Kaul(l987) notes. A counter-
cyclical monetary response does reinforce the negative real
activity-inflation relations witnessed during the post-war
period. However, Kaul argues that if central banks follow a
procyclical monetary policy, real activity and inflation could be
either unrelated or even positively related. This would lead to
insignificant or positive relations between stock returns and
inflation.
Kaul(1987) hypothesises that the relation between stock
returns and inflation is caused by the equilibrium process in the
monetary sector. More importantly, this relation varies over time
in a systematic manner depending on the influence of money demand
and supply factors. He found that the negative stock return-
inflation relations in the post-war period were caused by money
demand and counter-cyclical money supply effects in the US,
Canada, UK, and Germany. On the other hand, pro-cyclical
movements in money, inflation, and stock prices during the 1930s
lead to relations which are either positive or insignificant.
In a recent study, Titman and Warga(1989) examine whether
stock returns provide forecasts of changes in interest rates and
inflation. In contrast to earlier work, they find a significant
positive relation between stock returns and future inflation rate
changes as well as a significant positive relation between stock
returns and future interest rate changes.
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5.2 inflation and financial assets.
5.2.1 Inflation, the money stock, and fiscal policy.
There is no clear agreement among economists about the
causes of inflation and differences of opinion on the subject
are even greater among politicians. Monetarists stress that
inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. Money
supply(M2) is generally considered the most useful of the
published figures. Monetarism is the application of neoclassical
precepts to the problems of inflation and unemployment (the
Phillips Curve). It is based on the standard, economic textbook
view of markets in which price changes, including wages, reflect
shifting demand and supply curves. They believe that monetary and
fiscal policies are important determinants of the rate of
inflation. And both monetary and fiscal policies work in the same
direction.
However, monetarism has little regard for the importance of
institutions in its explanation of recent events. The economy is
one of atomistic competition or, if the existence of unions and
oligopolies is recognised, the market system still performs 'as
if' market power is not in evidence. Thus, a more widely
acceptable explanation of today's events takes into account the
importance of institutions and institutional change (Hahn 1982,
Cornwall 1984). Today's world of powerful corporations and
unions, according to this view, is one of institutions that yield
market and political power on a wide scale. This affects not only
the way in which markets work but it substantially alters the
nature of the inflationery process. Thus, demand-pull forces and
cost-push are given as the other causes of recent inflation.
Restrictive demand measures must be pronounced and prolonged in
order to bring inflation down noticeably.
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5.2.2 Nominal and real returns.
The original idea of relating the nominal interest rate to
expected inflation is commonly attributed to Irving Fisher(1930).
In his seminal work on interest rates, he suggested that the
nominal interest rate fully reflects the available information
about the future values of the inflation rate and, thus, the
nominal interest rate can be expressed as the sum of a 'real'
rate and an expected inflation rate. This hypothesis says that
the real interest rate does not change much. Otherwise there
would be large excess supply or demand for loans. Hence, higher
inflation must largely be offset by equivalently higher nominal
interest rates to maintain the equilibrium real interest rate.
This proposition, also known as the Fisher Effect or Fisher
Equation, has been widely accepted among financial economists and
can be generalised to rates of return on common stocks and other
assets (Jaffe and Mandelker 1976, Gultekin 1983).
Fama and Schwert(l977) explain the generalised Fisher effect
such that if the market is an efficient or rational process of
the information available at time t-1, it will set' the price of
any asset j so that the expected nominal return on the asset from
t-1 to t is the sum of the appropriate equilibrium expected real
return and the best possible assessment of the expected inflation
rate from t-1 to t. Formally,
(5-1) E (R I q, _1) = E ( rt I t_i ) + E(;Iq_1)
where Rtis the nominal return on asset j from t-1 to t,
E(rIp_1) is the appropriate equilibrium expected real
return on the asset implied by the set of information t-1
available at t-l.
E ( WtIØt_i) is the best possible assessment of the expected
value of the inflation rate that can be made on the
basis of 0t-l' and
tildes denote random variables.
As a quantity theorist Fisher felt that the real and
monetary sectors of the economy are largely independent. He
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hypothesised, thus, that the expected real return in equation
(5-1) is determined by real factors, like the productivity of
capital, investor time preferences, and tastes for risk, and that
the expected real return and the expected inflation rate are
unrelated. This assumption is convenient for this study because
it allows the examination of the asset return / inflation
/ expected real returns relationship.
The tests of the joint hypothesis that the market is
efficient and that the expected real return and the expected
inflation rate are independent can be obtained from the following
standard regression model,
(5-2)	 rt = a + PE ( ;t IPt_i ) +
The regression model in (5-2) estimates the conditional expected
value of the dependent variable as a function of the independent
variable. Provided that the expected inflation rate can be
estimated, an estimate of fi that is indistinguishable from unity
is consistent with the hypothesis that the expected return on
common stocks varies in one-to-one correspondence with the
expected inflation rate. And since the expected real return is
equal to the expected nominal return minus the expected rate of
inflation, an estimate of fi which is statistically
indistinguishable from 1.0 is also consistent with the hypothesis
that the expected real return on the asset and the expected
inflation rate are uncorrelated.
While studies in Gibson(l970 1972), Fama and Schwert(l977),
Fama and Gibbons(1982), and others have found a positive relation
between nominal interest rates and inflation in the government
bond markets, studies in the U.S. stock market have revealed an
anomalous negative relation between nominal stock returns and
inflation.
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5.2.3 Hedging against inflation.
Nominal (observed) interest rates consist of two components
- the 'real' rate of interest, to which real saving and
investment respond, and a premium based on expected changes in
the price level. This can be generalised to cover any return,
certain or uncertain:
NRRR+ I
where -
R is the return in real terms,
NR is the return in nominal or monetary terms,
I is the change in prices.
The tildes() indicate that the values of the variables may
not be known with certainty in advance.
Investors are usually concerned with real, not nominal,
returns, and a single price index is taken as adequate to
characterise the difference. Thus, the expected real return can
be expressed as the difference between the expected nominal
return and the expected change in prices.
E(RR) = E(NR) - E(I)
where
E(RR)is the expected real return on a security or portfolio,
E(NR) is the expected nominal return on a security,
E(I) is the expected rate of change in prices.
If investors are concerned with real returns, all securities
will be priced so that expected nominal returns incorporate
expected inflation. The expected return on every security should
thus account for expected inflation.
Nominal interest rates for securities with no risk of
default should cover both a requisite expected real return and
the amount of inflation expected over the period in question.
The real return, after the fact, will be the difference between
the nominal return and the amount of inflation actually
experienced, only when actual inflation equals expected inflation
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will actually real return equal expected real return on such
securities.
The rate of worldwide inflation has been increasing over the
last three decades. Korean economy is not exceptional. The
average annual rate of inflation during 1965-1980 was 18.8%, even
it is stable as 4.2% during 1980-1988. Perhaps more important,
inflation appears to have become more predictable. The typical
difference between the rate of inflation in one year and in the
previous year in the advanced economies was less after 1950 than
before. More relevant, the variation in the actual real return
was also smaller. If so, investors may well have been willing to
invest in short-term highly liquid securities even though they
expected to earn nothing at all in real terms. If they are
willing to do so still, such securities will be priced to give an
expected real return of approximately zero.
If this assumption is made, the market's predicted rate of
inflation over the near future can be estimated by simply looking
at the current annual yield on short-term government securities.
In a sense, Treasury Bill yields represent a consensus prediction
of inflation - a prediction likely to be more accurate in many
cases than the predictions of any single forecaster(Sharpe 1981).
Investors are concerned more with real returns than with
nominal returns. This implies that securities that provide a
hedge against inflation should be considered more attractive,
other things equal, than those that do not. Of course in an
efficient capital market other things would not be equal, and the
former would not be priced to be inferior in some other dimension
- for example, expected return. And most security returns are
subject to additional uncertainty because of factors unrelated to
inflation. The ability of a security to hedge against inflation,
following Sharpe(198l), could be summed up in a number(ht) in an
equation of the form:
where
	 = at + htI +
90
at is a constant,
is the security's sensitivity to inflation,
I is the rate of inflation,
et is the uncertain portion of the return of the security not
related to inflation.
The above formula fails to differentiate between expected and
unexpected inflation. Because all securities might serve as hedge
against expected inflation, but only certain ones might hedge
against unexpected changes in the rate of inflation. Thus, it is
preferable to treat the two aspects seperately as,
= at + ehtle + 't1u +
where
at is a constant,
eht is the security's sensitivity to expected inflation,
I is the expected rate of inflation,
is the security's sensitivity to unexpected inflation,
I is the unexpected inflation, i.e., the difference between
tI'e actual rate of inflation and the rate that was expected.
et is the uncertain portion of the return of the security
not related to inflation.
A good estimate of short-term expected inflation is provided
by the return on short-term Treasury Bills. If investors are
willing to settle for an expected real return of zero on six
month Treasury Bills, the return on such a bill will indicate a
consensus estimate of inflation over the forthcoming six months.
The difference between the actual rate of inflation during a
period and the Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of the period
can thus be considered the amount of unexpected inflation (Fania
and Schwert 1977, Sharpe 1981).
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(Table 5.1) Sensitivities of assets to expected and unexpected
inflation, six-month holding periods, July 1959-July 1971
Sensitivity Sensitivity
Asset	 to El (eht)	 to UI
6-month U.S. Treasury Bills
	 1.0	 0
1-2 year U.S. government bonds	 1.08	
-1.15
2-3 year U.S. government bonds
	 1.03	 -1.75
3-4 year U.S. government bonds
	 .88	 -2.37
4-5 Year U.S. government bonds
	 .79	
-2.75
Private residential real estate
	 1.27	 1.14
Common stocks	
-4.26	 -2.09
(Source)
Fama and Schwert(1977).
(Notes)
El: Expected inflation.
UI: Unexpected inflation.
Table 5.1 shows that the interest rate on a six-month
Treasury Bill is a relatively unbiased estimate of the rate of
inflation expected over the next six months. It thus hedges one-
for-one against expected inflation. Of course a six-month
Treasury Bill cannot provide a hedge against unanticipated
inflation over its life.
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5.3 The model.
Three aspects of post-war stock return-inflations in U.S.
have been identified by empirical research: expected inflation,
unexpected inflation, and changes in expected inflation. They are
all negatively related to real stock returns. In this part,
following Fama(1981) and Kaul(1987), the hypotheses concerning
these relations are traced in the Korean stock market.
5.3.1 Stock returns and expected inflation.
The most anomalous of stock return-inflation relations in
U.S. market is perhaps the negative relation between expected
real stock returns and the level of expected inflation. This is
because the level of expected inflation is an ex ante variable,
regressions of realised stock returns on expected inflation
estimate the relation between the ex ante expected component of
stock returns and ex ante expected inflation(Kaul 1987).
Fama(1981) suggests a money-demand based model to explain
this relation, using money-demand theory to model (ex post) the
expected inflation process. Assuming that real activity, money,
and the Interest rate are exogenous with respect to the price
level, following Fama(198l) and Kaul(1987), the typical money
demand equation can be converted into a model for inflation.
(5-3) It = a +	 + P2DRt + P3 DMt +
where
It: inflation rate for period t,
DIAt : growth rate of anticipated real activity,
DRt : change in the continuously compounded interest rate,
DMt : growth rate of nominal money,
Ct : random disturbance term.
$i<0 and fl2, p3 >O ; changes in the interest rate and the growth
rate of money are presumed to have the usual positive relation
with inflation.
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5.3.2 Stock returns and unexpected inflation / changes in
expected inflation.
Geske and Roll(1983) consider one type of monetary response
which reinforces Fama's prediction of a negative relation between
inflation and real activity in the U.S. They argue that stock
returns are negatively related to contemporaneous changes in
expected inflation because they signal a chain of events which
results in a higher rate of monetary expansion. Exogenous shocks
in real output, signalled by stock market, induce changes in tax
revenue, in the deficit, in Treasury borrowing and in Federal
Reserve 'monetisation' of the increased debt. Rational bond and
stock market investors realise this will happen. They adjust
prices and interest rates accordingly and without delay. Thus,
Geske and Roll(1983) conclude that stock price changes, which
are caused by changes in anticipated economic conditions, will be
negatively correlated with changes in expected inflation.
Following Geske and Roll, consider a simple adaptive
expectations model,
(5-4)	 Elt = EIt_i + ( 't - EIt_i] + ct
where
Elt : expected inflation over period t to t+l as of t,
r: speed of adjustment ( >0 ),
Ct : random disturbance term.
If the true return is between stock returns and changes in
expected inflation, EIt-EIt_i, the contemporaneous unexpected
inflation variable, UI, could serve as a proxy. This paper
examines the relationship between stock return-inflation in
the Korean economy, which is shown as negative in research on the
U.S. data.
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5.4 The data.
The study employs regression models of market returns on
equity and bonds, on rates of inflation for the period January
1975-June 1989. The method currently used to compute the Korea
Composite Stock Price Index was adopted at the beginning of 1983,
changing from a price-weighted method to a method based on
aggregate market value. The Stock Exchange reported the revised
Index backdated to the beginning of 1975. The data of Consumer
Price Index(CPI), Wholesale Price Index(WPI), Money Supply(Ml and
M2), and Industrial Production Index(IPI) were obtained from the
Bank of Korea, and Government Bond Yield(GB) and Korea Composite
Stock Price Index(KCSPI) were obtained from Dongsuh Securities
Co., Ltd. and the Korea Stock Exchange. The rate of inflation is
defined as the natural logarithm of the ratios of the values of
the CPI and WPI at t and t-l. Instead of using Treasury Bond
Yield as in other research in the U.S. market, The short-term
Government Bond Yield less than one year was used for calculating
interest rates.
Ml is defined as currency in circulation and deposit money
(demand deposits at monetary institutions), and M2 includes Ml
and quasi-money (time & savings deposits and resident's foreign
currency deposits at monetary institutions). The rates of Money
Supply(M1, M2) and IPI is calculated as the natural logarithm of
the ratios of the total values of Ml, 142, and IPI. Stock returns
are calculated in nominal and real terms. SPI is the nominal
stock return, and RSC and RSw are the real stock returns which
are measured by CPI and WPI respectively. All the variables are
calculated by monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual data
respectively.
For the general calculations, the MiniTab package was used in
the City University Business School. Means, standard deviations,
and autocorrelations of monthly changes of sample data are shown
in table 5.2. The sample autocorrelations of the returns on
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Government Bonds, CPI, and WPI are similar for all twelve lags
and reliably different from zero. On the other hand, the auto-
correlations of monthly changes of 142 and SPI are generally close
to zero for most lags except lag twelve (the seasonal lag). In
short, the behaviour of the autocorrelations of nominal monthly
changes differ across samples.
(Table 5.2) Summary description of monthly nominal changes of
samples (January 1975-June 1989)
N	 Mean Median TRMean SD
	 SEMean	 Ql	 Q3
GB 173 0.0186 0.0182 0.0182 0.0091 0.0007 0.0123 0.0236
CPI 173 0.0083 0.0061 0.0077 0.0102 0.0008 0.0017 0.0126
WPI 173 0.0067 0.0040 0.0053 0.0134 0.0010 0.0000 0.0086
Ml 173 0.0140 0.0101 0.0145 0.0567 0.0043 -0.0200 0.0500
M2 173 0.0175 0.0158 0.0172 0.0143 0.0011 0.0086 0.0265
SPI 173 0.0142 0.0123 0.0125 0.0569 0.0043 -0.0209 0.0419
RSc 173 0.0059 0.0015 0.0043 0.0588 0.0045 -0.0290 0.0358
RSw 173 0.0075 0.0036 0.0064 0.0598 0.0046 -0.0274 0.0367
IPI 173 0.0109 0.0112 0.0093 0.0575 0.0044 -0.0244 0.0379
Autocorrelat ions
Lag 1
	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 1011	 12
GB 0.52 0.46 0.36 0.41 0.35 0.39 0.31 0.34 0.41 0.33 0.39 0.42
CPI 0.53 0.33 0.31 0.24 0.30 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.39 0.39
WPI 0.50 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.25 0.31 0.37 0.27 0.31 0.36 0.25 0.21
Ml -0.23-0.01 0.23-0.26-0.07 0.02-0.10-0.18 0.18-0.04-0.14 0.49
142 0.04 0.18 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.04-0.02 0.14 0.11 0.20 0.42
SPI 0.01 0.11-0.01 0.10 0.00 0.06-0.01 0.17-0.01 0.12 0.03 0.26
RSc 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.08 0.30
RSw 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.22 0.05 0.17 0.09 0.30
IPI-0.28-0.10-O.0 g
-0.1l 0.12 0.06 0.15-0.14-0.01-0.21-0.07 0.60
(Note)
TRMean: 5% trimmed mean.
SEMean: Standard error of the mean = SD/IN
Qi: the first or lower quartile.
Q3: the third or upper quartile.
GB: the Government Bond Yield.
CPI: the change of Consumer Price Index.
WPI: the change of wholesale Price Index.
Xl: the change of Currency in circulation and deposit money.
142: the change of Ml and quasi-money.
SPI: the nominal stock return.
RSc: the real stock return, measured by CPI.
RSw: the real stock return, measured by WPI.
IPI: the change of Industrial Production Index.
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5.5 Empirical evidence in the Korean stock market.
5.5.1 Expected inflation forecasts.
Obtaining reliable estimates of expected inflation and the
implied estimates of unexpected inflation and changes in expected
inflation is needed to test the hypothesis of this paper. The
methodology of Fama and Gibbons(1984) is followed which extracts
inflation forecasts, EIt_i, from treasury bill rates assuming
that expected real returns follow a random walk.
Following Irving Fisher(1930) the one-period interest rate,
TBt_l, observed at the end of period t-1 can be broken into an
expected real return for period t, ERt...i, and an expected
inflation rate, EIt...i,
(5-5)	 TBt...1 = ER 1 + EIt_i, or
(5-6)	 EIt_i =
	 + TBt_i
Isolating the inflation forecast EIt....i in the interest rate
requires a model for the expected real return. The evidence of
Hess and Bicksler(1975), Fama(1976b), Garbade and Wachtel(1978),
and Fama and Gibbons(1982 1984) suggests a model in which the
expected real return is a random walk. In the Korean stock
market, the Treasury Bill rate is not suitable for this test
because of discontinuity of issuance and restricted coupon rate.
Instead of Treasury Bill rate, the short-term (less than one
year) government bond rate (GB) was used. The short-term
government bond rate is actually quite close to the Treasury Bill
rate in Korea.
Following Fama and Gibbons(1984), the ex post real return
for month t is
(5-7)
	 GBt_i -
	
= ERt...i +
then the difference between the real returns for t and t-1 is
(5-8)	 (GBt_i - 't ) - (GBt...2 - 't-i ) =	 + t - it-i
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where ERt_i is the expected real return,
TERt_i is the change in the expected real return from month
t-1 to month t, and
is the unexpected component of the real return for month
t.
If ERt_i is a random walk, rER4 _ 1 and 6t are both white noise.
The difference between the real returns for month t and t-]. can
then be represented as a first-order moving average process
(Cryer 1986, Chapt. 4),
(5-9)	 (GBt...i - 't ) - (GBt...2 - 't-i ) = Ut -
and the moving average parameter e is close to 1.0(0.0) when the
variance of 6 is large(small) relative to the variance of rER1.
The autocorrelations of the monthly levels and differences
of real return GBt_i are shown in table 5.2. Consistent with the
random walk model for the expected real return ER 1
 in table
5.2, the first-order autocorrelation of the real return GBt_i -
is 0.39, and other autocorrelations show a tendency to decay
toward zero at higher-order lags except lag l2month (the seasonal
lag). The first-order autocorrelation of the monthlfr differences
of GBt...i 
- 
1t is slightly large, -0.34, but autocorrelations in
higher lags 4-8 are quite small.
Following Fama and Gibbons(1984), the moving average
parameter e in equation (5-9) was estimated, using nonlinear
least squares. The monthly data for January 1975-June 1989 yield;
(5-10)	 (GBt_i -CPIt) - (GBt_2 - CPIt_i)	 Ut - 0.8114ut_i(0. 0453)
or	 -
(5-11)	 (CBt_i -WPIt) - (GBt..,2 - WPIt_i) = Ut - 0.8922ut_1.(0. 0348)
The autocorrelatjons except lag 1 of the ut estimated according
to the backforecasting procedure are close to zero. The estimate
of the expected real return for month t is the fitted value
(5-12) ER...1 = ( GBt_2 - CPIt_i) - 0.8114ut_i
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using the expected real return estimated from (5-12), the
expected inflation rate for month t extracted from the government
bond yield is
(5-13) EIGBt_i = GBt_i - ERt_i.
This model is used to attempt to explain the anomalous stock
return-inflation relations.
The same models are used for the quarterly and the semi-
annual data. The moving average parameter es are 0.9876 and
0.9904 for CPI and WPI of quarterly data, and 0.8340 and 0.2998
for CPI and WPI of semi-annual data respectively.
Some results of estimates of inflation regressions for the
period January 1975-June 1989 are shown in table 5.4. Models (1)-
(4) in table show the regressions of the ex post monthly
inflation rate (CPI and WPI) for month t on EIt_i, expected
inflation rate. Their estimated regression coefficients are
0.627, 0.635, 0.588, and 0.565 respectively. They will be used as
estimates of the ex ante expected rate, even though they absorb
less than 32% of the sample variance of the monthly inflation
rate.
(Table 5.3) Means, Standard deviations, and Autocorrelations of
monthly variables
Variable	 N	 Mean TRNean SD	 SEMean Ql	 Q3
CPI.-CPI.,.....1 173 -0.007 -0.007 0.986 0.075 -0.559 0.602
GB 1-CPrf
	173 	 1.037	 1.044 1.056 0.080	 0.443 1.628
T ( Bt..1-CIt) l73	0.004 	 0.044 1.167 0.088 -0.654 0.781
Autocorrelation
Lag	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 8	 10	 12
CPIt-CPI.t.. _1 -0.29 -0.19 0.04 -0.13 0.12 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.19
GB,.._1-CpI.,.
	
0.39 0.19 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.16
r ( Bt....1_cPIt)_0.34 -0.10 0.01 -0.09 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.09 0.10
(Note)
r (GBt_i-CPIt) = ( GBt_i-CPIt) - (GBt_2-CPIt_1), i.e., changes
in the real rate of government bond yield.
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0.3	 0.07 0.0429 0.95
As seen in table 5.4, CPI and WPI are positively related to
the expected inflation, using the interest rate model, in all the
regressions except regression (6) which t-ratio (-1.37) is not
significant. Thus, monthly data show more powerful than quarterly
or semi-annual data in forecasting expected inflation. And CPI
and WPI are negatively related to real stock returns in
regressions (3) and (4).
(Table 5.4) Estimates of expected inflation regressions for the
period January 1975-June 1989
No.	 Model
Rho1	 2	 3	 4	 8	 12	 R2 (%) F	 s(e)	 DW
PANEL A: Monthly data
(1) CPIt=0.003+0. 627EIGBct...i+et
(3.44) (8.94)
	
0.14-0.00-0.07-0.05 0.02 0.24
	 31.8 79.91 0.0084 1.71
(2)WPIt=0. 0024+0. 635EIGBwt_1+et(2.20) (7.40)
	
0.30-0.07-0.07-0.14 0.01 0.09
	 24.2 54.82 0.0118 1.40
(3) CPIt=0. 0035+0. 588EIGBct_i -0. 0272RSt+et(3.97) (8.29)
	 T-2.44
	
0.12 0.03-0.06-0.07-0.01 0.21
	 33.8 44.10 0.0083 1.75
(4)WPItO.0033+0.565EIGBwt.....i_O.O514RSt-s-€t
(3.02) (6.59)
	 '-3.39)
	
0.27-0.06-0.08-0.16-0.01 0.05
	 28.6 34.85 0.114 1.46
PANEL B: Quarterly data
(5) CPIt=0. 016+0. 33OEIGBct_i+€t(6.30) (8.29)
0.29 0.07 0.33 0.28 0.03-0.05
(6)WPIt0.O22O.O86EIGBwt...i+ct
(4.62) (-1.37)
0.53 0.62 0.54 0.41 0.18 0.03
PANEL C: Semi-annual data
(7)CPIt=0.043+O.O16EIGBCt....i-fct
(5.63) (0.26)
0.50 0.68 0.23 0.37-0.06-0.22
(8)WPItO023+O.352EIGBwt_i+Et
(2.34) (3.36)
0.08 0.52-0.14 0.34-0.21-0.12
55.2 68.64 0.0172 1.33
1.6	 1.89 0.0328 0.94
27.6 11.27 0.0462 1.77
(Notes)
CPI, WPI: the inflation rate by CPI or WPI.
EIGSc, EIBw: the expected inflations measured by CPI, WPI.
RSt : the real stock return for month t.
R2 : (adjusted) the coefficient of determination.
F: F-ratio.
s(e): the residual standard error.
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DW: Durbin-Watson test.
Rho: autocorrelations of residuals.
random disturbance term.
The numbers in parentheses below estimated regression coeff 1-
cients are t-ratios.
5.5.2 Real activity and inflation.
Following Faiva(1981), the relations between inflation and
the measures of current and future real activity are also
documented in table 5.5. The theoretical basis for this study of
inflation-real activity relations is a 'rational expectations'
combination of money demand theory and a simple version of the
quantity theory of money of Fisher(191l). Fama(1981) represent
the demand for money function, for empirical purposes, as
(5-14) rin m=rin Mt - rin
=a+fl 1 rin At+fl2 r1n Rt+€c
where
and Mt are the quantities of real and nominal money,
is the price level,
At is a measure of anticipated real activity,
Rt is one plus the nominal interest rate,
e is a random disturbance, and
r indicates the difference of the relevant variable.
Fama(1981 p.548) says, "the theory postulates that fl2<O..O,
that is, the demand for money at time t is negatively related to
the rate of interest set at t since the interest rate is the
opportunity cost of holding a unit of money which generates
returns in the form of transactions services rather than
generalised purchasing power. On the other hand, if P>O.O, more
real money is demanded at t to accomodate the larger volume of
transactions generated by a higher level of real activity
anticipated for the near future." He, thus, takes this assumption
that money demand is forward looking with respect to real
activity to be the essence of a rational expectations model of
money demand. To specify the endogenous and exogenous variables
in (5-14), he adopts a simple rational expectations version of
the Fisherian quantity theory of money as follows.
(5-15) Tln Pt=-a-p 17ln At-fl2rin Rt+fl3 1n Mt6t.
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Thus, the major hypothesis of this part is to examine, using
the Korean market data, that this negative relation between
inflation and real activity, with real activity assumed to cause
inflation, is the key to the spurious negative relations between
stock returns and inflation observed in the U.S. economy.
Estimates of inflation regressions are shown in table 5.5,
for monthly data as regressions from (1) to (5), for quarterly
data as regressions (6)-(8), and for semi-annual data as
regressions (9)-(12). In the regressions (3) (7) (9) and (10),
the inflation rate is negatively related to the current, future,
and past growth rates of industrial production, IPI, IPIt+1, and
IpI. But	 in regression (6), measured by quarterly data,
does not coincide with other results. Money growth is measured by
M2. The results from the estimated money demand / inflation
regressions are reliably positive in regressions (4) (5) (8) (11)
and (12). Uniform results are seen in both CPI and WPI data.
Regression(4) presents the monthly correlation between CPI and
lagged and current money growth. All of the coefficients are
positive and the eight month lagged coefficient is slightly
higher than other coefficients.
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(Table 5.5) Estimates of inflation-real activity regressions for
the period January 1.975-June 1989
Wo.	 Model
Rho1	 2	 3	 4	 8	 12	 R2 (%) F	 s(e)	 DW
ANEL A: Monthly data
(1)CPIt=0.0018+0.352GBt..i+ct(1.07) (4.32)
	
0.44 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.25
	 9.3 18.62 0.0097 1.11
(2)WPIt=0.000l+0.357GB...i+Et(0.04) (3.25)
	
0.38 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.08
	 5.3 10.54 0.0131 1.24
(3)CPIF=0.00870.005IPI0.026IPIt_,0.004IPIt+l+et
tlO.17) (-0.34)	 t-1.81)	 t-0.03)
	
0.55 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.30 0.36 	 0.2	 1.14 0.0102 0.90
(4)CPIt=-0.00l+0.117M2t+0.045M2t.....2+0.101M2t_4+0.073M2t..6(-0.50) (2.13)	 (0.80)	 (1.84)	 (1.27)
+0. 148M2t...o+c(2.83)
	
0.43 0.21 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.24 	 11.6	 5.31 0.0091 1.64
(5)WPIt=0.0022+0.130M2_,+0.128M2t+et(1.10) (1.84)	 &(1.73)
	
0.36 0.15 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.21 	 2.7	 3.34 0.0133 1.62
PANEL B: Quarterly data
(6)CPIt=0.0259+0.092IPIt...,-0.1121P1+.-0.049IPIt+i+€t(4.79) (1.24)	 t-1.56)	 t-0.68)
	
0.46 0.39 0.60 0.42 0.24 0.07 	 3.9	 1.73 0.0244 0.96
(7)WPIt=0.02850.03lIPIt...,0.150IPI+.0.095IPIt+l+et(3.84) (-0.31) 	 t-1.52)	 t-°.95)
	
0.23 0.48 0.42 0.29 0.19 0.11 	 5.1	 0.92 0.0334 1.53
(8)CPI=-0.0062-0.121IPIt-0.011SPIt+0.460GB+.+0.162M2t_i+t
-0.73) (-1.92)	 (-0.40)	 (3.28) tl.64)
	
0.08-0.04 0.29 0.18 0.03-0.01 	 28.1	 6.37 0.i209 1.72
PANEL C: Semi-annual data
(9)CPIt=0.0681-0.152IPIt.....,-0.0811P1+.-0.l14IPIt+i+et(3.84) (-0.85)	 t-0.40)	 -0.61)
	
0.48 0.70 0.23 0.47-0.02-0.22 	 8.2	 0.66 0.0439 0.96
(10)WPIt=0.0742-0.193IPIt...,-0.2481P1+.-0.1lOIPIt+i+et(3.31) (-0.85)	 t-0.97)	 t-0.46)
	
0.36 0.42 0.18 0.38 0.03-0.15 	 13.5	 1.15 0.0556 0.68
(11)CPI=-0.0218+0.347M2t...,+0.101M2t+0.208M2t+i+et
t-0.97) (1.40)	 (0.75)	 (0.87)
	
0.73 0.43-0.02-0.28-0.14-0.10 	 34.9	 5.46 0.0347 0.53
(12)WPIj.=-0.0393+0.261M2t...,+0.230M2t+0.268M2t+i+et
t-1.16) (0.71)	 (l.14)	 (0.76)
	
0.66 0.37-0.10-0.30-0.00-0.15 	 14.7	 2.43 0.0518 0.68
TNotes)
CPI, WPI1..: the inflation rate by CPI or WPI.
GBF_ : the government bond rate observed at t-1.
EIGB, EIGBw: the expected inflations measured by CPI, WPI.
SPI: the nominal stock return for time t.
RSf ! the real stock return for time t.
IPIf : the industrial production index for time t.
M2 the money supply(M2) at time t.
R2
 (adjusted) the coefficient of determination.
F: F-ratio.
s(e): the residual standard error.
DW: Durb jn-watson test.
Rho: autocorrelations of residuals.
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E : random disturbance term.
numbers in parentheses below estimated regression coeff 1-
dents are t-ratlos.
5.5.3 Stock returns, inflation, and real activity.
A direct test of the proxy hypothesis is to regress stock
returns on both inflation and real variables. The relevant
regressions are shown in table 5.6. The hypothesis regarding
real stock return-real activity relations is that, given
efficient capital markets, these relations should be positive.
Table 5.6 documents strong positive relations between a measure
of monthly and quarterly real stocks returns, RS, and the real
variables. In regressions (7) (17) and (18), the coefficients of
IPI, changes of industrial production index in natural logarithm,
are positive in times t, t-1, and t+l. Regressions (7) (17) and
(18) indicate that current rate of change in IPI, IPI., explains
slightly more than the variations of the past and future changes
in the industrial production index. As seen in regressions (25)
and (26), IPI using semi-annual data is negatively related to
the real stock returns. But their t-ratios are very small.
Monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual real stock returns are
negatively related to all the inflation variables of expected
inflation, EIGBct_i and EIGBwt...i, changes in expected inflation,
TEIGBct and TEIGBwt, in regressions (l)-(4), (13)-(16), and (22)-
(24)
Regressions (5) and (6) show monthly relations between real
stock returns and expected and unexpected inflations. Stock
returns are uniformly negatively related to expected and
unexpected inflations. Unexpected inflation, UIGBct or UIGBwt, is
just the difference between the ex post inflation rate for year t
and EIGBti. In regression (10), the positive relations between
real, stock returns and money supply(Ml, M2) are seen. However, in
regressions (19)-(20), the real stock returns show negative
relations to quarterly variables of money supply ( M2t...i, M2t, and
M2t+ i). Also the nominal stock returns are negatively related to
money supply in regression (21). In another regressions of (27)
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and (28), using semi-annual data, the future variables of money
supply show positive relations to the real stock returns, but the
current and the past variables of money supply show negative
relations. This means that money supply does not work
coiricidently with monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual real stock
returns. Regressions (11) and (12) show the relations between
real stock return and real variables. Government bond yield is
also negatively related with real stock return. As seen in table
5.6, the Durbin-Watson test is relatively large and
autocorrelations of residuals of monthly data are relatively
small (noise) except lag 12 (seasonal lag). Thus, it may be
confirmed that the stock market in Korea does not work as hedging
against inflation and real variables influence real stock returns
as fundamental determinants of equity values. These anomalous
relations, witnessed in the Korean Economy, are consistent with
other research in industrial economies (Faina 1981, Gultekin 1983,
and Kaul 1987).
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(Table 5.6) Estimates of regressions of stock returns on real
variables (January 1975-June 1989)
No. Model
Rho1	 2	 3	 4	 8	 12	 R2 (%)	 F	 s(e)	 DW
PMEL A: Monthly data
(1)RSCt=O. 0l851.43EIGBct_i+Et(3.11) (-2.99)
	
0.00 0.07-0.01 0.11 0.18 0.27 	 4.5	 8.94 0.0573 1.99
(2)RSwt=O.0174-l.36EIGBwt...1+Et
(3.27) (-3.21)
	
0.01 0.07-0.01 0.09 0.17 0.27 	 5.2 10.32 0.0581 1.97
(3)RSct=0.0220-1.86EIGBct...i-O.947TEIGBct+Et
(3.51) (-3.43)	 t-l.65)
	
0.01 0.07-0.01 0.09 0.18 0.27 	 5.5	 5.88 0.0570 1.99
(4)RSwt=0.0192-1.64EIGBwt...i-0.835TEIGBwt+Et
(3.53) (-3.55)	 t-1.47)
	
0.01 0.08-0.01 0.07 0.17 0.27 	 5.9	 6.28 0.0579 1.98
(5)RSct=0. 0201-1. 69OEIGBct..,i -1. 42UIGBct+et(3.19) (-3.09)	 t-2.99)
	
-0.01 0.11-0.02 0.08 0.15 0.24 	 5.8	 6.19 0.0572 2.00
(6)RSwt=0.0195-1.78EIGBwt..,i-1.234UIGBwt+Et
(3.71) (-4.09)	 t-3.32)
	
-0.01 0.10-0.03 0.07 0.14 0.23 	 10.2 10.69 0.0568 2.00
(7)RSct=0.0031+0.184IPIt+0.OlO6IPIt+i+0.0791IPIt....i+et
(0.65) (2.16)	 (0.13)	 (0.96)
	
0.06 0.12-0.01 0.11 0.21 0.27 	 1.2	 1.71 0.0583 1.86
(8)RSct=0.0122-0.942EIGBct....i+0.188IPIt+€t
(2.03) (-1.96)	 (2.39)
	
0.01 0.10-0.05 0.08 0.16 0.24 	 4.0	 4.57 0.0577 1.95
(9)RSwt=0.0147-1.4OEIGBwt..i+0.226IPIt+et
(2.79) (-3.36)	 (2.91)
	
0.02 0.13-0.06 0.02 0.12 0.21 	 8.9	 9.33 0.0572 1.95
(10)RSct=0.0108+0.0444M1t+0.293M2t+Et
(1.45) (0.55)	 (0.85)
	
0.05 0.12 0.01 0.14 0.21 0.29 	 0.5	 0.44 0.0591 1.89
(11)RSct=0.0209+0.149IPIt+0.0224M1,..1.49CPIf0.242GBt+€t
(2.05) (1.96)	 (0.29)	 t-3.36)	 t-0.48)
	
-0.01 0.12-0.06 0.03 0.11 0.20 	 7.5	 4.50 0.0566 1.99
(12)RSct=0.0185+0.188IPIt+0.196M2,_1.42CPIt_0.20GB.,._0.284EIGBCt
(1.70) (2.36)	 (0.57)	 t-2.93)	 t-0.37) t-0.52)
+€1-
	
0.0 0.13-0.07 0.03 0.11 0.20 	 7.5	 3.73 0.0567 1.97
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No.	 Model
Rho1	 2	 3	 4	 8	 12	 R2 (%)	 F	 s(e)	 DW
PANEL B: Quarterly data
(13) RSct=0.0392-0.678EIGBct_,-0.582TEIGBct+Et(2.22) (-1.83)	 t-2.22)
	
0.05 0.04 0.34 0.33 0.11 0.03 	 5.1 2.48 0.1124
(14) RSct=0.0395-0.527EIGBwt_ -0.466TEIGBwt+et(2.16) (-1.46)	 -2.04)
	
0.10 0.09 0.35 0.34 0.10 0.08	 3.9 2.11 0.1168
(15) RSCt=0.07142 .O3EIGBct_i-1.9OUIGBct+€t
(3.41) (-3.22)	 (-3.38)
	
0.03 0.09 0.18 0.22 0.08 0.08	 14.7 5.73 0.1065
(16) RSct=0.0573-1.72EIGBWt_i-1.67UIGBwt+€t(3.12) (-3.30)	 (-3.75)
	
-0.00-0.00 0.20 0.17 0.06 0.00 	 17.9 7.10 0.1095
(17) RSct=-0.0169+0.306IPIt...i+0.885IPIt+0.032IPIt+i+€t(-0.68) (0.90)	 (2.69)	 (0.10)
	
0.13 0.09 0.40 0.37 0.20 0.12	 7.6 2.49 0.1114
(18) RSwt=-0.0195+0.429IPIt...i+0.923IPIt+0.077IPIt+i+€t
(-0.76) (1.23)	 (2.72)	 (0.23)
	
0.14 0.13 0.39 0.41 0.24 0.17	 8.1 2.59 0.1149
(19) RSct=0.0981-0.409M2t... -0.569M2 -0.462M2t+i+et(2.11) (-0.76)	 1-1.12)	 -0.90)
	
0.12 0.18 0.29 0.30 0.04 0.05	 6.0 1.08 0.0981
(20) RSwt=0.10700.447M2t...,0.632M2F0.458M2t+l+et(2.24) (-0.81)	 t-1.20)	 t-0.86)
	
0.16 0.23 0.31 0.32 0.05 0.06	 1.0 1.17 0.1193
(21) SPIt=0.0984 -0. 140M2 t...., -0. 619M2 F-O. 234M2t+i+et(2.25) (-0.28)	 t-1.29)	 t-0.49)
	
0.07 0.16 0.24 0.22 0.03 0.04	 0.0 0.80 0.1088
PMEL C: Semi-annual data
(22) RSct=0.0848-0.938EIGBct_i-0.712TEIGBct+€t
(2.15) (-1.87)	 t-1.88)
	
0.26 0.34 0.27 0.02-0.17 0.02	 6.3 1.88 0.1715
(23) RSwt=0.1020-1.3OEIGBwt..,-1.O9TEIGBwt+Et
(2.66) (-2.62)	 t-2.48)
	
0.24 0.32 0.19 0.03-0.18 0.00	 18.8 4.00 0.1681
(24) RSct=0.1340-1.92EIGBct..,-1.83UIGBct+Et
(2.77) (-2.46)	 t-2.42)
	
0.21 0.19 0.25-0.05-0.28 0.06	 13.7 3.06 0.1646
(25) RSct=-0.06000.016IPIt...l+1.86IPIF-0.226IPIt+l+ct
(-0.89) (-0.02)	 (2.42)	 t-0.32)
	
0.38 0.44 0.39 0.28-0.04-0.06	 14.2 2.38 0.1673
(26) RSwt=-0.0662+0. 026IPIt...., +2.0311-0. 231IPIt+i+et(-0.95) (0.04)	 (2.55)	 t-0.31)
	
0.43 0.47 0.40 0.30-0.00-0.09 	 16.9 2.70 0.1731
(27) RSct=0.1910_1.470M2t...,_0.491M2t+0.58M2t+i+et
(1.60) (-1.13)	 t-0.69)	 (0.46)
	
0.28 0.25 0.23-0.08-0.20 0.00 	 0.0 0.82 0.1826
(28) RSwt=O.2080_1.38M2t.....,-O.620M2t+0.52M2t+i+€t
(1.66)(-1.01)	 t-0.83)	 (0.39)
	
0.34 0.27 0.21-0.07-0.17-0.04 	 0.0 0.76 0.1927
1.89
1.79
1.93
1.93
1.73
1.69
1.76
1.66
1.84
1.44
1.48
1.55
1.16
1.06
1.40
1.29
TRes)
RSct,
 RSwt : the real stock returns for time t.
SPIt: the nominal stock return for time t.
IPIt : the change of industrial production index for time t.
Mit, M2,..: the change of Ml M2 for time t.
GBt : the government bond yield for time t.
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EIGBc: the expected inflation using equation 5-13, measured by cPI.
EIGBw: the expected inflation using equation 5-13, measured by WPI.
rEIGBc,TEIGBw: the changes in expected inflation.
UIGBc, UIGBw.: the unexpected inflation measured by CpI and WPI.
R2 : tfle coefficient of determination.
s(e): the residual standard error.
The numbers in parentheses below estimated regression
coefficients are t-statistics.
Rho: the residual autocorrelation.
random disturbance term.
5.5.4 The experience of the recent economy.
In this section, an attempt is made to test whether real
stock return-inflation relations vary over time in a systematic
manner. The stock market in Korea has been very active during the
past several years. Similar tests are made on the shorter period
data of January 1984-June 1989. The contention is that the
positive stock return-real variable relation or the negative
stock return-inflation relation is likely to be stable over time.
Table 5.7 presents means, standard deviations, and
autocorrelations of sample data in the period of January 1984-
June 1989. Autocorrelations of this period except lag twelve
(seasonal lag) are generally much smaller than those of the whole
period data.
(Table 5.7) Summary description of monthly changes
(January 1984-June 1989)
N Mean Median TRNean SD
	 SEMean	 Ql	 Q3
GB 66 0.0123 0.0125 0.0124 0.0050 0.0006 0.0093 0.0152
CPI 66 0.0034 0.0031 0.0035 0.0055 0.0007 0.0000 0.0066
WPI 66 0.0008 0.0010 0.0008 0.0045 0.0006 -0.0022 0.0039
Ml	 66 0.0070 0.0030 0.0085 0.0679 0.0084 -0.0420 0.0692
M2	 66 0.0120 0.0118 0.0120 0.0116 0.0014 0.0034 0.0200
M3 66 0.0187 0.0187 0.0187 0.0088 0.0011 0.0125 0.0246
SPI 66 0.0296 0.0194 0.0284 0.0661 0.0081 -0.0188 0.0773
RSc 66 0.0262 0.0171 0.0250 0.0660 0.0081 -0.0260 0.0759
RSw 66 0.0288 0.0189 0.0279 0.0663 0.0082 -0.0216 0.0759
IPI 66 0.0093 0.0106 0.0086 0.0603 0.0074 -0.0231 0.0320
CAB 66 0.0005 0.0036 0.0010 0.0139 0.0017 -0.0073 0.0092
GFX 66 0.0126 0.0121 0.0204 0.1028 0.0127 -0.0085 0.0538
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Autocorrelations
Lag
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11 12
GB -0.09 0.06 0.03 0.05-0.13 0.10-0.04 0.11 0.13-0.09-0.04 0.16
CPI 0.09-0.19-0.01 0.13 0.10 0.02-0.06-0.00 0.05-0.08 0.06 0.23
WPI 0.11-0.31-0.11 0.21 0.24-0.16-0.00 0.17 0.06-0.08 0.03 0.11
Ml -0.28-0.12 0.31-0.33-0.10 0.09-0.13-0.14 0.19-0.02-0.19 0.52
M2	 0.01-0.01 0.11-0.12-0.14 0.14-0.18-0.15 0.13-0.00 0.04 0.45
M3 0.02 0.02 0.35-0.10-0.15 0.35-0.02-0.09 0.20-0.04-0.08 0.32
SPI -0.06 0.12-0.16 0.16-0.10 0.08-0.08 0.09-0.12 0.26-0.01 0.21
RSc -0.05 0.07-0.16 0.18-0.10 0.09-0.07 0.10-0.13 0.24 0.00 0.21
RSW -0.05 0.11-0.15 0.17-0.11 0.07-0.07 0.11-0.12 0.24-0.01 0.22
IPI -0.31-0.07-0.11-0.06 0.01 0.07 0.08-0.05 0.01-0.17-0.08 0.46
CAB -0.42-0.03 0.14-0.07-0.09 0.18-0.24-0.02 0.23-0.09-0.22 0.32
GFX -0.05-0.21 0.01-0.02 0.01 0.03-0.05-0.05-0.04 0.03 0.13-0.06
(Notes)
GB: the government bond yield.
CPI: the change of consumer price index.
WPI: the change of wholesale price index.
Ml: the change of currency in circulation and deposit money.
M2: the change of Ml and quasi-money.
M3: M2+Other Financial Institutions' deposits+Debentures issued
+Commercial bills sold+CD+RP.
SPI: the nominal stock return.
RSc, RSw: the real stock returns, measured by CPI, WPI.
IPI: the change of industrial production index.
CAB: the change of the balance of current account.
GFX: the change of the holding amount of Gold and foreign
exchange
Table 5.8 presents estimates of stock return-inflation or
real variable relations for the period of January 1984-June 1989
period. The expected inflation rate for month t extracted from
the equation (5-13),
EIGBt...1 = GBt_i - ER1
where
ER1 = (GBt...2 - CPIt...1) 
- °9672't-1 or,
= ( GBt...2 - WPIt_i) - 0.9792ut...1.
These results can be compared with the whole period in tables
5.4-5.6. The most interesting feature of table 5.8 is perhaps the
positive coefficients of both the expected inflation and
unexpected inflation variables to the real stock returns in the
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regressions (4)-(6). But in regressions (8) and (9), changes of
expected inflation is negatively related with stock returns as
seen for long-term data. Also expected inflation is negatively
related to the CPI and WPI in regressions (1) and (2).
These regression results are surprising, because the
observed positive- but not significant-relation between stock
return-inflation is in direct contrast to the previously
documented negative relations for the January 1975-June 1989
period. Why does the positive relation between the real stock
returns and expected inflation hold in January 1984-June 1989?
Also the relation between stock returns and current Ml
(regression 11) did not explain the positive relations. In this
period, the financial industry developed abruptly as explained in
chapters II and IV. The current account changed from a chronic
deficit to a huge suplus, and the stock market has been very
strong. Whereas economic variables have fluctuated, the stock
prices have advanced continuously. Even during the worldwide
stock market crash in October 1987, the Korean stock market did
not react adversely. Was one lesson to be learned that the Korean
financial economy is on 'auto-pilot' - in the sense that it is
managed with exceptional efficiency by the powerful bureaucracy?
This explanation is indirect, thus the relations with other
variables were tested.
As seen in chapter IV, Korea's fast growth and its rapidly
rising savings ratio have been accompanied by a remarkable
monetisation of the economy. If we look at the trend of the
Marshallian k (the ratio of money to GNP, i.e., the inverse of
velocity), we get an interesting clue. The Marshallian k ratios
for reserve money and Ml have decreased in recent years and the
ratio for M2 is relatively stable. However, the Marshallian k
ratio for M3 has continuously increased. This can be explained by
Comparison of financial assets between monetary and non-monetary
institutions as examined in section 4.4.3. Also the balance in
the current account (CAB) can be used as a variable to explain
the relation of inflation-real variable or stock return-real
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econoniy. As seen in table 5.7, quarterly lags of autocorrelations
of M3, and lags 1 and 12 of CAB are a little bit large, but the
others are relatively snall.
Inflation in recent years can be explained by M2, M3, and
the current account balance more than N].. Also high stock returns
may be explained by CABt and GFXt..i (Gold and Foreign exchange
holdings). In regressions (10) and (12), the surplus of current
accout are explained as positive relations to stock returns and
to CPI.
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(Table 5.8) Estimates of regressions of inflation, stock returns,
and real variables (January 1984-June 1989)
. Model
Rho1	 2	 3	 4	 8	 12	 R2 (%)	 F	 s(e) DW
1) cPIt=o.0038_0.O6B4EIGBct_i+€t
(5.39) (-1.94)
	
0.03-0.05 0.00 0.07-0.08 0.22
	 4.1	 3.76 0.0054 1.92
(2)WPI0• 00040. o656EIGBwt_i+Et
(0.65) (-2.19)
	
0.08-0.15-0.08 0.17 0.13 0.05
	 5.6	 4.81 0.0044 1.83
(3)cPIt=0.0014-0. OO89IPIt+0. O84GBt+0 .
 0346M2t+o. 0360M3 t-I- o. OO2OCABt(0.51) (-0.74)	 (0.55)	 (0.50)	 (0.39)	 (0.04)
+0. OO17GFXt+et
(0.24)
	
0.12-0.15-0.03 0.07-0.05 0.29
	 2.6	 0.26 0.0057 1.76
(4)RStO.023+0.547EIGBCt...i+ct
(2.66) (1.27)
	
-0.03 0.08-0.15 0.15 0.08 0.21
	 0.09 1.61 0.0662 2.01
(5)RStO.030+0.191EIGBwt_i+€t
(3.43) (0.42)
	
-0.05 0.11-0.16 0.16 0.10 0.21
	 0.03 0.18 0.0672 2.05
(6)RStO.0224+l.71EIGBCt....i+0.15UIGBct+Et
(2.13) (1.41)	 (0.10)
	
-0.03 0.07-0.15 0.16 0.08 0.21
	 2.5	 0.80 0.0668 2.00
(7)RSt=0.0304-0.70EIGBwt....i+0.84tJIGBwt,-€t
(3.43) (-0.34)	 (0.44)
	
-0.06 0.12-0.17 0.15 0.09 0.21
	 0.0	 0.18 0.0676 2.07
(8)RSt=0.0267+0.219EIGBct....i-0.213TEIGBct-f-ct
(2.82) (0.28)	 (-0.46)
	
-0.05 0.04-0.13 0.17 0.11 0.21
	 0.0	 0.83 0.0656 2.10
(9)RSt=0. 0297-0. 163EIGBwt....i -0. 291TEIGBwt+et
(3.08) (-0.20)	 (-0.60)
	
-0.08 0.09-0.14 0.17 0.13 0.24
	 1.2	 0.32 0.0664 2.14
(10)RSt=0.0276+0.217IPIt+0.773M2t-1.36M3t...i+1.O4CABt+€t
(1.42) (1.64)	 (1.04)	 (-1.38)	 (1.90)
	
0.03 0.01-0.21 0.02 0.00 0.15	 8.9	 2.59 0.0630 1.88
(11)RSt=0.0029_0.l89M1t+1.29M2t+0.63M3t+€t
(0.12) (-1.14) 	 (1.80)	 (0.49)
	
-0.02-0.01-0.11 0.12 0.09 0.16	 2.0	 1.45 0.0656 1.98
(12)RSt=o.0129+1.OBCABt+et
(1.32) (2.30)
	
-0.04 0.05-0.21 0.12 0.01 0.20	 6.2	 5.30 0.0640 2.03
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5.6 Conclusion.
The main purpose of this chapter has been to examine the
relation between inflation and real stock returns in Korea. Using
the interest rate model in the period of January 1975-June 1989
data, the expected inflation was uniformly positively related to
actual inflation (CPI and WPI). The relations between stock
returns and expected / unexpected inflation showed negative. Also
stock returns and the changes of expected inflation were
negatively related. These results do not coincide with the Fisher
Hypothesis, as reflected in U.S. results, that common stocks, as
claims against real assets, should be a good hedge against
inflation. The hypothesis regarding real stock return-real
activity relations is that, given efficient capital markets,
these relations should be positive. The monthly and quarterly
results indicated positive relations and the current rate of
change in IPI explains slightly more than the variations of past
and future changes in the industrial production index. The
results of monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual data for the
relations between money supply and the real stock returns do not
coincide with each other. And the government bond yield was
negatively related to real stock returns.
In another attempt, we examined whether real stock return-
inflation relations varied over time. We found that these real
stock return-inflation relations still vary over time. The
results of the most recent five and half years period show a
positive relation or no relation between real stock return and
inflation. 112 and the balance of current account were found more
powerful in explaining the stock return and (or) inflation. Some
of the dissimilarity in the behavior of short-term expected and
Unexpected inflation rates is probably a specific stock market
environmental consequence in recent years. However, it attributes
the increasing similarity in the behavior of longer-term
unexpected inflation rates to real market forces.
In summary, the Korean stock market does not work simply as
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a hedge against inflation and real variables influence to real
stock returns as fundamental determinants of equity values. Also,
in short-term subperiods, these real stock return-inflation
relations are found to vary over time.
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CHAPTER VI. EFFICIENT MARKET RESEARCH: THEORY AND EVIDENCE UP TO
THE PRESENT TIME.
6.1 Introduction.
The primary function of a stock market is to allocate
ownership of the economy's capital stock. If stock prices
provide accurate signals for resource allocation, firms are able
to make correct production - investment decisions, and investors
are able to choose the most suitable stocks for investment.
These choices are only possible if the market is efficient, that
is, if stock prices fully reflect all available information.
For many years a considerable volume of research activity has
been devoted to testing the validity of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis(EMH) as an explanatory model of price behaviour in
various speculative markets; commodity, foreign exchange and
stock markets. Basically, this hypothesis states that changes in
prices are independent over time. If this hypothesis is correct,
it implies that no trading rule based on past prices will earn an
economic profit.
Usually capital market efficiency has been tested in the
large and sophisticated capital markets of developed countries.
Little research has been devoted to those of developing
countries, even though their markets have grown rapidly in 1980s.
Therefore one must be careful to limit any conclusions to the
appropriate arena from which they are drawn. A cross-country
survey by U Tun Wai and Patrick(1973) of the actual experience of
less developed countries with capital markets suggests that
"With a few
	
exceptions (for example, in Brasil, India,
Malaysia and Singapore), markets are thin with little or no
trading and with relatively few and insignificant amounts of new
Public issues by private corporations... Information is poor
and manipulation is substantial, especially for private issues.
It is our strong view that the most profitable line of research
would lie in detailed case studies of capital markets in specific
Countries. 'I
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During several years, the stock market in Korea has been
developing rapidly and is expected to be opened to the
international investors in 1992. However, efficiency tests on
this market could not be found in the international literature
except one random walk study done by Cooper(1982) for 30 stock
markets in the world. Korea was included, but the sample was
limited to 300 weekly observations of the Korea Composite Stock
Price Index(KCSPI).
The efficiency of the Korean Stock Market in this piece of
research is tested in three different forms; that is, its weak
form, semi-strong form and strong form. The weak form states that
historic price movements cannot be used to predict future price
movements; or successive price movement are independent of (i.e.
unrelated to) previous price movements. In other words,
chartists who use historic price information to predict future
prices are basically wasting their time. The statistical tests
that will be adopted in order to test this form of efficiency
will be the following; frequency distribution, serial
correlation, runs analysis, and spectral analysis. With these
tests, the efficiency characteristics of two different periods
are compared with each other: 1978-1980 and 1986-1988. Semi-
strong form tests are involved with the effect of public
announcements on shares' returns. The announcements of bonus
issues are considered in this study during 1985-1988. Strong form
tests evaluate the unpublished recommendations of the Korean
brokerage houses or analysts, if an investor following the
recommendations would have achieved significantly positive
abnormal returns.
The results of these tests show the extent to which the
Korean stock market is pricing-efficient, that is, whether it
helps the market participants to 'correctly' evaluate individual
securities.
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(6-1)
where
(6-3)
Then
(6-4)
6.2 The Efficient Market Hypothesis.
If stock prices fully reflect the available information, and
these prices react instantaneously, and in an unbiased fashion to
new information, then this rules out the existence of any trading
system which would consistently outperform the general level of
market return (Fama 1970, Keane 1983, Sheffrin 1983, Strong and
Walker 1987). Returns will be a "fair game" with respect to the
information set. This approach, for the first time, was described
by Fama(1970) in terms of an "expected return" or "fair game"
model. In notational terms, the expected return theories are of
the form:
E(Pj,t+iIt)=[1+E(i. t+ikt)]P,t
E : the expected value operator
j,t : the price of security j at time t
j,t+i : its price at t + 1
rj,t+i : the one-period percentage return
= ( j,t+i -
: a set of information to be fully refletted in the
price at t
- : indication of random variables at t
The assumptions that the conditions of market equilibrium
can be stated in terms of expected returns and that equilibrium
expected returns are formed on the basis of the information set
have a major empirical implication. Thus let
(6-2)	 X.	
- E(P,t+1kt)
where Xjt+i : the excess market return of security j
at time t+1, and
Zj , t+i by Zj,t+i=rj,t+1-E(rj,t^ihlt)=0
E(Xj
 ,t+iIt) E ( Zj ,t^iI4t)0
which says that the sequence (X,t) is a "fair game" with
respect to the information sequence t)• Or more generally, let
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Vt+i(t) be the excess market value (i.e., the difference between
actual market value and the conditionally expected market value)
of any collection of the securities generated by any trading
system based on	 Then E(Vt+ikt)=O can be derived as a
"testable implication" of the efficient market model.
Fama(1970) considered sufficient conditions to determine
capital market efffeciency as follows.
(a) There are no transaction costs in trading securities.
(b) All available information is costlessly available to all
market participants.
(C) All agree on the implications of current information for the
current price and distributions of future prices of each
security. In such a market, the current price of security
obviously "fully reflects" all available information. But though
the three conditions above are not necessarily sources of market
inefficiency, they are potential sources. And all three exist to
some extent in real world markets. Measuring their effects on
the process of price information is, of course, the important
goal of empirical work in this area.
In the early 1960's, academic workers continued to
investigate the randomness of stock prices, and the financial
community continued to be indifferent, indignant, or only amused.
The variety of opinion stemmed from disbelief in the validity of
the findings or from the misconception that randomness implied a
kind of senselessness in the determination of stock prices. As of
this date, the vast bulk of the empirical evidence has been in
support of the efficient markets and random walk hypothesis, but
technical and fundamental analysts continue to flourish,
commanding sizable quantities of investors' capital in the
process. Technical and fundamental analysts argue that the tests
continued within the academic community have been unidimentional,
too restrictive, or too simplistic to offer conclusive proof that
market movements cannot be forecast in advance. However, academic
workers point out that their experiments have yet to indicate the
existence of any market inefficiencies and no practicing analyst
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has yet presented conclusive evidence of consistently significant
outperf0rma1e. (Le Roy 1976, Murphy 1977, Bishop and Rollins
1977, Benthelehelu 1979, Grossman and stiglitz 1980, Beaver 1981,
HatzoullS and Stark 1981, Ferguson 1983, Treynor and Ferguson
1985, and Joy and Jones 1986). Despite all the criticisms,
however, the EMH as presented by Fama is still adopted by most
researchers on the field, and it has been used in a variety of
areas since l980s. •With the wide acceptance of the information
based model of market behaviour, empirical research has become
more focused on how and at what speed the market reacts to the
receipt of various types of information as well as On the limits
of informational efficiency exhibited by the market.
The explanation of the apparent randomness of stock prices
lies in understanding the market making mechanism. In an
efficient market where information is freely available, the price
of a security can be expected to approximate its intrinsict1
value because of competition among investors. Intrinsic values
can change as a result of new information. If, however, there is
only a gradual awareness of new information and all that it
implies, successive price changes will exhibit dependence. If the
adjustment to information is virtually instantaneous, successive
price changes will be random. Although implicit in the work of
many, including Moore(l965) and probably even Adam Smith, the
first specification of efficient markets and their relationship
to the randomness of prices of things traded in that market is
attributable to Samuelson(l965) and Mandelbrot(l966).
If a market has zero transaction costs, and if all
participants and potential participants in the market have the
same time horizons and homogeneous expectations with regard to
prices, the market will assuredly be efficient and prices in
such a market will fluctuate randomly (Lone and Hamilton
1973). LeRoy(l976) criticised Fama's model for being tautological
and, therefore, empirically vacuous.
"Any stochastic processes { r , t)i {,t}' { X , t}, and {Zit)
related by equations (6-2) and (6-3), and the rate of return
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definition rj,t+l = ( j,t+i - j,t)/j,t will obey equations
(6-1) and (6-4). It follows that these equations cannot properly
characterise an efficient capital market, however defined, since
they are as true of the most naive Dow theory model as of a pure
random walk. Because the equations imply no restrictions on the
data, they cannot possibly generate testable implication,
contrary to Fama's clear implication".
However Fama(1976) replied by denying tautology. And he
presented the model in a different way which hopefully is free of
whatever is misleading or difficult to follow in an earlier
approach.
m
"f( Pt I t_i ) = fm(r'tIt_l)
where	 is the vector of prices of
securities at time t, , is the set of information available at
t-1,	 is the set of information used by the market,
fm(tk_l) is the market assessed density function for t' and
f( PtIØt..i) is the true density function implied.by
Market efficiency says nothing specific about how the
characteristics of fm(PthP...i) determine the equilibrium
expected return Em(RjtIø...l).	 This is the province of the
model of market equilibrium."
Murphy(1977) argues that efficiency is not an accurate
description of the capital markets and may not even be a very
good description, and there are serious problems with the
risk/reward relationship, the existence of various classes of
'winners' and perhaps even the statistical methods. Grossman and
Stiglitz(1980) criticise that arbitrage profits cannot be
perfectly eliminated when arbitrage is costly. However, it should
be mentioned that Grossman and Stiglitz did not comment on this
point at all, the existence of investors who choose to pay, in
order to acquire and process information may not be due to the
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fact that they can consistently obtain a return on this outlay.
Rather it can be due to the point made by Lone and Hamilton
(1973), Henfrey, Albrecht and Richards(1977), Firth(1977) and
Hevas(1984) that the necessary conditions for efficiency are far
less stringent and are merely that information be readily
available to a "sufficient" number of investors, that transaction
costs be "reasonable" , and that, in the absence of agreement
about the implications of current information and expectations
regarding price movements, there be no evidence of consistent
superiority or inferiority by significant participants in the
market.
Ferguson(1983) illustrates four obvious possibilities for
the stock market to be inefficient: information, analysis,
judgment, and idiosyncratic behaviour. Rosenberg et al(l985)
suggest two strategies (book/price strategy and specific return -
reversal strategy) in detecting market inefficiency and show
still larger profits to be made. Treynor and Ferguson(1985) show
that the pastprices, when combined with other valuable
information, can indeed be helpful in achieving unusual profit.
However, it is nonprice information that creates th opportunity.
Sorensen discussed at the same paper that their assumptions
(explicit and implicit) pop up throughout the manuscript.
Therefore a review of them adds clarity and puts the model in
perspective.
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6.3 Weak Form Empirical Studies.
All the empirical research on the theory of efficient
markets has been concerned with whether prices "fully reflect"
particular subsets of available information. A distinction is
made between three potential levels of efficiency(Faina 1970).
They are weak form efficiency, semi-strong form efficiency, and
strong form efficiency. Weak form efficiency implies that the
market is efficient in the weak sense if share prices fully
reflect the information implied by all prior price movements.
Price movements in effect are totally independent of previous
movements, implying the absence of any price patterns with
prophetic significance. As a result, investors are unable to
profit from studying charts of past prices. In addition,
efficiency at the weak level rules out the validity of 'trading'
rules, such as 'sell a stock if it falls by X% below a certain
price level', designed to produce above-average returns. Prices
would respond only to new information such as new economic
events.
6.3.1 Testing the Random Walk Hypothesis
The random walk hypothesis is indeed the true challenge for
both fundamental and technical techniques. It assumes that the
security trading mechanism represents an 'efficient' marketplace,
which is characterised by the presence of a large number of
rational, profit-seeking, risk-averting investors who compete
freely with each other in their efforts to predict the future
value of individual securities. Information significant enough to
affect any security's future value is available to all investors
immediately. As a result, chart reading by technical analysis or
recommendation by fundamental analysis contains no useful
information that will enable an investor to consistently
outperform a buy and hold strategy in managing portfolio.
The random walk hypothesis is usually tested by looking for
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association between stock price changes on consecutive days. The
tests fall into frequency test, regression analysis, and runs
test. Frequency distribution tests investigate the degree of
normality in price changes from transaction to transaction. If
transactions are fairly uniformly spread across time, and if the
number of transactions per day, week, or month is very large,
then the Central Limit Theorem leads us to expect that these
price changes will have normal or Gaussian distributions.
Regression analysis examines whether price changes were
linearly related over time. They examine the correlation between
past price changes and future price changes. For example, if
is today's price change and
	 Pt is yesterday's price
change, they fit the line
= a + fi
The term 'a' measures the expected change in price, unrelated
to the previous price change. The term 'fi' measures the
relationship between the previous price change and the next price
change. Many have taken the log of price relatives. Others have
used the rate of return on both sides of the equation.
Historically, the stock market has attracted surprisingly
little study by professional scholars or statisticians until
three decades ago. It is interesting to note that Carl Menger is
reported to have made careful studies of the Vienna stock
market in 1871, developing the concept of marginal utility and
his theory of prices. Later, the French mathematician, M.L.
Bachelier, published his 'Theorie de la Speculation'(1900) in
which the random character of stock price movements was derived.
Later, A de Pietri-Tonelli, a student and expositor of Pareto,
repeatedly quoted Bachelier approvingly in his work 'La
Speculazjone di Borsa'(1912), but he didn't elaborate on the
random walk explicitly (Granger and Morgenstern 1970). The first
reference to the highly significant studies was made by A. Cowles
(1937). After the war, a number of studies have appeared by
Kendal].(l953), Alexander(l961), Cootner(l962), Osborne(1962) etc.
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9. Jennergren
(1975)
10.Jennergren
& Korsvold
(1975)
11 • Errunza
(1979)
12 . Laurence
(1986)
lday
2 days
5 days
1 day
3 days
5 days
1 month
0.068
-0.070
-0.004
0.102
-0.021
-0.016
-0.163
Their results may be summarised as follows.
(Table 6.1) Empirical studies of serial correlation analysis
No Author	 Data	 Variables Interval	 ACC
1. Kendall(1953) 22 commodities(UK) Price 	 1 week	 0.088
2. Kendall	 19 indicies(UK)	 Price	 iweek	 0.131
& Alexander	 2 weeks	 0.134
	
(1961)	 4 weeks	 0.006
8 weeks -0.054
16 weeks	 0.156
3. Moore(1964)	 30 companies(US) Log price 1 week 	 -0.056
4. Cootner	 45 companies(US) Log price 1 week 	 -0.047
	
(1962)	 14 weeks	 0.131
5. Fama	 30 companies(US) Log price 1 day 	 0.026
	
(1965)	 4 days	 -0.039
	
9 days	 -0.053
	
16 days	 -0.057
6. Brealey(1970)	 FT index(UK)	 Price	 1 day	 0.02
7. King(1966)	 63 companies(US) Log price 1 month 	 0.018
8. Praetz	 16 indices	 Log price 1 week	 0.000
	
(1979)	 20 companies	 Log price 1 week	 -0.118
(Australia)
15 companies	 Log price
(Norway)
30 companies	 Log price
(Sweden)
64 companies	 Log price
(Brazil)
16 companies	 Log price 1 day
(Malaysia)
24 companies	 Log price 1 day
(Singapore)
0.041
0.078
13.Brown and Easton Daily prices Log price 1 day	 0.049
(1989)	 (UK)
(Note)
ACC : Average correlation coefficient.
Other researchers have used more complicated models of
expected return and then examined the correlation of excess
return. Galai(1977) used a model developed by Black and Scholes
to estimate expected returns on the option market and then
examined the correlation of excess return. Roll(l970, 1982) used
the term 'structure' of interest rates to estimate expected
return in the Treasury Bill market and then looked at the
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correlation of excess returns.
The correlation coefficient may be heavily influenced by one
pair of extreme observations (so called outliers). In order to
correct for this possible bias we can use the non-parametric runs
test which takes into account only the signs of
	 and not their
magnitude. Designate a price increase P>O by +, a price
decrease by -, and constant by 0. If price changes were
positively related, it would be more likely that a + was followed
by a + and - by a -, than to have a reversal in sign. This would
mean that an investigator analysing a sequence of correlated
price changes would expect to find longer sequences of +'s and -
's than could be attributed to change. Consecutive occurrences
of the same sign are called a run. A sequence of + + 0 - - - -
for example, would be made up of four runs. If runs tend to
persist (that is, if there are trends), the total number of runs
will be fewer and the average length of runs longer than if the
series were random. Stigler(l964), Fama(1965), Granger and
Morgenstern(l970), and many others did work in this area.
6.3.2 Testing Filter Rules.
Alexander(1964) tried to devise trading rules based solely
on price changes that could produce abnormally high rates of
return. A filter rule goes as follows:
If the price of a security moves up at least X%, buy the
security and hold it until its price moves down at least X% from
the subsequent high, at which time sell the stock and go short;
the short position is maintained until the price rises X% above
the subsequent low, at which time cover the short position and
buy the stock. If the stock price changes by less than X% up or
down, simply do not make any transaction. Such trading rules are
called X% Filters. The magnitude of X is a matter of individual
choice, so one can have 1%, 2%, 5% etc., filter rules, where each
filter indicates a different set of transactions even though all
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deal with the same stock and are based on the same set of price
changes.
The filter rule evidence for weak-form efficiency is not,
however, as obvious as it seems to many. The studies of the 1960s
tended to understate filter rule returns relative to buy-and-hold
and to do a poor job of selecting possible winners. In addition,
these tests did not have statistical confidence bounds for
judging significance. Fama and Blume(1966), looking at the Dow 30
of the late 1950s, found no profits for the best(0.5%) rule after
adjusting for transactions costs. Also Jennergren(l975) couldn't
get any results showing a profit from examining filter rules for
Swedish stocks. Beebower and Priest(1980) found little net
evidence that the active trades they examined moved the market in
an unfavourable direction. Frankfurter and Lamoureux(1988), using
906 stocks'monthly returns for the period 1963-1981, applied the
filter techniques, but they could't get any benefits above a
simple buy-and-hold strategy. However, Sweeney(l988), using 14
NYSE securities in period of 1970-1982, got highly significant
profits for a floor trader.
In chapter VII, the weak form efficient market hypothesis on
the Korean stock market will be tested.
6.4 Semi-strong Form Empirical Studies.
The market is efficient in the semi-strong sense if share
prices respond instantaneously and without bias to newly
published information. Whether or not the users of information
might differ amongst themselves about the significance of new
data, the implication is that the prices that are actually
arrived at in such a market would invariably represent the best
interpretation of the information. The focus of empirical studies
of this form seeks to analyse share price movements to see
exactly how long it takes for the share price to digest and
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respo to new information.
publicly available information is so large and
ter0geneol that it is Impossible to test for market efficiency
relative
 to all the sources of information. However, one can
test several types of information which are conceived to have a
major effect on stock prices. Information On the stock splits,
bonus issues, rights issues, published investment recommend-
ations, earnings announcements, and weekend or yearend effects
are examples of the semi-strong form empirical tests. Some of
them are summarised in table (6.2).
(Table 6.2) semi-strong form empirical studies
No Name	 Subjects	 Country
1.FFJR(l969)
2.Bar-Yosef & Brown(1977)
3.Firth(1977)
4.Morris(l975)
5.Firth(1979)
6.Bidwell(1977)
7.Saunders & Woodward(1976)
8.Franks et al. (1977)
9.Merrett et al. (1967)
lO.French(1980)
ll.Baesel et al. (1982)
12.Roll(1983)
13.Theobald and Price(l984)
14.Grinblatt et al. (1984)
15.Kato and Schallheim(1985)
16.Brennan and Copeland(1988)
Stock splits
Stock splits
Capitalisation issues
Inflation accounting
Recommendations
Recommendations
Money supply
Mergers
Right issues
Weekend effect
Granville' s prediction
Yearend effect
Weekend effect
Stock splits
Seasonal ity
Stock splits
US
US
UK
UK
UK
US
UK
UK
UK
US
US
US
UK
US
Japan
US
6.4.1 Stock splits and capitalisation issues.
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll(FFJR 1969) examined the
effects of stock split. The excess cumulative return was positive
over 30 months before the split. But after the announcement of
split, no such excess return could be made. Bar-Yosef and Brown
(1977) found also positive abnormal cummulative excess return
before the split. However, this upward trend stoped at the split
date and moreover, after this date the abnormal cummulative
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return actually declined.
Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman(1984) used daily data and
looked at shareholder returns on the split announcement date as
well as the split ex-date. For the sample of 125 'pure' stock
splits they found statistically significant returns on the ex-
date and around the announcement date. They also confirmed
earlier studies on stock dividends by Foster and Vickrey(1978)
and Woolridge (1983). Recently Brennan and Copeland(1988) provided
a signalling theory explanation for stock splits and showed that
it was consistent with the data.
Merrett, Howe and Newbould(1967) observed an average return
of 1.2% over the right issue data and 3.2% over the following
year. Firth(l977) tested the impact of capitalisation issues on
share prices. There was no mechanical way of forecasting the
occurance of a capitalisation issue. Without having inside
knowledge of when an issue was to be made, no consistently
profitable investment strategy appeared to exist.
6.4.2 Published investment recommendations.
Firth(1979) examined the recommendations in three newspaper
portfolios to see if the tipsters out-performed the market and to
determine how quickly new information (if any) contained in the
'tip' was discounted into the share price. The result was clear
that once a tip had been published it was impossible to profit
thereby if only for the simple fact that newspapers were
available to all. Bidwell(1977) found that brokerage research did
not increase the return on the recommended investments beyond
what could be achieved by a random drawing from the list of all
stocks registered on the NYSE.
6.4.3 Announcement effects of economic indicators or mergers.
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Saunders and Woodward(1976) examined the effect of the money
supply variables on the market to see how quickly the market
incorporated such new information. No relationship however could
be found. Franks, Broyles, and Hecht(1977) analysed abnormal
share price behaviour around the time of the merger to see how
the gains, if any, were allocated between acquiror and acquiree.
A distinctive positive trend was noticeable throughout indicating
the sample to have performed better than predicted by 22.7%.
This trend is most likely due to changes in the industry. To
compensate for this, the forecasting model was altered to include
the appropriate sector index. As a result, the positive trend
disappeared and the predictive model was therefore more accurate.
6.4.4 Weekend effects or seasonality.
French(1980) studied daily returns on the Standard and
Poor's composite portfolio of the 500 largest firms on the NYSE
over the period 1953-1977. The negative returns on Monday (mean -
0.1681) were highly significant. Another interesting test in
stock prices is the so-called yearend effect, which has been
documented by Branch(1977), Keim(l983), Reinganuin(1983), Gultekin
and Gultekin(l983), and Roll (1983), using US data. Stock returns
decline in December of each year, especially for small firms and
for firms whose price had already declined during the year. Then
the prices increase during the following January.
Theobald and Price(1984), using U.K. daily index data in
Section I, II, III, analysed seasonality and found to be
strongest for the means of the return distributions. However,
while finding a negative weekend effect, as in U.S. studies, this
was observed to hold only as a pervasive phenomenon for non ex
div Mondays and for two of the four subperiods studied. Kato and
Schallhe jm(1985) examined stock returns on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange for the presence of January and size effects and found
remarkable similarity with the U.S. market.
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In chapter VIII, the sample data will be tested by the
models of semi-strong form efficient market hypothesis.
6.5 Strong Form Empirical Studies.
The market is efficient in the strong sense if share prices
fully reflect not only published information but all relevant
information including data not yet publicly available. If the
market were strongly efficient, therefore, even an insider would
not be able to profit from his privileged position. These tests
consist of an examination of the performance of
analysts' recommendations or professionally managed portfolios.,
i.e., mutual funds, and insider trading. Some of the research is
summarised in table (6.3).
Table (6.3). Strong form empirical studies
No	 Name	 Data	 Country. Remark
1. Friend, & his assoc.	 189 mutual funds US Performance
(1962)
2. Sharpe(l966)	 34 mutual funds US Performance
3. Jensen(1969)	 115 mutual funds US Performance
4. Fitzgerald(1975)	 635 analysts' recom UK Recommendation
5. Bjerring et al(1983)
	 221 additions Canada Recommendation
6. EGG(1986)	 Data base by BTC US Recommendation
7. Dimson & Marsh(1984)	 4187 forecasts	 UK Recommendation
8. Rutherford(l969) 	 142 unit trusts	 UK Performance
9. Cranshaw(l970)	 New unit trusts	 UK Performance
10.Russell & Taylor(].968) 20 unit trusts 	 UK Risk
11.BS5(1969)
	 14 unit trusts	 UK Risk
12Lorie & Niederhoffer(1968) mutual funds 	 US Insiders
13.Jaffe(1974)
	 200 large firms	 US	 Insiders
14Kerr(1980)
	
120 stocks	 US Insiders
15.Givoly and Palmon(1985)	 us Insiders
16.Seyhun(1986)
	
6000 transactions US Insiders
17.Levy & Lerman(1987)	 424 stocks	 US Insiders
18.Ippo]. jto(1989)	 143 mutual funds US Performance
19.McNjchOls(l989)
	
733 forecasts	 us Signalling
(Notes)
Insiders : Insider information
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6.5.1 Portfolio performance tests.
Friend, Brown, Herman, and Vickers(1962) examined the
performance of the mutual funds and found it was insignificantly
different from the performance of an unmanaged portfolio with
similar asset composition. Rates of return on the latter were
measured by the Standard & Poor's Index. About half of the funds
performed worse and half of the funds performed better than the
unmanaged portfolios. There was no evidence of consistently
superior performance by any of the funds. Sharpe(l966) studied
accounts for rates of return and risk, as measured by variability
in rates of return for individual funds. Even the professional
managers of mutual funds failed consistently to outperform a
comprehensive market index. Jensen(1969) compared the performance
of individual mutual funds with the expected performance from
randomly selected portfolios of equal riskiness. He found that a
mutual fund that was superior to a randomly relected portfolio in
one period was superior to a randomly selected portfolio in a
subsequent period about half the time.
Rutherford(1969) used the Spearinan correlati6n coefficient,
for the consistency or inconsistency of the rankings from year to
year, but no degree of consistency in ranking could be
recognised. Cranshaw(1970) investigated superior performance of
new unit trusts comparing average investment performance of new
unit trusts against all unit trusts. The result was only a
relatively small difference in performance which is not
sufficient to explain the preponderance of new trusts in the top
twenty. Ippolito(1989) studied the performance for 143 mutual
funds over the period 1965-1984. Mutual funds, net of all fees
and expenses, except load charges, outperformed index funds on a
risk-adjusted basis.
6.5.2 Analysts' recommendations or forecastings.
Fitzgerald(1975) examined the recommendations of 25
Stockbroking firms over the period January 1971 to March 1973.
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Stockbroking firms were first classified into six different
groups based on their answers to a questionaire. Residuals
analysis was used to study the behaviour of the share price
around the time the recommendation was published. No advantage
could be taken of the recommendations, because abnormal returns
totaled approximately 1.0%, still insufficient to cover
transaction costs. Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen(l983)
evaluate the recommendations of a Canadian brokerage house by a
number of techniques. The results reveal that an investor
following the recommendations would have achieved significantly
positive abnormal returns, even after allowing for transactions
cost.
Elton, Gruber, and Grossman(l986) examine the information
content in analysts' recommendations. The data contained over
10,000 classifications per month prepared by over 720 analysts at
34 brokerage houses. Excess risk adjusted returns could be earned
by buying upgraded stocks or stocks that were in a better
classification and selling downgraded stocks or stocks that were
in a lower classification. One was better off following the
advice of the average or concensus forecaster thai the advice of
any set of forecasters who performed best over a previous period.
Dimson and Marsh(1984) analysed 4,187 return forecasts made for
200 of the largest U.K. common stocks provided by thirty five
different firms of analysts. They correlated actual return with
forecasted returns and found an average correlation coefficient
of 0.08. Thus, the square of the correlation coefficient, (0.08)2
= 0.0064, of realised return is explained by analysts' forecasts
of return.
6.5.3 Insider information.
Lone and Niederhoffer(].968) investigated stock performance
following months in which there were at least two more buyers
than sellers or at least two more sellers than buyers among the
insiders of a company. They found that a security experiencing an
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intensive buying month was more likely to advance than to decline
relative to the market in the 6 months subsequent to the event.
conversely, a security experiencing an intensive selling month
was more likely to decline than to advance relative to the market
in the 6 months subsequent to the event. In order to estimate the
profitability of insider trades, Jaffe(l974) examines the
performance of a security. Including transaction costs eliminated
profits for outsiders in all but the intensive trading samples,
where profits on the order of 2.5% could be earned. Kerr(1980)
calculates the rate of return on a portfolio constructed from the
insider buying list and the rates of return on a random portfolio
(i.e., S & P Index). That value, 0.0484, reveals no significant
difference between the return on the insider based portfolio and
the random portfolio. Givoly and Palmon(1985) correlate insider
trading with subsequent news announcements and get surprising
results that there is no relationship between insider trading and
news events. Seyhun(1986) investigates the availability of
abnormal profits to insiders and to outsiders who imitate
insiders. As a percentage of stock price, the expected loss to
insiders and firm size are negatively correlated.
Levy and Lerman(1987) check the hypothesis that low P/E
stocks indeed performed better using stochastic dominance tests.
The low P/E portfolio was found to dominate high P/E portfolios
and the random buy-and-hold portfolios for all risk-averse
investors.
In chapter IX, the empirical tests of strong form efficient
market hypothesis on the Korean stock market will be generated.
6.6 Empirical studies on the emerging capital markets.
Over the last two decades a substantial amount of empirical
research has been undertaken to investigate market behaviour in
the U.S. and other major industrial countries of the world.
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While a limited number of empirical work is available for the
stock markets of the emerging or less developed countries,
considerable testing still needs to be undertaken for the
underdeveloped capital markets of the world. Interest in these
markets has increased significantly in recent years, but doubts
about their riskiness remain. Errunza and Rosenberg(1982)/
compared risks and returns of investment between developed and
less developed countries, and found the reverse conclusion that
investment risk for large corporations was lower in less
developed countries than developed countries. A number of
emerging markets are reasonably well-developed. In terms of
market depth, breath, turnover, and efficiency, the emerging
markets compare favourably with smaller developed markets.
Further, the international investors would be better able to bear
the liquidity and diversification constraints of individual firms
and markets in relation to domestic investors in these markets
who primarily hold local assets (Levy and Sarnat 1970, Errunza
1983, Errunza and Losq 1987).
The definition of emerging market is sometimes ambiguous,
but for convenience, all the other markets except the USA, UK,
and Japan will be included in this paper. Recently the findings
of studies for the EMil on the emerging markets are increasing,
including Norway and Sweden(Jennergren and Korsvold 1975),
Germany(Conrad and Juttner 1973), Holland(Theil and Leenders
1965), Spain(Palacios 1977), Greece(Hevas 1984), Hong Kong,
Singapore and Malaysia (Law 1983, Dawson 1984 1987, Neoh 1986,
Laurence 1986), Thailand (Sareewiwatthana and Malone 1985, Barnes
1986), Kuwait (Gandhi et al 1980) , Finland(1988), and Mexico
(Haugen et a.1985). Also world market analysis is found in
I
Cooper(1982) ,f Some of them are summarised in table (6.4).
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Serial, runs.
Serial . runs.
ARR
Serial . runs.
CAPM & APT
Others-rej ect
Reject
Reject
Accept
Reject
Reject
Table(6.4) Summary of EMH on the emerging markets
- Naine(year)	 Country(Sample)	 Testing method	 Efficiency
1.Jennergren(1975) Sweden (30)	 Filter test	 Reject
2.Jennergren &	 Norway(15) &
	
Serial, runs.
Korsvold(1975)	 Sweden(30)	 & distribution tests Reject
3.Officer(1975)	 Australia(651)	 Seasonality	 Accept
4.Jttner & McHugh Australia(188)	 Runs.serial.	 Reject
(1976)
5.Roux &	 Johannesburg(24) Serial.runs.
	 Reject
Gilbertson(1978)
6.Ang & Pohlman	 Far East	 Serial	 Accept
(1978)
7.HaJ. Hong(1978)	 Far East(4)	 Serial.runs.	 Japan-accept
8.Gandhi et al(1980) Kuwaitindex)
9.Law(1983)	 Hong Kong(56)
1O.Dawson(1984)	 Hong Kong(267)
11.Wong & Kwong	 Hong Kong(28)
(1984)
12 .Sareewiwatthana Thailand(30)
& Malone(1985)
13 .Parkinson(l985) Kuwait 	 Theil-Leenders	 Reject
14.Barnes(1986)	 Thailand(72)	 Serial.runs.spectral Accept
15.Laurence(1986) Malaysia(16) 	 Serial.runs.	 Reject
& Singapore(24)
16.Dawson(1987) Hong Kong(21), Singapore New issues 	 Accept
(39) & Malaysia(21)	 & reject
(Notes)
ARR : Abnormal average return.
Serial: Serial correlation analysis.
Runs: Runs test.
Spectral: Spectral analysis.
6.7 Implications of the efficient market hrrothesis.
Even if not agreeable between a believer and the investment
COmmunity, the validity of the random-walk or efficient market
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hypothesis draws its significance, ultimately, from its practical
implications for market participants. The concept of EMH cannot
adequately be defined except in terms of its practical
consequences for investors, an efficient market being one whose
prices are such that investors cannot 'beat the market' other
than by chance (Keane 1983). EMH says that most security analysis
is logically incomplete and valueless. Therefore, any hope for
earning consistent abnormal returns for a given risk level lies
in nonstandard ways of combining and analysing information, or in
obtaining information that is not generally available to other
market participants, or in obtaining this information prior to
other market participants. Many investors do subscribe to the
conventional view, and it is a fair assumption that few are
personally familiar with the empirical research literature.
The optimal policy for believers of the EMH is to secure a
position which ininimises the chance of being beaten by the
market, in effect to hold the market portfolio. An investor's
primary task is to maximise diversification and to minimise
transaction costs. Even without the prospects of superior
profits, an efficient market may be assumed to depend heavily
upon the activities of a skilled broker or investment analyst who
is a kind of financial interior decorator to design portfolios to
reflect his client's personality. Under this strategy, the roles
of the investment advisers are to perform:
(a)determination of the appropriate level of risk for the
portfolio, (b) achievement of the desired level of risk by
constructing a portfolio of well-diversified common stocks, which
is either dampened through inclusion of riskless assets or
leveraged by purchasing on margin, (c) periodic review of the
appropriateness of the level of risk, (d) maintenance of the
desired level of risk, (e) management of additions to and
deletions from the portfolio to minimise taxes and provide either
for additional investment or for the reduction of investment in
order to make disbursements, (f) miniiiiisation of transaction
Costs. To do them, investment advisers deserve more research and
resources than they traditionally receive (Lone et al. 1985).
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Market efficiency also implies that the suppliers of capital
should accept rather than seek to exploit the market's prices and
the financial managers should accept rather than seek to exploit
its signals. The price of time and risk and, therefore, the
benchmark for evaluating investment projects, is determined
solely in the market place, and not only applies equally to all
companies in the market, but is incapable of being affected by
them.
6.8 Conclusion.
This chapter deals with the literature connected with
research on the subject of capital market efficiency. Given that
this field is one of the most intensely researched areas of
finance, the number of publications which has to be reviewed is
very large. Clearly there are many areas requiring further and
better research. Conditions in the market place change overtime.
It would be informative to repeat some of the early work on more
recent data. Intensive research in this area is only possible
with the advent of large high speed computers and the setup of
large computerised databases.
For the weak form and semi-strong form efficiency, the
weight of the evidence on the advanced capital markets is
overwhelmingly in favour of efficiency. The evidence suggests
that the stock market rapidly and accurately discounts new
information into share prices, so stock prices confirm to a fair
game model. But they are not precisely a random walk because of
small first-order dependencies in prices and nonstationarities in
the underlying price distribution over time. The empirical tests
are not consistent with the strong form. In certain situations,
individuals with inside information appear to be able to earn
abnormal returns. In particular, corporate insiders can beat the
market when trading in the securities of their firm. More
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evidence of the strong form hypothesis would be desirable,
particularly of performance of forecasting and performance of
institutions other than pension funds and unit trusts. If the
market is efficient as per the strong form hypothesis then the
semi-strong form and the weak form hypothesis also hold.
While a limited number of empirical work is available for
the emerging capital markets, many of their results are not
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis in even their
weak form and semi-strong form. More testing still needs to be
undertaken for the underdeveloped capital markets of the world.
The efficient market test on the Korean capital market with
international literature could not be found, even its market has
grown rapidly In recent years, as explained in Chapter II.
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CHAPTER VII. THE WEAK FORM EMPIRICAL TESTS OP THE KOREAN STOCK
MARKET.
7.1 Introduction.
As explained in chapters II and III, the capital market in
Korea has been developing rapidly during past two decades and it
is on the way of liberalisation to international investors in
1992. However, besides some descriptive studies, no research has
been found in the international literature in respect of the
behaviour of the capital market. The reason is believed to be
that a computerised databank has not been established until
recent years, even though the Stock Exchange has promoted the
computerisation of securities transaction since 1975. In recent
years, however, the securities industry in Korea has experienced
consolidation with the merger of major firms and acquisitions by
large business groups. The capital base has been broadened
gradually since the Government's measures for the Reinforcement
of Capital Market Functions was macted in July 1983 to induce
corporations in good standing to go public and help propel the
new issue market.
During the last several years, Korean securities houses
realised a spectacular business performance helped by the market
rally, and in their attempt to strengthen competition and to
boost preparation for internationalisation, one after another,
they concentrated on stronger capital base, and manpower.
Especially large houses which are permitted to do international
business are setting up over ten securities and economic research
institutes for research activities to provide quick, in-depth
information to investors both home and abroad. On the other hand,
investment management firms were newly opened in 1988. The
competitive boom of establishing them by securities companies or
others resulted in the appearance of over 20 new-born firms. This
changing environment is expected to make a great contribution to
capital market research in the near future.
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This chapter is a comprehensive investigation of the weak
form of the efficient market hypothesis in the Korean stock
market. The actual tests will be the followings: serial
correlation analysis, runs test, and spectral analysis. Before
doing these tests, frequency distributions will be analysed. With
these tests, the efficiency characteristics of two different
periods are compared with each other. Thirty companies in January'
1978 to December 1980 and thirty four companies in January 1986
to December 1988 were selected as samples. Also the Korea
Composite Stock Price Indices (KCSPIs) were compared in the same
periods. To investigate short-term movements, huge numbers of
daily price observations were used (total 53,887 observations).
Also some effects of daily price limit system will be examined,
with the exclusion of data of over 10% fluctuation in a day.
7.2 The models used.
For the weak-form tests, three different models are used in
this research:
(a) Serial correlation coefficient model.
(b)Runs analysis model.
(c) Spectral analysis model.
Before doing these, the distribution of price changes will be
tested to see if it is normally distributed. The significance
tests are followed by the three different models which are
mentioned above.
7.2.1 Frequency distribution model.
There is a simple way of analysing the distribution of
changes in log price, by constructing frequency distributions
for the individual stocks. Mathematically, the pricing model may
be expressed in a number of ways but the simplest model is of the
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form:
=	
+
Where t is the price of a stock at time t, Pt... is the price of
the stock in the immediately preceding period and Et is a random
error.
As Granger and Morgenstern(1970) and Cooper(l982) stated:
a) if Et and Et_k are uncorrelated where k is any lag and k > 0,
then k is a second-order martingale, i.e., the absence of serial
correlation does not in itself imply independence,
b) if Et and Et_k are independent where k > 0, then P. is a
strict random walk,
c) if Et and Et_k are independent and Et are all identically
normally distributed, then P is a Wiener process.
The sum to which P dollars will amount after k periods at a
continuous rate of return Ut is
A=Pexp (Utk)
after one time period where k = 1
A=Pexp (Ut)
We know that 't/t = exp (log (t+l/t)]
t+l = t exp [ log (t+i/t)]
therefore,	 U = log (t+i/t) = log	 - log t
where	 : the stock price at the end of day t + 1,
: the stock price at the end of day t.
For each stock, the empirical proportions of price changes
within given standard deviations of the mean can be computed and
compared with what would be expected if the distributions were
exactly normal.
7.2.2 The Serial correlation Coefficient Model.
The serial correlation coefficient (rk) provides a measure
of the relationship between the value of a random variable in
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time t and its value k periods earlier. The population serial
correlation coefficient (Rk) is estimated using the sample serial
correlation coefficient ( rk) .	 For the variable U,
(=log	 - log nt)' the serial correlation coefficient for lag
k is the correlation between pairs of terms k units apart, viz
Coy
 ( Ut, Ut_k )
(7-i)	 rk =
o( U. )•a( Ut_k )
which can be approximated by
Coy ( U, Ut_k )
(7-2)	 rk
Var ( Ut
where Uk is a log price relative,
t =1, 2, . . . , n
k =1, 2, . . . , n-i
Or in more analytical terms
1 n-k	 1 
n-k ] [ Ut+k	
1 n-k
— E --	
--EUt+k]n-kl Lt n_ki t
	-ki
(7-3) rk = 1 n-k	 1 n-k	 1 n-k	 1 n-k	 ½
[—E(ut_—Eu )2.—E(Un-k 1	 n-k 1	 n-k i	 t+k _flTiE Ut+k)2]
In practice (and also for theoretical convenience) it makes
for simplicity to modify these definitions to some extent.
Instead of measuring the first (n-k)U's about their mean, we may
measure about the mean of the whole set of observations; and
similarly for the values at the end. Thus, writing U for
flU
E	 , we may put as follows (Kendall and Stuart, 1964 & 1976).
in
n-k
E (Ut - U) • (Ut+k - U)
n 1
(7-4)	 rk = -.
	
n-k	 n	 -
E (Ut - U)2
Hagerman and Richmond(l973) suggested another approach as
the following estimate of the slope coefficient in the regression
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model for large samples
Ut = a + Ut_k + Et
In this model, fi is the effect of the return from t-k-1 to t-k
on the return from t-k to t-k+l. a is the average continuously
compounded monthly return on the security if
	 is zero, which is
implied by serial independence.
If the distribution of U. has finite variance, then for
large samples, the standard error of rk may be computed as
a a(r) 
=	
(Fama 1965, Cooper 1982, Wong and Kwong 1984).
We will test whether rk is significantly different from zero, by
comparing rk with the statistic 1201. If Irk I ^ 2 1 0 1, then rk
is not significantly different from zero. If Irk I > 2 1 0 1, then
it is significantly different from zero, which means that there
exists a linear dependence among U , Ut_k.
7.2.3 Runs Analysis Model.
A 'run' is defined as a sequence of price changes of the same
sign. For stock price changes, there are three different types
of price change: positive (+), negative (-), and zero (0).
Therefore, there are three different types of runs. The number
of runs over any given period is the number of sign changes plus
one. The larger is the positive serial dependence in price
changes, the smaller will be the expected number of runs. The
expected number of runs (m) is compared with the actual number of
runs (R) and the standardised normalised variable k tests the
statistical significance of (R -
R + 1/2 - m(7-5)	 k =
where
3
N(N+l) - E fl.2
i=l 1
N
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m : the expected number of runs in the series.
N : the total number of price changes or differences (Ut).
nj :the number of price changes of each type (i = 1 for positive
changes, i = 2 for negative changes, i = 3 for no change).
The standard error of m is
3	 23	 2	 33	 3	 ½
E I1i {E ni + N(N + 1)) - 2N E ni - N
(76)	 0m =
N2 (N - 1)
The computation of m is based on two assumptions: that the sample
proportions of positive, negative and zero price changes are good
estimates of the population proportions and that successive price
changes are independent (Wong and Kwong 1984).
For large N, the sampling distribution of m is
approximately normal. Because the distribution of k is N(O,l),
then the critical value of k at the 5% level of significance is
±1.96 • Wherever k ^ I 1.961, then the sign movements series are
not randomly distributed and a tendency exists for a movement in
the direction to be succeeded by a further movement in the same
direction. In such cases, the random walk hypothesis is rejected,
otherwise, it is accepted.
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7.2.4 Spectral analysis model.
7.2.4.1 Introduction.
Spectral analysis decomposes a time series into a number of
components, each associated with a frequency or period. The
'frequency' of variation is the reciprocal of the period.
Frequency indicates the number of cycles per unit of time, and
the period describes the length of the time required for one
complete cycle. This chapter examines the transformation of
changes in the log of share prices which defines the correspon-
dence between the time domain and the frequency domain. This
allows the researcher to pinpoint any cyclical or seasonal
patterns and to measure their relative importance in a way which
the simple statistical methods of time series analysis cannot.
This spectral decomposition of a time series yields a spectral
density function and measures the relative importance of each of
the frequency bands in terms of its contribution to the overall
variance of the time series. Essentially, spectral analysis is an
examination of the variance of a time series with respect to
frequency components (Rausser and Cargill 1970, Leuthold 1972).
Two special types of spectra need to be noted. If the
spectrum is flat, indicating that every component is present to
an equal amount, the series is merely a sequence of uncorrelated
readings, a so-called 'purely random or white noise series'. That
means, if the random walk model is in fact true, then :
(7-7)	 X=logP1-logP
where	 is the closing price series in time t, the model
suggested that X has mean zero and is uncorrelated with Xt+k,
all k + 0. The X. series is called white noise. If the spectrum
has a clear peak at some frequency, this results in a 'cycle'
appearing in the series. In practice, estimated spectra are
rarely of either of these shapes, rather being very high at zero
and very low frequencies (long periods) and consistently falling
in value as frequency increases, except for possible peaks at the
Seasonal frequencies ('typical spectral shape').
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Spectral analysis has been much used in testing necessary
conditions for market efficiency, in the context of commodity
markets, futures markets, securities markets, money markets, and
foreign exchange market. The subject is to decide if the
estimated spectrum departs from a population spectrum which is a
constant independent of frequency or price always follow a random
walk. Previous studies on share prices have been carried out by
Granger and Morgenstern(1963, 1970), Praetz(1973, 1979), Cooper
(1982), and Hevas(l984). Bond prices have been studied by Granger
and Rees(1968), Juttner, Madden and Tuckwell(l975). Also Larson
(1964), Roll(l972), Leuthold(1972), Dusak(1973), and Cargill and
Rauser(l975) have studied on the commodity or futures prices. The
main references on applied spectral analysis in social science
are Granger and Hatanaka (1964), Fishman(1969), Harvey(l975), and
Kendall(l976). The notation here follows those of Harvey(l975)
and Praetz(l979).
7.2.4.2 The model to be tested.
Consider the Fourier transform which expresses fx(w) in
terms of the r(k) and w, i.e.,
1
(78)	 fx(W) = - E T x( k ) exp (-iwk),	 -w^w^w
2w k=-a
where w is frequency measured in radians per unit time, fx(w) is
a continuous function of w called the theoretical power spectrum
and I is the square root of -1, and rx(k) is the covariance
between X. and Xt+k.
Since we are dealing with a real process, the autocovariance
function will be symmetric about k=0, and likewise the power
spectrum will be symmetric about w=0. Expression (7-8) can
therefore be expressed as
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1
(79)	 f(") = - [ox2 + 2 E T(k) COS wk],	 O^w^,T
27r	 k=1
Estimation of the spectrum corresponding to a theoretical
f(w) often uses a finite set of values, denoted (wJ 1 j=0, 1,..,
in, as it is impossible to estimate overall values of w, O^w^ir. A
very commonly used set of values is an equispaced set (Praetz
1979) defined by wj = jw/m. For the size of in, conventional
wisdom suggests in n/5 to n/6, where n data points are
available.
Therefore spectral estimates are of the form
	
1	 in
(7-10)	 f(wj) = - [&. C(0) + 2 E !.tk C(k) cos w.jk]
	
27	 k=l
where
n-k
C(k) = E (Xt - X) (Xt+k - X) / (n-k)
i.e., C(k) is the autocovariance coefficient of order k.
"k : a set of weighting coefficients.
in : an arbitrary integer to be chosen by the user
representing the maximum lag.
: a set of real numbers with IwI ^
(j = 0, 1, 2, . . •, in)
If an appropriate set of weights is not used, the estimates
f(wj ) are not consistent estimates of f(w). Therefore weights "k
are used for consistent estimates of f(w). There are several
weights functions used, and the commonly used set of windows are
the 2nd Tukey-Hanning weights and the 2nd Parzen weights (Jenkins
1961).
(1)the 1st Bartlett weights k = 1
(2)the 2nd Bartlett weights 1'k = 1-k/rn
(3)the 1st Tukey-Hanning weights
= l-2a+2acos7rk/iu
(a=0. 23 suggested)
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(4) the 2nd Tukey-Hanning weights
1
= - (1 + cos irk/rn),	 1k! < m
= 0,	 IkI ^ m
(5)the 1st Parzen weights 	
'k = l-k2/m2
(6)the 2nd Parzen weights
- 1 - 6k2 (1 - IkI / m)/m2
3
= 2(1 - Iki /m)
m
o < 1k! ^ -2
m
- ^ 1k! < m2
1k! ^rn
(k=0, 1, . . . n)
=0
(7) Daniell	 = sin kh / kh
After having obtained the spectral estimates, the next step
is to examine whether or not they represent a significant
deviation from a white-noise time series. It has been shown that
for a sequence of uncorrelated normal variates, the periodogram
is proportional to a chi-squared variate with two degrees of
freedom (Fishinan 1969, Praetz 1979). Spectral estimates will be
asymptotically chi-squared with equivalent degrees of freedom
(EDF) a function of the weights ('k} used. More specifically, for
the 2nd Tukey-Hanning weight and for the 2nd Parzen weight, they
are
2 n
EDF = 2 - -
3m
n
= 3.7 -
m
for the 2nd Tukey-Hanning weights
for the 2nd Parzen weights.
The significance of the spectral ordinates, therefore, can
be estimated by getting confidence interval at a level a of
significance. The confidence intervals used are of the form
(Howrey 1968, Praetz 1979, Gottman 1981, Hevas 1984).
(711)
	 1 - a = P{f(wj) V1 ^ f(w j ) ^ f(w j ) V}
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S2	 EDF•f(w4) 2
or	 P{X
EDF,a/2 f(wj )	 EDF,a/2
where
2
V1 X	 / EDF is the lower limit
EDF, 1-a/2
2
and V2 = X	 I EDF is the upper limit.
EDF,a/2
As the flat spectrum can be simplified to f(w)=a 2 /2n for all
w by the equation (7-9), actual spectral estimates are compared
whether they deviate from the flat spectrum. In this case a 2
 can
be replaced by the sample variances (Praetz 1979). Therefore, the
actual test is to consider the number of estimates that lie
outside the confidence interval and compare them with the
expected number of observations to lie out of the confidence
intervals. Praetz(1979) has shown that for a 95% spectral
confidence limits (a=O.05), the expected value of s, the number
of estimated spectral ordinates, is given by
(7-12)	 E(s) = O.05(m + 1)
The only problem which this approach presents is to judge whether
the difference, s-E(s), presents a serious deviation from a white
noise or not. Any answer on that is, for the time being,
subjective relying explicitly on the researcher's personal
judgement (Hevas 1984).
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7.3 The sample data and Results.
7.3.1 Sample data and adjustment.
In selecting sample stocks the primary factor considered was
homogeneity of both market sector and trading activity. Data for
this study are composed of individual stock price observations of
two different periods: 30 companies commencing 1st January 1978
through 31st December 1980 and 34 companies commencing 1st
January 1986 through 31st December 1988. These samples were the
stocks of major companies in various industries and were traded
actively. For the period of 1986 - 1988, four extra sample
companies were added. They were selected each one company from
four financial subsectors: provincial bank, short-term finance
company, securities company, and insurance company. They were not
traded actively in 1970's. But now they became some of the most
actively traded stocks. Also the Korea Composite Stock Price
Index(KCSPI) was compared in the same periods. For each sample,
the daily share prices which it is actually traded were traced.
The share price which is not traded is excluded, regardless of
whether it moved downward or upward. Thus there are sixty six
samples with about 400 - 900 observations per sample (total
53,887 observations). Original stock price data were obtained
from Dongsuh Securities Co., Ltd. in Seoul which is one of the
biggest investment bankers in Korea with market capitalisation of
nearly US$ 2.0 Bil. at the end of March 1989.
Before using the data for statistical tests, they were
transformed and screened for large errors using the following
methods. The actual tests were not performed on the daily prices
themselves but on the first differences of their natural
1ogaritiirs. The variable of interest is
pt+1
== loge
	loge P^ - loge P,
Pt
where
	 is the closing price of the stock at the day t+l,
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and t is the closing price at the day t.
This is a procedure widely used in the empirical research
for the following reasons:
(a) The change in the log price is the yield, with continuous
compounding, from holding the stock for that day (Fama 1965),
that is
Pt+1	 Pt+1
-exp ( loge
Pt+1
't exp ( loge	) = 't exp ( loge 't+i - loge P
Pt
This is equivalent to 'the assumption that investors are
interested in proportional changes in share prices rather than in
their absolute value.
(b) Moore (1965) has shown that the variability of price changes
for a given stock is an increasing function of the price level of
the stock; taking logarithms seems to neutralise most of this
price level effect.
Also sample data were adjusted for cash and stock dividends,
splits, and rights issues as those models established by Fama
(1965). Rights issue adjustment assumed the value of a right,
R= ( tr / (n+l),
where
= closing price on last trading day before ex-right day,
= subscritption prices, and
n = number of rights required to buy one new share
(Laurence 1986).
Appendices 7.1 and 7.2 present the samples of common stocks
and adjustment factors used in the weak-form tests. The analyses
Were performed by Fortran 77 programme using the Prime computer
in the city University.
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7.3.2 The Results.
7.3.2.1. Frequency distributions.
The particular issue considered here is whether or not share
prices follow a random walk. For the frequency distribution
analysis, the 'Fama' approach is utilised. In a perfectly
competitive stock market, share prices presumably equal their
intrinsic values. Gross rates of return, discounted for the risk
of every individual stock, should be the same for all stocks.
Therefore, prices that fully reflect the available information
are the correct signal to guide the efficient allocation of
capital. Since share price related information could be generated
randomly during the day-to-day operation of the economy, share
prices would also adjust randomly upwards or downwards with
respect to new information, if the market is efficient.
Appendices 7.3(l)-7.3(6) illustrate means, standard
deviations, and the proportions of observations within 0.5, 1.0,
1.5, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0 and 5.0 standard deviations of the mean, as
well as the proportion greater than 5.0 standard dviations from
the mean found by Fama(1965). Two different data sets are used in
this research. One is the total samples. The other is the trimmed
data. This is to check the daily price limit system in the Korean
stock market. The daily share price upward or downward limit was
around 5%-13% in 1970s. But to find the daily prices which have
moved to the actual limit is almost impossible. Thus, the trimmed
data used here exclude observations of over ±10% movement in a
day. Thirty observations in 1978-1980 and thirteen observations
in 1986-1988 were found over ±10% in the difference of daily
share price return. But the daily returns on the ex-right day of
right issues, bonus issues, and dividend payment are included in
the trimmed data, even though they are over ±10% of daily return,
because the price limits do not apply.
Comparisons of empirical frequency distributions with other
markets are summarised in table 7.1. On the first line of the
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body of the tables the proportions for the unit normal
distribution are given. Also the comparisons of the unit normal
and the empirical distributions were given in appendices 7.3(7)-
7.3(9). Positive numbers in these tables mean the excess of
relative frequency in the empirical distribution over what would
be expected for the given interval, if the distribution were
normal. Similarly, negative numbers are interpreted as the
deficiency of relative frequency within the given interval.
Some samples are very close to normal distribution (e.g.,
sample no.30, 20, 81, 83), but some samples are very far from
the normal distribution (No. 29, 6, 7). Within 0.5 standard
deviation, all the samples are negative except one (sample
No.20). But within 2.0 standard deviations, only 9 out of 66 are
negative. The empirical distributions of 59 among 66 samples are
more peaked in the center within 1.0 standard deviation than the
normal distribution. And average results over 3.0 standard
deviations have larger tails than the normal distribution. This
indicates relatively 'fat' tails combined with peakedness or
leptokurtosis. The results using the ±10% trimmed data are quite
similar as those using the total data. Even though the daily
share price limit system exists, the empirical distribution of
daily share price returns fluctuated very widely within the
limit. Also the bonus issue, right issue, and cash dividend
payment had sometimes a quite positively effect on share prices.
On the ex-right dates on which the daily share price limit system
does not apply, the daily share price returns in many cases were
found very large.
Compared with other markets, empirical distributions in the
center within 1.0 standard deviation in Korean market during
1978-1980 is similar as Singapore and Malaysia, and less close to
normal distribution than USA and Sweden. However, the results of
between 1986-1988 are presented much closer to the normal distri-
bution than those of other researches and those of between 1978-
1980. This means that the market has recently become more
similar to those of advanced markets. Also the reduced limit of
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daily share price upward or downward in 1986-1988 compared with
that of 1978-1980 seemed to have affected the empirical results.
(Table 7.1) Comparison of empirical frequency distributions
INTERVALS
0.5SD 1.OSD l.5SD 2.OSD 3.OSD 4.OSD 5.OSD >5.OSD
	
Normal	 0.3830 0.6826 0.8664 0.9545 0.9973 0.9999 1.0000 0.0000
Korea
(1).1978-1980
30 Co(x)0.5271 0.7561 0.8721 0.9378 0.9871 0.9971 0.9989 0.0011
30 Co(y)0.5204 0.7529 0.8693 0.9356 0.9877 0.9979 0.9992 0.0008
	
KCSPI	 0.5455 0.8114 0.9148 0.9568 0.9875 0.9909 0.9932 0.0068
(2).1986-1988
34 Co(x)0.4537 0.7086 0.8502 0.9431 0.9966 0.9994 0.9998 0.0002
34 Co(y)0.4519 0.7064 0.8485 0.9418 0.9969 0.9997 1.0000 0.0000
	
KCSPI	 0.4224 0.7295 0.8881 0.9532 0.9920 0.9988 0.9989 0.0011
USA(a) 0.4667 0.7469 0.8847 0.9478 0.9886 0.9970 0.9988 0.0012
Sweden(b)0.4624 0.7487 0.8833 0.9451 0.9877 0.9966 0.9990 0.0010
Norway(b)0.5534 0.8038 0.8995 0.9447 0.9815 0.9921 0.9963 0.0037
Malaysia
(c)	 0.5609 0.7967 0.8995 0.9462 0.9833 0.9943 0.9970 0.0030
Singapore
(c) 0.5814 0.8085 0.9056 0.9487 0.9820 0.9926 0.9963 0.0037
Johannesburg
(d) 0.5316 0.7733 0.8903 0.9436 0.9834 0.9948 	 -	 -
(Notes)
x: Results using total samples.
y: Results using trimmed data which are excluded over ±10% of
the first difference of daily share prices.
SD: Standard deviation.
(a)Famna (1965).
(b)Jennergren and Korsvold (1975).
(c)Laurence(1986).
(d)Roux and Gilbertson(1978).
In appendices 3(10)-3(12), extreme tail areas in terms of
number of observations rather than relative frequencies are
calculated and they are summarised in table (7.2). In sampling
from a normal distribution the probability that an observation
will be more than two standard deviations from the mean is
0.04550. In a sample of size N, the expected nunthers of obser-
vations more than two, three, four, and five standard deviations
from the mean are NxO.04550, NxO.0027, NxO.000063, and N
X0.0000006 respectively.
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(Table 7.2) Summary of analysis of extreme tail areas
INTERVALS
>2SD	 >3SD	 >4SD	 >5SD
EN AN AN/EN EN AN AN/EN EN AN AN/EN EN AN AN/EN
Korea(1). 1978-1980
30(x) 1079.6 1464 1.4 64.1 293 4.6 1.49 63 42 0.0142 25 1761
30(y) 1078.3 1507 1.4 64.0 279 4.4 1.49 49 33 0.0142 19 1338
KCSPI	 40.0	 38 1.0 2.4 11 4.6 0.06 8 133 0.0005 6
	 12000(2) .1986-88
34(x) 1289.3 1624 1.3 76.5 92 1.2 1.79 16
	 9 0.0170 5
	
294
34(y) 1288.8 1657 1.3 76.5 85 1.1 1.78 8	 4 0.0170 1
	 59
KCSPI	 39.9	 41 1.0 2.4	 7 2.9 0.06 1 17 0.0005 1
	 200
USA(a) 1787.4 2058 1.2 106 448 4.2 2.51 120 48 0.0233 45 1931
(Notes)
x: the results using all the daily share price returns.
y: the results using the ±10% trinuiied daily share price returns.
SD: Standard deviation.
EN: Expected numbers.
AN: Actual numbers.(a) Fama(1965).
The results are not consistent across the samples. But the
average shows that actual numbers are higher than expected
numbers and if we are closer to tail areas, the ratio of actual
numbers by expected numbers becomes much larger. And actual
samples show slightly less leptokurtosis than does the KCSPI.
However, at the extreme tail areas the results are much different
from sample to sample. For instance, 18 actual numbers out of 30
samples in 1978-80 and 23 out of 34 samples in 1986-88 over four
standard deviations are smaller than expected numbers. Some
samples show fluctuations of daily share price returns within
three standard deviations. 6 actual numbers out of 30 samples in
1978-1980 and 18 out of 34 samples in 1986-1988 over three
standard deviations are smaller than expected numbers. The
distributions at the extreme tail areas in Korean market are
closer to a normal distribution than that of Faina(1965). Also
between the two different periods, the average result of 1986-
1988 is much closer to a normal distribution than that of 1978-
1980. The trimmed data showed slightly reduced fat tails.
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7.3.2.2. Serial Correlation Coefficient Analysis.
This test is simply a computation of the correlation
coefficients between price changes lagged 1,2,3,4.... etc., time
periods.(Kendall 1976). Basically, the efficient market theory
tells us whether the change of today's price can be predicted by
the change in share price of yesterday or several days ago.
serial correlation coefficients were computed on the sample
data's log price differences between consecutive transaction days
(differencing interval 1) for lags 1-10. Results for lags 1-10
are shown in appendices 7.4(1)-7.4(2). Of the 64 serial
correlation coefficients for lag 1, only 19 are non-significant
at the 5% level. The largest coefficient is 0.323 and the
smallest coefficient is -0.095, while the mean serial correla-
tions for 30 samples in 1978-1980 is 0.098 and for 34 samples in
1986-1988 is 0.110. While for lag 1 the serial correlation
coefficients are generally positive, only four out of 64 are
negative. Agreement in signs among the coefficients for
different stocks may indicate that there is a constant pattern of
dependence.
However, King(1966) argued that price changes of different
stocks are related to a certain extent to a 'market' component
common to all stocks. Wong and Kwong (1984) mentioned that this
common market component may tend to produce a common sign for rk
of all stocks during a specific sampling period. And 44 out of
64, or 69%, of samples are statistically significant at least at
the 2a level. For lag 2, 46 of 64 serial correlation coefficients
are negative and 20 of 64 or 31.3% are significant at 2a level.
While mean values tend to become smaller as the lag increases, no
distinct patterns emerge from serial correlation coefficients for
lags greater than four. If we compare two different periods, the
fluinbers of significance at 20 level are only slightly larger in
lags i, , 7, and 9 in 1986-1988 than in 1978-1980.
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	9 	 12
	
25	 22
	
2	 4
5.9 11.8
-0.02 -0.02
(2). 1986-1988
(+)	 33	 10	 13
(-)	 1	 24	 21
^2a 25	 8	 6
%	 73.5	 23.5	 17.6
AV 0.11 -0.01 -0.02
	
19	 12	 15	 28	 17
	
15	 22	 19	 6	 17
	
2	 2	 3	 3	 2
	
5.9	 5.9	 8.8	 8.8	 5.9
0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.01
(Table 7.3) Summary of the serial correlation analysis
ig	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
pANEL A: using all the share price returns
(1). 1978-1980
(+)	 27	 8	 8	 5	 7	 13	 13	 14	 20	 14
(-)	 3	 22	 22	 25	 23	 17	 17	 16	 10	 16
^2a	 20	 12	 8	 5	 2	 3	 1	 2	 2	 3
%	 66.7	 40.0	 26.7	 16.7	 6.7	 10.0	 3.3	 6.7	 6.7	 10.0
AV 0.10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.00
(2). 1986-1988
(+)	 33	 10	 12	 9	 12	 20	 13	 15
(-)	 1	 24	 22	 25	 22	 14	 21	 19
^2a	 24	 8	 6	 4	 6	 2	 2	 3
%	 70.6	 23.5	 17.6	 11.8	 17.6	 5.9	 5.9	 8.8
AV 0.11 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00
PANEL B: using the trimmed data
(1). 1978-1980
(+)	 28	 10	 7	 5	 6	 14	 13	 12
(-)	 2	 20	 23	 25	 24	 16	 17	 18
^2a	 20	 12	 10	 4	 1	 4	 1	 2
%	 66.7	 40.0	 33.3	 13.3	 3.3	 13.3	 3.3	 6.7
AV 0.10 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
	
27	 17
	
7	 17
	
3	 2
	
8.8	 5.9
0.03 -0.01
	
19	 12
	
11	 18
	
3	 2
	
10.0	 6.7
0.02 -0.00
(Notes)
the trimmed data: the trimmed data over ±10% of daily share
price returns.
(+): Number of positive signs.
(-): Number of negative signs.
^2a: Number of serial correlation coefficient greater than 2a.
%: Percentage of the number of serial correlation coefficient
greater than 2a.
AV: Average serial correlation coefficient.
If we compare the results in Korean market with others (table
7.4), the number of over 2a are larger than those of other
narkets. The standard deviation in Korea is smaller than those of
other markets. The results using the trimmed data also shows many
numbers of serial correlation coefficient greater than 20
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(see appendix 7.4(3) and 7.4(4)). The results of using these two
different sets of data show the high levels of serial
correlation, thus the change of today's price could be said to be
predicted a little bit by the change in share price of yesterday
or several days ago.
(Table 7.4) Comparisons of serial correlation coefficients
distribution
ASC	 SD	 No^2a	 Positive No
Korea
	
1978-80(30 Co.)(x) 0.098	 0.039	 20/30	 27/30
	
(y) 0.104	 0.034	 20/30	 28/30
	
1986-88(34 Co.)(x) 0.110
	 0.028	 24/34	 33/34
	
(y) 0.113	 0.027	 25/34	 33/34
USA(a)	 0.026	 0.057	 11/30	 22/30
UK(a)	 0.072	 0.066	 21/40	 34/40
France(a)	 -0.019	 0.082	 41/65	 33/65
Italy(a)	 -0.023	 0.069	 9/30	 14/30
Germany(a)	 0.078	 0.075	 23/35	 28/35
Switzerland(a)	 0.012	 0.073	 4/17	 11/17
Sweden(a)	 0.056	 0.049	 1/6	 3/6
Brazil(b)	 -0.163	 0.127	 5/64	 6/64
(Notes)
x: using all the daily stock returns.
y: using the trimmed data.
ASC : Average serial correlation.
SD : Standard deviation of average serial correlation.
No^2a : Number of termns^2o.
Positive No.: Number of positive terms.
(a)From Solnik(1973,p.1156).
(b)From Errunza(1979, p.374). The statistics reported here are
for monthly data of 64 companies.
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7.3.2.3 Runs Analysis.
Following Faxna (1965) runs tests were calculated for the
same samples. The results for differencing interval 1 are
presented in appendices 7.3(1), 7.3(3), 7.3(5) and 7.5(l)-7.5(2)
for the total data and in appendices 7.5(3)-7.5(4) for the
trimmed data, and are summarised in table 7.5. All but three
stocks have negative standardised variables indicating that 61 of
64 companies have less actual than expected runs for each set of
all the data and the trimmed data respectively.
(Table 7.5) Summary of runs analysis
Samples	 RA	 RE	 SE	 (RA-RE) /RE
	 SV
1978-1980
30 Co.s(x)	 393	 447.8	 13.146	 -0.144	 -5.214*
30 Co.s(y)	 391	 477.3	 13.137	 -0.144	 -5.207*
KCSPI	 363	 442.4	 14.771	 -0.177	 -5.275*
1986-1988
34 Co.s(x)	 447	 502.5	 13.513	 -0.078	 -2.866*
34 Co.s(y)	 446	 502.4	 13.510	 -0.078	 -2.866*
KCSPI	 384	 429.5	 14.220	 -0.104	 -3.096*
(Notes)
x: The result using all the stock returns.
y: The result using the trimmed data.
RA: The actual number of runs.
RE: The expected number of runs.
SE: Standard error.
(RA-RE)/RE: Fractional difference.
SV: Standardised variable.
*: over the critical value at the 5% level.
Also the significance levels of the standardised variables
in table 7.5 and the mean absolute standard variables in table
7.6 are very high and the latter are much larger than those of
other research, as seen in table 7.6. 46 out of 64 share prices
(25 in 1978-1980, 21 in 1986-1988) do not appear to be randomly
distributed. Only 18 out of 64 companies appear to be randomly
distributed at 5% significance level. The results using the
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trimmed data are quite similar as those of using all the data. By
way of comparison, the minimum values in Korean market(-9.243,
-.9.330, -7.864, and -7.826) are smaller than those of other
markets. Also the mean absolute standard variables in Korea are
the largest levels at 5.25 in 1978-1980 and 2.96 in 1986-1988.
These results strongly suggest that there is a tendency in price
movements, not to follow a random walk, thus rejecting the weak
form of the EMH.
(Table 7.6) Runs test comparisons(differencing interval 1,lag 1)
Standardised variables
Reference
<-2	 <-3 Positive MV	 MASV
Korea
1978-80:30 Co(X) 25/30 23/30 1/30 -9.243 5.255 Appdx 7.5(1)
(y) 25/30 23/30 1/30 -9.330 5.248 Appdx 7.5(3)
1986-88:34 Co(x) 21/34 13/34 2/34 -7.864 2.963 Appdx 7.5(2)
(y) 21/34 13/34 2/34 -7.826 2.963 Appdx 7.5(4)
USA(30 stocks)	 8/30	 --	 4/30 -4.23 1.53 Fama(1965)
Malaysia(16 stocks) 6/16 	 3/16 1/16 -4.54 1.73 Laurence
Singapore(24 stocks)l7/24 10/24 1/24 -6.47 2.67 (1986)
(Notes)
x: The result using all the stock returns.
y: The result using the trimmed data.
MV : Minimum value.
MASV : Mean absolute standard variable.
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7.3.2.4 Spectral analysis.
The data used for spectral analysis were exactly the same as
the one used in the frequency distribution test, serial
correlation test, and runs test. All the share price data have
been transformed by taking logarithms and then first differences.
Daily returns are adjusted for dividends and capital changes.
This test is to examine whether there appeared to be any cyclical
fluctuations on the daily returns realised on each share separate
in the market. Therefore, by determining the number of estimated
spectral ordinates outwith, say, 95% confidence limits for a
white noise process, randomness can be tested.
The spectral analysis was carried out using the equation (7-
14).	 1-a	 P(f(wj )V1
 ^ f(wj ) ^ f(w)V2)
Spectral estimates f(wj ) were tested by upper and lower limit of
f(wj )V2 and f(wj )Vl, where Vl and V2 were the Chi-square limits.
The general features of the spectral density functions estimated
with the maximum number of lags m=l50 are set out in appendices
7.6(1) and 7 • 6(4). Although there is not any objective method to
determine the value of m, it is suggested conventionally that any
value of mn/5 to n/6 and <n/3 (Praetz 1979) or mn/3 to n/4
(Cooper 1982, Hevas 1984). The data used for each sample were
between 385-880, but usually around 750-870. Judged on this the
value of m=l50 should not present any problem.
The expected number of observations to lie out of the
95% confidence interval for cx=O.05 was
E(s) = 0.05(m+1) = 7.55
The 2nd Parzen weights were used for the set of windows and
equivalent degrees of freedom. The number of estimates that were
actually outside the confidence interval are reported in
appendices 7.6(1)-7.6(4) and summarised in tables (7.8) and
(7.9). As the figures in columns E(s) and s show, 28 out of 30
samples (93.3%) in 1978-1980, and 30 out of 34 samples (88.2%) in
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1986-1988, yield more observations outside the 95% confidence
interval than expected. The average numbers outside the 95%
confidence interval (s(%)) in both periods are 16.7 (11.06%) and
15.4(10.21%) respectively compared to the 7.55(5%) of expected
under normal sampling fluctuations. This represents a deviation
from white noise. Comparing both periods, the average number of
observations outside confidence interval in 1986-1988 is slightly
smaller than that of 1978-1980.
Figures 7.1 to 7.18 show the first differences and spectral
density functions of selected samples. The existence of cycles in
some samples is apparent, even though the patterns of spectrum
are different. For each truncation point used in the estimation,
the location of the relative peaks in terms of lags per cycle and
the estimated peak and trough values are given. For expository
purposes, the relative peaks and troughs are grouped in the table
7.7 according to their location. KCSPI (sample number 91) show
five cycles during January 1978 - December 1980. Five points of
peaks are lags 34, 61, 95, 125, and 148 working days per cycle.
Five points of troughs are lags 18, 51, 79, 110, and 137. The
spectra of the Haitai Confectionery(Figure 7.4) shows peaks in
lags 39, 72, 99, and 126. And the Cheil Sugar(Figure 7.6) exhibit
major peaks in lags 14, 32, 53, 67, 92, 110, and 127. During
January 1986 - December 1988 cyclical trends are clear in
KCSPI(Figure 7.8), Korean Air(Figure 7.12) and Lucky Ltd. (Figure
7.14), even their frequencies are different from each other.
However, Gold Star(Figure 7.18) did not show any peaks and
troughs. Table 7.7 shows major peaks and troughs of some samples.
In the table, each in represents a maximum lag.
Comparing the spectra across samples, some samples moved
similarly with each other. For instance, Haitai Confectionery(04)
and Korean Air(77), and Tongyang Nylon(56) and Pacific Chemical
(60) showed peaks at the quite similar lags. Sometimes, the share
prices of same industry showed simultaneous movements in the
Korean stock market. But in general, the spectra showed peaks and
troughs at different lags.
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86-(56 3353
72
101
130
	45 	 0.3650
	
63	 0.3858
	
87	 0.3551
	
115	 0.1391
0. 9582
1. 2 174
0. 7433
0. 6555
In summary, a simple spectral analysis of daily share
(Table 7.7) Location and value of spectrum peaks and troughs
Peaks	 Troughs
sample(No.)	 m spectra estimate
	 in	 spectra estimate
KCSP.L 7b-S0	 0.4267	 1(91)	 61	 0.3186	 51	 0.1614
	
95	 0.3378	 79	 0.0996
	
125	 0.3013	 110	 0.1235
	
148	 0.3020	 137	 0.1841
tneii sugar	 14	 1.366]	 21	 0.31378-80	 32	 0.9316	 38	 0.4247(02)	 53	 1.4701	 59	 0.5461
	
67	 1.2379	 80	 0.1785
	
92	 1.5690	 106	 0.4011
	
110	 0.9802	 112	 0.2655
	
127	 0.9761	 135	 0.2755
flaitai cont.	 J9	 0.9716	 20	 0.183578-80	 72	 0.7989	 52	 0.1448(04)	 99	 0.8444	 113	 0.3208
	
126	 0.9532	 145	 0.2649
KCSPJ. bb-88	 1/	 0.5.82	 .LS	 0.1901(92)	 41	 0.4391	 24	 0.1664
	
68	 0.4012	 55	 0.1907
	
107	 0.4050	 81	 0.1410
	
127	 0.3493	 118	 0.1064
6-88	 66	 1.3861	 57	 0.7486
77)	 100	 1.8541	 82	 0.2925
	
140	 1.2113	 120	 0.3349
LUCKY Lata.	 19	 1.1/83	 11	 0.3213
86-88	 38	 1.2779	 23	 0.3215(59) 69	 1.4456	 55	 0.5237
	
99	 1.1411	 82	 0.2685
	
124	 0.9446	 110	 0.3614
	
138	 0.8836	 130	 0.3436
	
9	 0.44831.9838	
36	 0.6633
Pacific Cflemica.L	
1.2849	
64	 0.4316
86-88	
72	 1.0423	
90	 0.3843(60) 99	 1.2499	
109	 0.4013
TNOte)
m: Maximum lag.
returns indicates that the randomness of stock market price
behavior in Korea cannot be accepted. This is consistent with the
findings from consideration of frequency distributions, serial
correlation, and runs test.
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Table (7.8) significance test of spectral estimates' results(1978-1980)
áinp1e N	 in	 E(s5) si.	 s5	 sb	 sl(%)	 s5(%) slO(%)
	
].	 857 150 7.55	 4	 13	 21	 2.65	 8.61	 13.91
	
2	 638 150 7.55	 5	 18	 31	 3.31	 11.92	 20.53
	
3	 813 150 7.55	 7	 21	 34	 4.64	 13.91	 22.52
	
4	 776 150 7.55	 4	 12	 25	 2.65	 7.95	 16.56
	
5	 643 150 7.55	 3	 7	 15	 1.99	 4.64	 9.93
	
6	 385 150 7.55	 3	 9	 18	 1.99	 5.96	 11.92
	
7	 806 150 7.55	 5	 ii	 20	 3.31	 7.28	 13.25
	
8	 870 150 7.55	 2	 11	 23	 1.32	 7.28	 13.25
	
9	 839 150 7.55	 11	 27	 40	 7.28	 17.90	 26.49
	
10	 863 150 7.55	 3	 10	 15	 1.99	 6.62	 9.93
	
ii.	 719 150 7.55	 7	 17	 26	 4.64	 11.26	 17.22
	
12	 659 150 7.55	 7	 16	 21	 4.64	 10.60	 13.91
	
13	 740 150 7.55	 5	 12	 23	 3.31	 7.95	 15.23
	
14	 656 150 7.55	 6	 14	 25	 3.98	 9.27	 16.56
	
15	 811 150 7.55	 2	 15	 23	 1.32	 9.93	 15.23
	
16	 851 150 7.55	 5	 14	 29	 3.31	 9.27	 19.21
	
17	 819 150 7.55	 9	 23	 37	 5.96	 15.23	 24.50
	
18	 871 150 7.55	 1	 8	 15	 0.66	 5.30	 9.93
	
19	 750 150 7.55	 1	 7	 16	 0.66	 4.64	 10.60
	
20	 870 150 7.55	 8	 19	 30	 5.30	 12.58	 19.87
	
21	 869 150 7.55	 6	 16	 24	 3.98	 10.60	 15.89
	
22	 818 150 7.55	 8	 18	 31	 5.30	 11.92	 20.53
	
23	 872 150 7.55	 1	 10	 20	 0.66	 6.62	 13.25
	
24	 851 150 7.55	 5	 12	 16	 3.31	 7.95	 10.60
	
25	 861 150 7.55	 14	 28	 37	 9.27	 18.54	 24.50
	
26	 846 150 7.55	 10	 28	 45	 6.62	 18.54	 29.80
	
27	 852 150 7.55	 4	 ii	 21	 2.65	 7.28	 13.91
	
28	 852 150 7.55	 2	 ii	 21	 1.32	 7.28	 13.91
	
29	 847 150 7.55	 36	 52	 68	 23.84	 34.44	 45.03
	
30	 824 150 7.55	 20	 31	 36	 13.25	 20.53	 23.84
Avr 791 150 7.55	 6.8 16.7 26.9 4.50% 11.06% 17.79%
KCSPI 880 150 7.55 	 1	 6	 10	 0.66%	 3.97%	 6.62%
The ratios of si > E(si) = 27/30 = 90.0%
s5 > E(s5) = 28/30 =93.3%
si0 > E(slO) = 27/30 = 90.0%
(Notes)
N: Number of sample.
in: Maximum lag.
E(si), E(s5), E(siO): Expected ordinates at 1%,
significant level respectivel v . They are 1.51,
s1,s5,and sb: The numbers outside of 1%, 5% and
level respectively.
sl(%) = si/(m+1) x 100%.
s5(%) = s5/(m+i) x 100%.
S10(%) = sbO/(m+1) x 100%.
Avr: Average.
5% and 10%
7.55, and 15.1.
10% significant
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Table (7.9). Significance test of spectral estimates' results
(1986-1988)
Sample N	 m	 E(s) Si	 s5	 slO	 sl(%) s5(%) siO(%)
51	 873 150 7.55	 6	 13	 19	 3.97	 8.61	 12.58
52	 811 150 7.55	 1	 12	 23	 0.66	 7.95	 15.23
53	 789 150 7.55	 7	 20	 28	 4.64	 13.25	 18.54
54	 859 150 7.55	 3	 7	 10	 1.99	 4.64	 6.62
55	 696 150 7.55	 9	 19	 25	 5.96	 12.58	 16.56
56	 795 150 7.55	 31	 45	 65	 20.53	 29.80	 43.05
57	 851 150 7.55	 7	 23	 34	 4.64	 15.23	 22.52
58	 876 150 7.55	 4	 12	 25	 2.65	 7.95	 16.56
59	 876 150 7.55	 2	 13	 29	 1.32	 8.6].	 19.21
60	 867 150 7.55	 10	 21	 28	 6.62	 13.91	 18.54
61	 778 150 7.55	 7	 13	 22	 4.64	 8.61	 14.57
62	 793 150 7.55	 3	 11	 25	 1.99	 7.28	 16.56
63	 874 150 7.55	 12	 27	 42	 7.95	 17.88	 27.81
64	 814 150 7.55	 2	 19	 27	 1.32	 12.58	 17.88
65	 851 150 7.55	 8	 16	 23	 5.30	 10.60	 15.23
66	 873 150 7.55	 5	 9	 17	 3.31	 5.96	 11.26
67	 866 150 7.55	 1	 5	 15	 0.66	 3.31	 9.93
68	 876 150 7.55	 1	 11	 19	 0.66	 7.28	 12.58
69	 852 150 7.55	 3	 7	 16	 1.99	 4.64	 10.60
70	 876 150 7.55	 0	 11	 18	 0.00	 7.28	 11.92
71	 876 150 7.55	 5	 14	 23	 3.31	 9.27	 15.23
72	 876 150 7.55	 5	 19	 33	 3.31	 12.58	 21.85
73	 873 150 7.55	 3	 14	 25	 1.99	 9.27	 16.56
74	 873 150 7.55	 4	 9	 21	 2.65	 5.96	 13.91
75	 852 150 7.55	 4	 11	 16	 2.65	 7.28	 10.60
76	 860 150 7.55	 3	 16	 28	 1.99	 12.58	 18.54
77	 876 150 7.55	 13	 22	 29	 8.6].	 14.57	 19.21
78	 870 150 7.55	 3	 12	 20	 1.99	 7.95	 13.24
79	 873 150 7.55	 4	 8	 19	 2.65	 5.30	 12.58
80	 855 150 7.55	 0	 7	 12	 0.00	 4.64	 7.95
81	 739 150 7.55	 5	 12	 22	 3.31	 7.95	 14.57
82	 700 150 7.55	 7	 19	 36	 4.64	 12.58	 23.84
83	 833 150 7.55	 14	 34	 45	 9.27	 22.52	 29.80
84	 635 150 7.55	 7	 13	 25	 4.64	 8.61	 16.56
Avr 836 150 7.55	 5.9 15.4 25.4 3.88% 10.21% 16.83%
KCSPI 876 150 7.55	 2	 11	 23	 1.32%	 7.28% 15.23%
The ratios of
51 > E(sl) =
s5 > E(s5) =
510 > E(slO)
29/34 = 85.29%
30/34 = 88.2%
= 31/34 = 91.18%
(Notes)
N: Number of sample.
in: Maximum lag.
s1s5 and sb: The numbers outside of 1%, 5%, and 10%
significant level respectively.
E(s1) E(s5), E(slO): Expected ordinates at 1%, 5%, and 10%
significant level respectively. They are 1.51, 7.55, and 15.1.
sl(%) = s1/(in+].) X 100%.
s5(%) = s5/(ni+1) x 100%.
S10(%) = slO/(in+1) x 100%.
Avr: Average.
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7.4 Conclusion.
The purpose of this chapter has been to contribute to the
literature by exploring the validity of the weak form efficient
market hypothesis for the Korean stock market in two different
periods. To this end three statistical tests, based upon serial
correlation, runs test, and spectral analysis, have provided
evidence of the character of successive daily price changes for
some of the most actively traded stocks and KCSPIs. Also the
frequency distributions of the daily share price returns were
examined.
The results manifest mixed behavior as summarised in table
7.10. In the frequency distribution model, the average results
indicate relatively fat tails combined with peakedness or
leptokurtosis, even though the results are not completely
consistent across samples. In the serial correlation analysis, we
found large numbers of significant serial correlation
coefficients for lags under four. The significance levels of the
standardised variables in the runs test are larger and the market
seems to have a tendency in price movements, not to follow a
random walk. Similar results are found in spectral analysis. Some
samples exhibit random walk behaviour, but large numbers appear
to deviate from a random walk. Even though the pattern of
dependence relationships may vary over time, their presence is
sufficient to reject the weak form of the EMH. This means that
the traditional technical analysis and fundamental analysis may
be useful the short-term decision making of stock portfolio
choices in the Korean stock market. Comparing the two different
sub-periods, deviation from a random walk in 1986-1988 is smaller
than in 1978-1980. This can be interpreted as due to the improved
informational efficiency of the Korean stock market recently;
information is disseminated more rapidly due to the development
of sophisticated communication technology, hordes of analysts,
large numbers of business journals and market regulation
favouring transparency.
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The results of this research raise a number of problems
oncerfliflg the Korean stock market which deserve further
jvestigation. Although the non-random behaviour of some stocks
j.s highlighted, it does not confirm that this dependent
relationship s
 are consistent over time. Therefore, the same
analysis could be applied to more samples and to longer periods,
so as to trace the development of patterns of share price
changes.
(pable 7.10) Summary results of frequency distribution and
weak form tests
mp1es Frequency distribution S C C
	 Runs test Spectrum
A	 B	 C	 D	 E
1978-1980
30 Co.s(x)
(y)
KCSPI
198 6-198 8
34 Co.s(x)
(y)
KCSPI
	
1.356	 -0.0735
	
1.398	 -0.0703
	
0.950	 -0.1288
	
1.260	 -0.0260
	
1.286	 -0.0238
	
1.028	 -0.0469
	
0.193	 Reject
	
0.197	 Reject
-	 Reject
	
0.176	 Reject
	
0.168	 Reject
-	 Reject
Reject
Accept
Reject
Reject
Notes)
A: Percentage of AN/EN over two standard deviations of extreme
tail areas.
B: Comparison of empirical frequency distributions with normal
distribution in one standard deviation.
C: Percentage of number of serial correlation coefficients
significant at the 95% level (total 10 lags).
D: Standard variable at the 95% level.
E: Spectral ana1ysi.
SCC: Serial correlation coefficient.
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CHAPTER VIII. THE SEMI-STRONG FORM EMPIRICAL TESTS OP
THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS.
8.1 Introduction.
In testing semi-strong form efficiency, we are concerned
with whether share prices 'fully reflect' all of the information
accompanying firm specific events (e.g., stock splits, earnings
reports, right issues etc.). A major concern in those 'event'
studies has been to assess the extent to which security price
performance around the time of the event has been abnormal - that
is, the extent to which security returns were different from
those which would have been appropriate, given the model
determining equilibrium expected returns.
Past empirical research on splits by FFJR(1969), and then
later by Bar-Yosef and Brown(1977), and Charest(1978), among
others, presents evidence which is interpreted as a split
announcement effect. Also Chottiner and Young(1971), Foster and
Vickrey(1978), Woo].ridge(1983), Eades, Hess, and Kim(1984),
French and Dubofsky(l986), and recently Karpoff and Walkling
(1988), Ball and Torous(1988), and Heath and Jarrow(1988) have
analysed stock price behaviour around the declaration dates or
the ex-right dates for stock splits or stock dividend.
Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (henceforth GMT,1984) show
that, even in clean cases where no other firm-specific event
coincides with a split announcement, stock splits generate a
positive abnormal return of close to 3.44% upon announcement and
an additional 1% abnormal return on the ex-day. Ohlsori and Penman
(1985) find that the volatility of stock returns after the ex-
split date is significantly higher than the presplit volatility,
for stock splits larger than two-for-one (one hundred percent).
Dravid(1987) extends the work of Ohlson and Penman to all types
of stock distributions and supports GMT's conclusions that stock
Splits and stock dividends are 'different' types of event.
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Copeland(l979) finds that liquidity decreases following a
split, but Lainoureux and Poon(1987) argue that the number of
shareholders in a firm actually tends to increase after a split.
Lakonishok and Lev(1987) report that the earnings of firms that
split subsequently grow faster than the earnings of a control
sample of nonsplitting firms and they argue, however, that it is
the presplit volume that is abnormally high and the postsplit
volume is quite similar to that of their control sample of
nonsplitting firms. Recently Brennan and Copeland(1988) estimated
a signaling model using a large sample and explained a
substantial fraction of the split-announcement returns. Healy and
Palepa(1988), and Venkatesh(1989) analysed the dividend and
earnings information on returns.
For the Korean accounting procedures, stock splits are not
normally practised by the listed companies. Par value for the
listed companies is fixed at 5,000 Won per share by the Law.
During the past several years, no company split its stock.
Instead, like many British firms, they issue bonus shares.
Although bonus issues are procedurally different from stock
splits, they are identical from the financial poinl of view. In
this paper, therefore, a model of market reaction to bonus
issues is presented and tested. We employ similar models to those
used by Woolridge(1983) and GMT(1984) with a slight change. Stock
price behaviour around the announcement dates of bonus issues for
62 cases of the Korea Stock Exchange during 1985-1988 are
analysed in two stages.
First, ex-right day opening prices are compared with
theoretical opening prices. In addition, the magnitude of the
Overnight price adjustment is analysed using the prior day
closing to ex-day closing stock returns. Second, announcement
effects are examined using the closing prices around the
announcement dates and adjusting for the payment of the dividend.
These returns are compared to the mean daily return of a
representative period around the event day for inference
pUrposes.
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The declaration of a bonus issue, in itself, creates no
wealth since it produces no extra future stream of income.
Rather the distribution merely cuts the corporate pie into more
pieces. Accordingly, a company's shares should theoretically have
the same total value immediately before as immediately after the
issuance of the stock distribution. Thus, after the announcement
of a bonus issue, security prices should not on an average
provide higher than normal returns. The market can therefore be
said to be very efficient in terms of information on bonus
issues. The situation in Korea, however, gives the impression
that investors do not seem to understand fully the meaning of a
bonus issue. Western investors would be amazed by the amount of
press coverage and general interest generated by rumours or news
of an impending bonus issue. This is very much in contrast to the
way American investors treat the news of an impending stock
split. It is, thus, conceivable that the Korean market may not
treat the news of bonus issues as efficiently as the US market
treats news of a stock split. It is therefore proposed that the
information effects on stock splits or stock dividend is
replicated as closely as possible in Korea.
8.2 Models for measuring information effects on security prices.
8.2.1 Ex-right day effects.
With the above hypothesis, a company with N shares selling at
price pit-i immediately before the bonus issue and thus having
total market value NPit_i should have the same market value after
the issue. However, after the payment of a B % stock
distribution, it has N(].+B/lOO) shares outstanding. In order to
have the same total market value, the price immediately after the
issue, jt will have to be lower than ti• is found as
follows.
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Market value after issue = Market value before issue
(N)( l+B/ l0O ) Pjt = NPjt_i
NP	 pit-i
it=
	
	
=	 or
(N) (l+B/l00) l+B/lOO
Pit-i(8-1)	 Pit = l+b
where b is the bonus issue expressed in decimal form.
General market movement may be considered for adjustment. In
Korea, Composite Stock Price Index (KCSPI) for all shares is the
best index. KCSPI is computed by a total market value index which
is composed of total listed companies as follows.
Current market value
KCSPI =	 100
Base market value
(Base date and base index : 4th January 1980 = 100).
Consequently, the adjusted theoretical price, Tt, is:
Tit = Pjt(KCSPIt/KCSPIt_i)
where KCSPIt...i is Composite Stock Price Index on prior day
and KCSPIt is Composite Stock Price Index on ex-date. Or
it-1 KCSPIt(8-2)	 Tit =
(1+b)	 KCSPIt_i
For the closing Composite Stock Price Index, this model will be
applied. However, the opening Composite Stock Price Index in
Korea is not recorded. Therefore, for the comparison of opening
prices, we will use the original data,
Pit-i
Pit =
l+b
After calculating the adjusted theoretical opening price(Pt),
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was compared to the actual opening price (P 0 ) on the ex-date.
Observations
 were grouped by the distribution percentage and
for each percentage with five or more observations the following
was determined:
= the number of observations.
n(+) = the number of times the market price opened higher
than the adjusted theoretical value (P 0
 > P1k).
n(-) = the number. of times the market price opened lower than
the adjusted theoretical value (P0 <
= n(+)/n = the proportion of higher than theoretical
openings to total observations.
For the ex-right day, the daily returns (Rjt) are computed
in the following manner.
Pjt(l+b)
(8-3)	 Rit =	 - 1,
Pit-i
where
Tjt(i+b)
orR1t =	 -1
Tt_i
= closing price on the ex-date
= closing price on the day prior to the ex-date
b = Eonus issue size
Tit = adjusted closing price on the ex-date.
T t...i = adjusted closing price on the day prior to the ex-date.
To test the null hypothesis, that the proportion (p) of times
the opening price is above the theoretical price is .5, the
normal approximation of the binomial distribution is employed. To
test the size of the price adjustment on the event day, the
close-to-open returns (Rt) are calculated using equation (8-3)
and substituting the event day open price for Under the null
hypothesis that the close-to-open stockholder return is zero, a
t-statistic can be constructed in which R1t N(0, a2/N):
RIt(8-4)	 t =
Js2/N
where 2 is an estimate of a2 (Woolridge 1983).
The sample data and the results of this research are
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continued in sections 8.3.1 and 8.3,2.
8.2.2 Announcement day effects.
A basic question which this study seeks to answer is whether
or not an announcement of bonus issue has any measurable impact
on its securities' prices. Portfolios were formed for this
analysis in event time to represent an average of security
returns for a common event date as each portfolio daily rate of
return. The event date is defined as the number of trading days
before or after the announcement date under scrutiny, where day 0
is the actual announcement date. In order to assess security
price changes or rates of returns, a variant of the Comparison
Period Returns Approach(CPRA) is used (Masulis 1980, Brown and
Warner 1980, Woolridge 1983, GMT 1984). The CPRA may be
specified as follows.
Assuming stationarity, a security's return (Rit) over time
can be specified as
(8-5)	 Rit = Uj
 + eit
where Uj
 is the expected return of security i,
ejt is a stochastic error term which has
Cov ( ejt, ejt_1) = 0 for all I and all t.
E(e1t) = 0 and
The serially uncorrelated stochastic disturbance term, et repre-
sents both inarketwide influences and security specific effects.
The non-stochastic term U is a market determined function of
the assumed asset pricing model and security specific attributes.
This general formulation of security returns process is clearly
consistent with the well known variants of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model.
The impact of new information on security prices can be
discovered through the examination of ejt's. The conventional
approach to estimating Uj is to first estimate a variant of the
fl1arket model which specifies a statistical relationship between
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contempane0l
 security and market returns (the most widely used
formulation being R t = + iRmt + ext). The market's
anflOUncem 1t
 period return is then substituted into the estimated
relationship to yield	 = ai +
	
An alternative approach
for estimating Ujt1 termed the Comparison Period Returns approach
(CPRA), is employed in this study(Masulis 1980, Woolridge 1983,
GMT 1984). A securityts mean return is estimated from a time
series of the security's returns over a representative period
(not including the announcement period) which is defined as the
comparison period. This yields an unbiased estimate of U j
 given
that the SecUritytS return process is stationary over the period
of observation.
To establish if the ext's around an event date are nonzero,
a test is conducted to determine if the mean daily return of the
event period (observation period) is statistically different from
the mean daily return of some other representative time period
(the comparison period). The mean daily return for the
comparison period is actually an estimate of U j , the expected
daily return in equation(8-5). To minimize error in the
estimation of U 1., portfolios of securities are formed in event
time around announcement dates. If security returns are
independent and stationary over time with finite variances,
portfolio daily returns in large samples approach normal
distributions. Therefore, a student-t for the difference in
population means can be employed to test for equality of event
period and comparison period mean returns.
The sample data and the results of this research are
generated in sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.3.
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scrutiny , where day 0 is the actual announcement date on which
the market becomes aware of the firm's intention to expand the
number of shares. "Dividend simultaneous" here was presumed to be
simultaneous event of bonus issue and cash dividend.
(Table 8.1) Sample classifications of semi-strong form EM!!
a. Pure and contaminated sample breakdown.
Pure event	 41
Dividend simultaneous 21
Total	 62
b. Sample breakdown by percentage of distributions.
<15%	 21
^l5% <25%
	 19
^25%	 22
Total	 62
8.3.2 The Ex-date effects.
Table(8.2) contains the results for the comparisons of the
ex-date effects. For the prices, equations (8-1) and (8-2) were
used respectively. Generally, the results which used unadjusted
prices cover higher mean returns and more significant levels than
the results which used adjusted prices. Overall 77.42% of the
unadjusted opening prices and 61.29% of the adjusted closing
prices are above the theoretical prices. For the entire sample,
the unadjusted mean return of 4.86% is significantly above zero
at the .0]. level. The unadjusted mean returns of all subsamples
classified by distribution percentage are also significant at .01
level. Subsample with cash dividend simultaneous is significant
at .10 level. However, among the mean returns of adjusted prices,
entire samples and subsamples except smaller issues under 15% are
not significant even at .10 level. The main consideration to test
here is the adjusted returns. Hence the bonus issue could be said
not having significant impact on the ex-day.
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(Table 8.2) Comparison of Ex-date effects
Remarks	 Sign differential	 Portfolio returns
n
n(+) ri(-) p(%)
	 Rjt(%)	 S.D.	 t
PANEL 1. Comparison of Ex-date opening prices and prior day
closing prices (unadjusted prices).
a. Pure	 41	 33	 8	 80.49	 5.30	 5.66 4.876**
b. Div. simult 21	 15	 6	 71.43	 3.99	 11.36 1.611
c. All	 62	 48	 14	 77.42	 4.86	 6.52 5.869**
d. ^25%	 22	 19	 3	 86.36	 7.36	 9.02 3.828**
e. ^15% <25%	 19	 14	 5	 73.68	 3.39	 1.54 9.617**
f. <15%	 21	 15	 6	 71.43	 3.56	 6.83 2.389*
PANEL 2eCOlUparisOfl of Ex-date closing prices and prior day
closing prices (adjusted returns).
a. Pure	 41	 29	 12	 70.73	 5.30	 44.70 0.759
b. Div. simult 21	 9	 12	 42.86	 2.16	 22.84 0.434
C. All	 62	 38	 24	 61.29	 4.24	 45.76 0.729
d. ^25%	 22	 13	 9	 59.09	 7,06	 42.94 0.771
e. ^15% <25%	 19	 12	 7	 63.16	 3.00	 .17.00 0.770
f. <15%	 21	 13	 8	 61.90	 2.39	 7.61 1.439
(Notes)
** Significant at .01 level.
* Significant at .05 level.
n : the number of observations for its category.
n(+) : the number of times the market price opened (or closed)
higher than the theoretical value for its category.
n(-) : the number of times the market price opened (or closed)
lower than the theoretical value for its category.
p(%)	 n(+)/n : the proportion of higher than theoretical prices
to total observations for its category.
S.D. : Standard deviation.
Div. simu].t : Cash dividend simultaneously.
Pure : Bonus issue only.
R t : The mean of daily return.
t: t statistics.
186
8.3.3 Initial announcement effects on share prices.
A basic question which this study seeks to answer is whether
or not an announcement of firm's bonus issue has any measurable
impact on its share price. The results to this question are
contained in table(8.3) for unadjusted prices and in table(8.4)
for adjusted prices for the Korea Composite Stock Price Index.
The portfolio daily return(PDR), the cumulative portfolio daily
return (CPDR), and the percent of daily returns greater than zero
are given in tables for seventy one days around the ex-dates for
the entire bonus issues. The portfolio daily returns on various
days around the announcement are compared with the average daily
return for a subsequent benchmark period of 52 trading days
through days -40 to -10 and days +10 to +30. As a comparison
period, several different periods can be considered. After
comparing the portfolio daily returns with the mean portfolio
daily return for the entire 71 days, a comparison period was
selected of 52 days.
The observed announcement date price adjustments in the
share prices are dramatic. The portfolio four day return through
day-i to day +2 using unadjusted data is 5.296%, the average
percent of greater than zero is 58.87%. If the data are adjusted
by the market index, the portfolio daily return is 4.384%,
average percent of greater than zero is 64.92% (table 8.4). The
market appears to have prior knowledge from about day -22 that a
bonus issue is coming such that the price tends to move up more
sharply than previously. There appears to be some degree of
speculative buying based on the prior knowledge of the impending
bonus issue. Also high PDR5 of 1.19% and 1.065% respectively on
prior day show that the market or some internal investors knew
the information of bonus issue before announcement. This means
that the news only became general knowledge very much later,
probably only after the official announcement although there is
some amount of leakage in the three weeks before the official
announcement. After the announcement of the bonus issue, the
share price advances for another three days and then it declines.
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This means that the price reaction period is a little longer in
Korea than in other markets. In the previous chapter, we saw that
the price limit system did not affect significantly to the share
price returns, using the weak form effcient market models. Korean
investors seemed to believe the bonus issues as good news. Also
the news of bonus stock issue did not seem to be disseminated
rapidly to the investors.
If we compare this result with other research, the
portfolio four day return and percentage of greater than zero
through day 0 to day +3 of Korea (unadjusted data) are larger
than the New York Stock Exchange samples (table 8.5). To test the
significance of the announcement return, both day 0 and day +1
are examined. Because the announcements sometimes become public
after the close of trading on day 0, the price limit on
fluctuations within a day in the Korean market does not allow the
information effects to be reflected fully on the security prices
until the following day. The standardised t-test can be used to
test the null hypothesis that each of the two announcement period
returns has the same mean as a comparison period return. The
average returns on the days subsequent to the announcement are
appropriate benchmarks for the expected returns of these
securities if mean returns are stationary and if the market is
informationally efficient. If these returns are different
systematically from their expected returns, investors can get
abnormal returns by trading on the bonus issue announcements.
In the tables (8.3) and (8.4), the mean two-day return
around the announcement date for the entire samples is 2.979% for
unadjusted data and 2.647% for market index adjusted data. The
mean two-day returns for a benchmark period of 52 trading days
subsequent to the announcement are only 0.601% and 0.259% for
unadjusted and adjusted data respectively. The standardised t-
statistic indicates that day 0 and day 1 returns are signifi-
cantly higher than the benchmark.
Figure 8.1 plots the cumulative return for the sample. It
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highlights abnormal returns around the announcement date with
large jumps at days through -1 to +2. Investors correctly infer
an increased probability of a near-term cash dividend rise at the
announcement of a bonus issue.
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(Table 8.3) Announcement effects of bonus issues on portfolio
returns (unadjusted prices)
ED PDR	 CPDR % returns>0 ED PDR 	 CPDR % returns>0
	
-40	 -0.194 -0.194 32.26	 -4	 0.557	 12.835 48.39
	
-39	 -0.124 -0.318 24.19	 -3	 0.947	 13.781 48.39
	
-38	 0.193 -0.125 33.87	 -2	 0.837	 14.618 53.23
	
-37	 0.227	 0.102 37.10	 -1	 1.190	 15.809 66.13
	
-36	 0.101	 0.203 22.58	 0	 1.448	 17.257 59.68
	
-35	 -0.001	 0.202 25.81	 +1	 1.531	 18.788 58.06
	
-34	 -0.271 -0.069 20.97	 +2	 1.127	 19.915 51.61
	
-33	 0.240	 0.171 35.48	 +3	 0.468	 20.383 43.55
	
-32	 0.455	 0.626 32.26	 +4	 0.020	 20.403 32.26
	
-31	 0.480	 1.105 40.32	 +5	 -0.122	 20.281 38.71
	
-30	 0.106	 1.212 35.48	 +6	 0.144	 20.425 45.16
	
-29	 0.011	 1.222 30.65	 +7	 0.460	 20.885 41.94
	
-28	 0.141	 1.363 29.03	 +8	 0.908	 21.793 51.61
	
-27	 0.448	 1.811 37.10	 +9	 0.277	 22.070 40.32
	
-26	 0.031	 1.842 29.03	 +10	 0.123	 22.193 22.58
	
-25	 0.066	 1.909 29.03	 +11	 0.291	 22.484 37.10
	
-24	 0.074	 1.983 32.26	 +12	 0.240	 22.724 30.65
	
-23	 0.425	 2.407 35.48	 +13	 0.307	 23.031 35.48
	
-22	 0.276	 2.683 35.48	 +14	 0.027	 23.058 33.87
	
-21	 0.377	 3.060 37.10	 +15	 0.148	 23.206 29.03
	
-20	 0.658	 3.718 37.10	 +16	 0.273	 23.480 41.94
	
-19	 0.619	 4.337 41.94	 +17	 0.464	 23.944 41.94
	
-18	 0.645	 4.982 37.10	 +18	 0.443	 24.387 50.00
	
-17	 0.339	 5.321 32.26	 +19	 0.056	 24.443 30.65
	
-16	 0.861	 6.182 46.77	 +20	 0.558	 25.001 46.77
	
-15	 0.571	 6.753 45.16	 +21	 0.350	 25.351 33.87
	
-14	 0.222	 6.976 37.10	 +22	 0.870	 26.222 48.39
	
-13	 0.798	 7.774 43.55	 +23	 0.636	 26.858 43.55
	
-12	 0.834	 8.608 45.16	 +24	 0.621	 27.479 41.94
	
-11	 0.295	 8.902 32.26	 +25	 0.504	 27.983 40.32
	
-10	 0.251	 9.154 37.10	 +26	 0.191	 28.174 37.10
	
-9	 0.150	 9.304 33.87	 +27	 0.033	 28.206 35.48
	
-8	 0.932 10.236 46.77	 +28	 -0.184	 28.022 24.19
	
-7	 0.779 11.015 40.32	 +29	 0.732	 28.754 41.94
	
-6	 0.776 11.792 51.61 	 +30	 -0.213	 28.541 29.03
	
-5	 0.486 12.277 38.71
Mean of daily return from day -40 through day -10 and from day
+10 through day +30 = 0.3005% (Standard deviation 0.4591%)
SPRt statistics: Day -1 returnDay 0 return
Day +1 return
Day +2 return
Day +3 return
SPRt = 1.9378
SPRt = 2.4998SPR1.. = 2.6806
SPR = 1.8005
SPRt = 0.3650
SPRt=	
tRt
-10	 +30	 1/2)2/30 ] + E r )
wheçe Rt is PDR at t, 1 is the mean return of comparisonperiod.
ED : Event day.
PDR(%) : Entire portfolio daily return(%).
CPDR(%) : Cumulative portfolio daily return(%).
This statistic reflects the CPDR for the entire
71 days around the ex-dates.
SPRt : Standardised portfolio return at t.
190
(Table 8.4) Announcement effects of bonus issues on portfolio
returns (adjusted prices)
ED	 PDR	 CPDR % returns>0 ED	 PDR	 CPDR % returns>0
	-40 -0.153 -0.153 	 50.00	 -4	 0.406	 7.365	 56.45
	
-39 -0.322 -0.475	 30.65	 -3	 0.361	 7.726	 53.23
-38	 0.194 -0.282	 54.84	 -2	 0.861	 8.587	 69.36
	
-37 -0.084 -0.362	 48.39	 -1	 1.065	 9.652	 72.58
-36	 0.143 -0.219	 46.77	 0	 1.261 10.913	 72.58
-35	 0.008 -0.211	 43.55	 +1	 1.386 12.298	 66.13
	
-34 -0.255 -0.466	 37.10	 +2	 0.672 12.970	 48.39
-33	 0.058 -0.408	 45.16	 +3	 0.476 13.446	 51.61
-32	 0.311 -0.097	 58.07	 +4 -0.021 13.425	 37.10
-31	 0.144	 0.047	 48.39	 +5 -0.331 13.095	 37.10
	
-30 -0.049 -0.001	 48.39	 +6 -0.154 12.940	 37.10
	
-29 -0.013 -0.014	 43.55	 +7	 0.171 13.112	 50.00
-28	 0.238	 0.224	 53.23	 +8	 0.478 13.590	 56.45
-27	 0.361	 0.585	 61.29	 +9	 0.178 13.767	 51.61
-26 -0.263	 0.322	 43.55	 +10	 0.206 13.973	 45.16
-25 -0.089	 0.234	 43.55	 +11	 0.276 14.249	 45.16
-24 -0.073	 0.161	 48.39	 +12 -0.101 14.148
	 40.32
-23	 0.093	 0.254	 45.16	 +13	 0.063 14.211	 48.39
-22	 0.177	 0.431	 51.61	 +14 -0.148 14.063	 40.32
-21	 0.554	 0.985	 69.36	 +15 -0.080 13.983	 41.94
-20	 0.175	 1.159	 46.77	 +16	 0.204 14.187	 50.00
-19	 0.449	 1.609	 59.68	 +17	 0.084 14.271	 48.39
-18	 0.552	 2.161	 58.07	 +18	 0.265 14.535	 53.23
-17	 0.076	 2.236	 43.55	 +19 -0.339 14.197	 40.32
-16	 0.559	 2.795	 59.68	 +20	 0.149 14.345	 53.23
-15	 0.554	 3.349	 58.07	 +21	 0.590 14.935	 59.68
-14 -0.134	 3.215	 41.94	 +22	 0.334 15.270	 50.00
-13	 0.485	 3.700	 59.68	 +23	 0.234 15.503	 54.84
-12	 0.448	 4.148	 51.61	 +24	 0.259 15.763	 58.07
-11	 0.348	 4.496	 48.39	 +25	 0.515 16.278	 51.61
-10	 0.122	 4.618	 56.45	 +26 -0.064 16.214	 38.71
	
-9	 0.133	 4.751	 48.39	 +27 -0.109 16.105	 53.23
	
-8	 0.554	 5.305	 53.23	 +28 -0.301 15.804	 38.71
	
-7	 0.564	 5.869	 51.61	 +29	 0.293 16.097	 59.68
	
-6	 0.841	 6.710	 61.29	 +30 -0.204 15.893	 43.55
Mean of daily return from day -40 through day -10 and from day
+10 through day +30 = 0.1297%
(Standard deviation = 0.4277%)
SPRt statistics : Day -1 return SPRt = 2.1876
Day 0 return SPRt = 2.6449
Day +1 return SPRt = 2.9368
Day +2 return SPRt = 1.2674
Day +3 return SPRt = 0.8105
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(Table 8.5) Comparison with other research
ED	 PDR	 % of returns>0
Koreal Korea2	 W	 GMT	 Koreal Korea2 W	 GMT
	
-2	 0.837	 0.861	 0.633	 0.45	 48.4	 69.4	 48.1	 48.
	
-1	 1.190	 1.065	 0.605	 0.55	 53.2	 72.6	 48.7	 49.
	
0	 1.448	 1.261	 0.968	 1.84	 66.1	 72.6	 58.9	 67
	
+1	 1.531	 1.386	 0.081	 1.57	 59.7	 66.1	 39.2	 64
	
+2	 1.127	 0.672	 0.061	 0.67	 58.1	 48.4	 41.1	 53
	
+3	 0.468	 0.476	 0.238	 0.22	 51.6	 51.6	 38.9	 46
	
CA	 4.574	 3.815	 1.348	 4.30	 58.9	 59.7	 44.5	 57.5
(Notes)
ED: Event day.
PDR: Portfolio daily return.
% of returns>0: The percentage of returns greater than zero.
Koreal : unadjusted returns for 62 samples.
Korea2 : adjusted returns for 62 samples.
W : Woolridge(1983) for 317 NYSE samples.
GMT: Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman(1984) for 1762 NYSE
samples.
CA: Cumulative PDR or average percentage of return greater
than zero through day 0 to day +3.
8.4 Conclusion.
This study has performed an empirical test of the semi-
strong form of the EMH. The valuation effects of bonus stock
issue announcements were found to react to share prices in a
relatively short period. However, on average, there is a
significant increase in a firm's stock price at the announcement
in the Korean stock market and the average magnitude of these
announcement returns exceeds that found previously for NYSE
samples. Post-announcement returns, particularly around the ex-
dates of bonus issues, have been also documented. Portfolio
returns at the ex-date are significantly larger for unadjusted
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data than those of adjusted data. The result using adjusted data,
however, was not found significant. These results mean that the
Korean stock market is relatively efficient with respect to the
information of bonus issues, e.g., investors on average cannot
get significant abnormal returns.
However, some sources showed innormative. The 'family
character' of most of the Korean corporations allows a limited
numbers of market participants to use 'internal information'
profitably. Investors need to understand the meaning of the bonus
stock issues exactly. The declaration of a bonus issue, in
itself, creates no wealth since it produces no extra future
stream of income, as explained at the beginning of this chapter.
Also information did not seem to be disseminated in a short
period to all the investors.
The following strategies are recommended for the market
efficiencies: strengthening fair transaction activities and
establishing a firmer public notifying system; strenthening the
external audit system and applying the international standard
audit system; revising or eliminating the price limit system of
fluctuation within a day; improving investor protection system;
revising the securities transaction act and other laws to promote
the capital market; operating specialised financial department
independently from the family management profit centre of listed
companies; expanding the range of institutional investors.
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CHAPTER IX. THE STRONG FORM EMPIRICAL TESTS OF EMH.
9.1 Introduction.
Strong form tests of market efficiency are concerned with
whether given investors or groups have monopolistic access to
(nonpublic) information relevant to price formation (Fama 1970).
Accordingly, if the market were strongly efficient, even an
insider would not be able to profit from his privileged position.
Obviously the semi-strong form and weak form hypothesis are
special cases of the strong form hypothesis. Historic stock price
data and publicly available information about a company can be
'known' extremely easily. Numerous studies of strong form
empirical tests are published on the advanced markets, as
summarised in chapter 6.5. These tests consist of examinations of
the performance of analysts' recommendations or professionally
managed funds and insider trading. Research in this area on the
emerging markets, however, is very limited, due to the
difficulties of getting a database or internal information.
In this chapter, the value of verbal recommendations, using
the unpublished, confidential lists of approved stocks which are
produced each week will be investigated. Several studies of the
performance of stock recommendations, in the US, Britain, Canada,
Australia, and Hong Kong, have in fact been published. They, as
summarised in Table 9.1, almost universally have examined
published recommendations (Dimson and Marsh 1984). Their results
generally indicate a small degree of forecasting ability, at
least before dealing costs are taken into account.
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(Table 9.1)Performance of brokers' and analysts' recommendations
PRR P
Name	 Country NS NR	 Type	 PD +lD +1W Long
Cowles(1933)	 USA 45 7500 Published 	 -1.4
Cowles(1944)	 USA 11 6904 Published	 0.2
Ferber(l958)	 USA 4 345 Published	 0.5	 1.1	 0.7
Ruff(].963)	 USA 1	 31 Published	 4.0
Colker(l963)	 USA 1 1054 Published	 3.8
Stoffels(1966)	 USA 3 264 Published	 0.7 1.0 1.5	 1.4
Money Which(1968)	 UK 6 90 Published	 11.9
Cheney(1969)	 USA 4 n.a. Published	 2.0
Brealey(1971)	 UK 1 360 Published	 4.1
Diefenbach(1972)	 USA 24 1209 Published 	 2.7
Firth(1972)	 UK 4 1100 Published	 -1.0 -3.0
Black(1973)	 USA 1 500 Published 	 10.0
Logue & Tuttle(1973) USA 6 304 Published 	 3.0
Fitzgerald(l975)	 UK 35 635 Unpublished 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5
Bidwell(1977)	 USA 11 99 Published 	 2.6
Shepperd(1977)	 USA 7 1008 Published	 -3.0
Davies & Canes(l978) USA 8 785 Published 	 1.3 1.6 1.7
Fitzgerald(l978) 	 UK 11 467 Published	 3.1 3.2 3.5 1.0
Groth et al.(1979)	 USA 1 6014 Published 	 1.8 2.6
Stanley et al. (1981) USA 1 4461 Published 	 0.7
Dawson(1982)	 Hong Kong 1 300 Published	 0.4 1.2 2.9
Garmaise(1982)	 Canada 10 6968 Unpublished	 -2.0
Copeland & Mayers(1982)UK 1 3840 Published	 0.2	 0.4 3.4
Finn(1983)	 Australia 1 361 Published	 2.0
Bjerring et al.(1983)
Canada & USA 1 92 Published 1.5 2.1 1.2
Hanna(].983)/Holloway(1981 1983)
	
USA 1 1500 Published 	 3.6
Dimson & Marsh(l984) UK 35 4187 Unpublished	 1.2
Dimson & Fraletti(1986)
	UK 1 1649 Unpublished 	 0.07 0.22-0.8
Elton et al.(1986) 	 USA 34 9977 Unpublished	 0.18
(Notes)
NS: Number of services.
NR: Number of recommendations.
PRRP: Percentage return on pre-recommendation price.
PD: Publication day.
+lD: After one day.
+1W: After one week.
Long: Longer term.
(Source)
Diinson and Marsh(l984) with updates.
Among others, Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen(1983)
evaluate the recommendations of a Canadian brokerage house by a
flUinbers of techniques. They use the market model for calculating
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abnormal returns. The results reveal that an investor following
the recommendations would have achieved significantly positive
abnormal returns, even after allowing for transaction costs.
Dinison and Marsh(1984) describe an empirical study of over 4,000
specific share return forecasts made by 35 UK brokers and by the
internal analysts of a large UK investment institution, using the
CAPM model as comparison. They found that after the date of
forecast there was a significant degree of out-(under-)
performance by those stocks with positive (negative) predictions
of abnormal return. These observations conflict with the usual
outcome from following the published recommendations of brokers
and other advisors, whose performance from the date of receiving
the recommendation is approximately neutral. Evidently the
unpublished forecasts, collected by the institution which
provided the data, had some real, albeit limited, economic value.
In another paper, Dimson and Fraletti(1986) examine the
profitability of following the telephone recommendations given
daily during 1983 by a leading UK stockbroker, using the CAPM
model. They tried to reduce the risk of a type II error when
unpublished forecasts are investigated, as seen in 'the Dimson and
Marsh study (1984). Their study reminds us that in a competitive
market only a very few investment advisors can consistently be
successful. Even those analysts closest to the market can rarely
expect to do a great deal better than picking stocks with a pin.
Elton, Gruber, and Grossman(l986) study the information content
in analysts' recommendations which are made on a five-point buy,
hold, or sell scale. They find that approximately 4.5% extra
return can be earned by purchasing new buys rather than new
sells.
Major Korean securities houses each have a committee meeting
regularly once in a week and a general committee meeting once in
a quarter. The participants are limited to research analysts,
sales managers of branches in Seoul, and general managers of
business related departments at the head office. Research
institutions which are affiliated companies of securities houses
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analyse worldwide and domestic economic trends and industries,
and forecast market trends. They concentrate on the long-term
trends usually. The research results are published in periodicals
such as weekly, monthly, and quarterly, and irregular
publications. The Sales Promotion Department of securities
companies, however, concentrates on information surrounding the
market. As a result, its managers pay more attention to the
short-term investment strategy. Because the brokerage commission
is the biggest source of company income, (42% average in 1988),
frequent buying and selling is preferred by them. Short-term
forecasting ability is very important for their business. They
don't publish research papers, but they prepare internal
circulations for short-term market trends and recommended stocks.
They don't usually recommend stocks to sell or to hold, but only
to buy. Stocks which are recommended are expected to provide
favorable abnormal returns after purchase. This information is
usually used promptly for discretionary fund managers and for
major clients by telephone. About 70 of each firm's staff are
regular users of the recommended list.
Although similar in scope, this study differs in two ways
from previous studies in this area. First, the brokerage house
recommendations cover Korean stocks, on which no previous
research has been found. Second, as the samples of
recommendations, only new buys are included. If the same stock is
recommended in the following week, it is excluded in that
following week. But after stopping the recommendation, when the
stock appears again on the list, it is included on that week.
This is to study brokers' ability to choose the new list of
recommendations. The stocks whose listing periods are less than
one year are also excluded.
9.2 Models for an analysis of brokers' unpublished recommen-
dations.
9.2.1 The CAPM Model and the Simple Model.
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To examine the potential gains from following the brokers'
recommendations, the return on recommended stock j in day t is
calculated as follows,
(9-1) Rjt = ( jt - jt-i + Dit) / jt-i
where
jt = stock price at day j
jt-1 = stock price at the previous day
Dit = dividend payment after tax.
Also appropriate adjustments are made for right issues and
bonus issues. No adjustment is made for commissions. There is no
tax for capital gains on portfolio investment in Korea.
The abnormal return on a security is the difference between
the realised return and an appropriate benchmark. The abnormal
returns ejt on recommended stock j in day t are defined as
(9-2) ejt = Rjt - E(Rjt).
Using the Sharpe(1964)-Lintner(l965) Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), the unconditional return E ( Rit) is
(93) E ( Rjt) = ( l-Pj) Rft + Pjut,
where
Rft is the return on risk free government bonds, represented
in Korea by Short-term Government Bond yield.
Rmt is the return on the market portfolio, using the return
on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index.
= Cov(Rj , Rm) / Var ( Rm), the beta or systematic risk of
stock j. P j s are calculated from the 52 weekly transaction
prices and returns data of 1987.
Substituting for equation (9-3) in equation (9-2), the abnormal
return on stock j in day t is therefore given by
(9-4) ejt = Rjt - (1 - fl) Rft - Pjmt
For convenience in this empirical work with daily data, a beta is
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assumed stationary.
The simple model
(9-5) ejt = Rit -
i.e., a straight difference between the return on the stock and
the return on the market index will be used again.
Market Model was tested, but the results were not
appropriate to accept. As Dimson and Marsh(1984) commented,
Sharpe's market model would be particularly inappropriate when
estimating correlations for specific security returns.
Rjt=aj+PjRmt+Vjt.
For stocks which performed well(poorly) during the estimated
period, a j will be projected to be positive(negative); and since
favourable (unfavourable) performance doesnot persist in weak-
form efficient markets, the Vjt can be predicted to be negative
(positive). The market model would thus provide a quite
inappropriate benchmark, since analysts who simply predict trend
reversals will always appear to have positive forecasting skills.
9.2.2 Event time portfolio method.
The abnormal returns are monitored in event time. Event time
represents the day which appeared first on the recommended list.
If the same company is recommended at the following week, it is
excluded. But if it is recommended again after stopping the
recommendation, it is included. The mean recommendation periods
are 2.18 weeks for broker 1, 1.21 weeks for broker 2, 1.31 weeks
for broker 3, and 1.62 weeks for broker 4. Broker 2, and 3
changed recommended stocks almost every week, but broker 1 kept
recommended stocks for 2.18 weeks. For each of the 467 cases, the
abnormal return in the t-th day of listing for t=-lO,-9, . . 0,
+47 is computed. Total data used are huge, 32,472
share prices and index (248,952 characters). Included in the
abnormal return for individual securities are the effects of firm
specific events occuring during the time period. If the stock
recommendations provide information with economic value, then the
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mean abnormal return for period t, AARt, will be positive. If,
however, the markets are efficient, one can expect that the AARt
will be equal to, or not statistically different from, zero. A
cross sectional average can reduce this disturbance as follows:
1 N
(9-5)	 AARe=—Eejt
N j=1
where
AARe = the mean abnormal return for period t.
N: the number of recommended stocks.
The cumulative abnormal return at T is then computed as
follows:
(9-6)	 CART = E AARt,
where the cumulation runs from t=0 to t=T.
The null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance on day t is
tested with the t-statistic using Crude Dependence Adjustment
(Brown and Warner 1980), even though this method was criticised
by Dimson and Marsh(1986) for the size effect.. Because the
samples in this research are relatively frequently traded stocks
with large capitalisation, the size effect can be disregarded.
The standard deviation of the day "0" average performance measure
is estimated from the values of the average performance measure
in days +16 through +46.
AARt
(9-7)	 t =
a/N
where
N1 +46	 ____
= F E F -	 ( e - AARt )2 ] ]L j=l L 29 t=+16
____ +46
AARt =EAARt/ 30
t=+ 16
This test statistic is distributed student-t distribution with 28
degrees of freedom.
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9.3 The sample data and results.
9.3.1 The sample data.
As samples, four subsets of recommendations by four leading
Korean securities houses are used. The data consist of new
recommendations made by the broker for 25 weeks during January
1988 - June 1988. Because of using an unpublished recommendation
list, longer term lists couldn't be found. The market situation
is changing continuously and investors need to get new
information. Old information or record does not so much affect
share prices. Thus, a relatively short-term period data were used
in this research. The nuithers of new recommendations of each
broker are 102, 132, 118, and 115 respectively. In total during
this period, there are 467 recommendations for 149 different
companies, and an average of 4.67 companies appeared as new
recommendations each week by each broker. The recommendations are
not clustered very much in time, which are different from other
research (Bjerring et al.1983, Dimson and Marsh 1984, Dimson and
Fraletti 1986). If a stock is known to be recommended in a
particular week, it is not usually recommended in the following
week.
The numbers of brokers' recommendations each week are
limited, but they cover broadly all industries of the Korean
stock market. That is similar to UK research by Dimson and
Fraletti(1986). This is because the list is used to identify
stocks which could reasonably be proposed both to active clients
who already hold an equity portfolio, and to new investors who
wish to construct a portfolio de novo. As seen in Table 9.2,
machinery & equipment, banking & finance, and chemical &
pharmaceutical industries are frequently recommended stocks in
numbers. But as the ratio to KCSPI, wholesale & retail(l.47),
banking & finance(1.45), and machinery & equipment
industries(1.30) are favoured.
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(Table 9.2) Distribution of sample across industry groups
Industry	 No.of recomm.	 % % of KCSPI (b)/(c)
(a)	 (b)	 (C)	 (d)
Foods & Beverage	 28	 6.0	 9.6	 0.62
Textile, Apparel, & Leather 	 18	 3.9	 10.1	 0.39
Wood & Paper	 10	 2.1.	 3.7	 0.56
Chemical, Petroleum, & Pharmacy 	 60	 12.8	 18.7	 0.68
Nonmetallic mineral products 	 25	 5.4	 4.6	 1.17
Basic Metals	 36	 7.7	 6.6	 1.17
Machinery & Equipment 	 95	 20.3	 15.6	 1.30
Construction	 41	 8.8	 7.7	 1.14
Wholesale & Retail	 43	 9.2	 6.3	 1.47
Banking, Finance & Insurance	 93	 19.9	 13.7	 1.45
Transport & Others	 18	 3.9	 5.3	 0.74
Total or average	 467	 100.0	 100.0	 1.00
9.3.2 Results.
9.3.2.1 The naive results.
The first approach involves measuring the average total
returns(ARs) to the stock recommendations made in calendar day t
(t=-10, -9, . . . , 0, +1, . . . +47). In each calendar day, an
equally weighted portfolio was constructed from all recommended
stocks. The daily cumulative average returns(CARs) were then
calculated. These daily CARs were then organised in event time,
where event day zero is the recommendation day. The equally
weighted mean of the CARS Ofl all the recommendation portfolios
was then calculated for event days -10 to +47.
Appendix 9.1 shows the average total returns for the
recommended stocks by Korean stockbrokers and it is summarised in
Table 9.3. Three brokerage houses have meetings in the morning
between 8:00-9:00 before the market opens at 10:00PM. The pre-
recommendation price over the prior 10 days indicates that the
market already recognised that these stocks were good
investments. The average pre-recoinmendation return over 10 days
was 5.48%. Broker 2 was the highest as 6.40%, broker 3 was the
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lowest as 4.86%. It was similar to the results of other research
(Hong Kong market by Dawson 1982, UK market by Dimson and
Fraletti 1986). It could be that the price increase attracted the
information analysts' attention so that the company became the
subject of a recommendation report. In any case, there was no
sudden price change on average when the recommendation was made,
nor was it necessary for the investor to act quickly before the
price increase stopped, since these stocks continued to rise
throughout the research period. The CAR over 47 days after
recommendation was 5.86% on average, 7.86% for broker 4 which was
the highest and 4.15% for broker 3 which was the lowest.
Let us look at the t-test, for determining whether the stock
returns from a group of stocks with returns are different from
zero. The asterisks in the table indicate that most of the
observations during days -5 to +3 have a 0.01, or 0.05 level of
statistical significance. This means that there is just one
chance in a hundred, or twenty, that the average recommended
stocks of analysts' forecasts came from a group of stocks that
did not change in price. The results in Table 8.3 indicate that
the stock recommendations under study were reliable. The stocks
with a buy recommendation gained in value in the short-term.
Broker 1 and broker 4 outperformed broker 2 and broker 3.
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(Table 9.3) Average return of recommended stocks
(unadjusted data)
Time	 Total	 Broker 1	 Broker 2	 Broker 3	 Broker 4
period_________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________
AR CAR	 AR CAR AR CAR	 AR CAR AR CAR
-10 0.50 -5.48 0.58 -5.73 0.67 -6.40 -0.17 -4.86 0.90 -5.20
	
-5	 0.21 -2.91 0.08 -2.66 0.20 -3.49 0.42 -2.85 0.78 -2.54
	
-1	 0.60 -0.60 0.61 -0.61 0.85 -0.85 0.66 -0.66 0.23 -0.23
	
0	 0.28 0.28 0.18 0.18 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 -0.03 -0.03
	
1	 0.45 0.73 0.36 0.54 0.95 1.42 0.21 0.67 0.20 0.17
	
2	 0.71 1.44 1.02 1.56 1.06 2.48 0.13 0.80 0.64 0.81
	
3	 0.30 1.74 0.28 1.84 -0.11 2.37 0.79 1.59 0.27 1.08
	
5	 0.03 2.00 0.45 2.85 -0.58 1.86 0.13 1.61 0.25 1.81
	
10	 0.04 2.65 0.33 3.95 -0.31 2.09 0.16 1.98 0.06 2.89
	
15	 0.26 3.43 0.50 4.50 0.29 2.80 -0.05 2.72 0.34 4.03
	
20	 0.07 3.89 -0.08 5.45 -0.07 2.91 0.64 3.31 -0.24 4.31
	
25	 0.48 4.95 0.80 6.96 0.46 4.06 0.18 3.55 0.52 5.71
30 0.07 5.06 -0.06 7.24 0.24 3.59 -0.05 3.96 0.13 6.03
35 -0.09 5.18 -0.18 6.72 -0.16 3.86 -0.35 4.01 0.17 6.61
40 -0.29 4.91 -0.15 6.65 -0.51 3.52 -0.26 4.00 -0.14 6.02
	
45	 0.17 5.79 0.23 7.44 0.25 4.61 -0.03 4.04 0.25 7.56
	
47	 0.23 5.86 0.35 7.65 -0.07 4.64 -0.10 4.15 0.76 7.86
(Note)
AR: Average total return.
CAR: Cumulative average total return. Meeting is held in the
morning before the market opens. Accordingly the closing
price of recommended day is calculated on day 0 and the
closing price of previous day is seen on day -1.
Absolute means and absolute t-values during day -10 to +47.
AR t(AR)
Total	 0.235 2.342*
Broker 1 0.313 1.469
Broker 2 0.329 1.783
Broker 3 0.259 1.293
Broker 4 0.310 1.543
CAR t(CAR)
3.288 15.783*
4.451 7.627*
2.596 7.980*
2.579 7.360*
3.874 8.274*
9.3.2.2 Adjusting for market changes.
The first performance test made no adjustment for changes in
the market's level. If the market rises, for instance by 25%,
some critics of stock recommendations point out that a stock that
does not also increase by 25%, assuming it is of average risk, is
a poor investment. Looking at the market, the Korea Composite
Stock Price Index(KCSPI), which explains the average movement of
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the market well, has risen 38.7% during the first five months of
the research period and then the index declined. Accordingly,
tables 9.4-9.8 present another test, which adjusts the stock
returns for changes in the market as measured by two models. One
is the simple model which assumes the systematic risk is always
one. The other is the CAPM model which uses different betas of
the systematic riskiness of the samples, their variabilities
relative to the market. The mean beta of total 467 samples was
0.9744.
Using the sai
calendar time porl
portfolios therefor
who, each day, allo
recommended by the
stock. Instead of
calculated. Because
abnormal returns we
methods as the naive model in 9.3.2.1, the
o1ios are analysed. These calendar time
correspond to the holdings of an investor
tes the same amount of money to all stocks
broker, with an equal investment in each
s, the average abnormal returns(AARs) are
of adjusting for the market index, daily
e comDuted for each of the 5R days ai-nurnl
recommendation day, and the daily cumulative abnormal
returns(CARs) were then calculated. They are expressed relative
to the portfolio value for the day(t) in which the .portfolio was
recommended.
As seen in Tables 9.4-9.8, the pre-reconunendation price over
the prior 10 days also indicates that the market already
recognised that these stocks were good investment as in the naive
results. The average pre-reconimendation returns over 10 days were
2.47% from CAPM model and 2.43% from simple model (table 9.8).
The pre-reconunendation returns of each broker are 2.94% and 2.87%
for broker 1, 2.93% and 2.95% for broker 2, 1.82% and 1.86% for
broker 3, and 2.18% and 2.03% for broker 4. Also the meeting has
an immediate positive impact on stocks recommended to some
clients, During days 0 to +4, the CARs of total samples have the
quickest impact on broker 2. The degree of stock price impact
OVer 47 days on recommended stocks is much different &mong
brokers. The recommendations by broker 1 and broker 4 have
positive impacts of around 2.8% and 3.0% respectively. However,
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the result by broker 2 shows performance which is strikingly
close to zero and the result by broker 3 exhibit negative
performance. Over 47 days following formation of the portfolio
the mean CARS are 1.120% and 1.108% by the CAPX model and the
simple model respectively. And the t-statistics for CARs show
significant. For the two models, the results using the CAPM model
are more significantly out-(under-)performed for total samples
and broker 1, 2, and 3 than the results using the simple model.
However, the result for broker 4 using CAPM is less outperformed
than the result using the simple model.
This study of recommended portfolios gives a hint of a few
exploitable stock selection skills in the very short-term, for
instance two months. Analysis of the recommended sample stocks
does not support the hypothesis that the Korean markets are
efficient in the strong form. It is possible, however, that,
since the Korean market is less developed and more regulated than
the New York or London Stock Exchange, areas of greater and
lesser efficiency may exist. But the level of stock selection
skills among brokers in Korean market varies widely.
9.4 Summary and conclusion.
This part has examined the profitability of following the
recommendations given weekly during the first six months of 1988
by four leading Korean stockbrokers. In all, 467 recommendations
were provided for 149 different companies during 25 weeks. The
results in this paper show that some brokerage houses provided
valuable services to their clients in selecting stocks which
achieved positive abnormal returns during the recommendation
period. However, amongst the brokers there were large differences
of predictive ability. The total recommended lists show 1.1%
average additional profit margin. And the t-values for CARs are
significant. But considering transactions costs of 0.2-0.4%
brokerage commission and 0.5% transaction tax, the abnormal gain
is close to zero. There is no capital gains tax currently in
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Korea. Also no spread between bid and ask prices is applied, not
like some other markets, because securities are traded
automatically by computerisation. Thus, we may conclude that the
Korean brokerage houses on average do not provide valuable
services to their clients in selecting stocks, even some
brokerage houses provide valuable services.
A few words of caution. First, the research periods of
recommendation are shorter than the other studies, because
unpublished data were not available for longer periods in the
Korean stock market in which the market environment is changing
very quickly. Also analysts seem to believe that getting new
information is more important than keeping old records. Second,
past success is not a guarantee of future success. And third,
investors need to select stockbrokers for their better
performance because the levels of stock selection abilities among
brokers is different from each other.
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(Table 9.4) Performance of recommended list - Broker 1
CAPM Model	 Simple Model
Day	 AAR t (AAR) CAR t (CAR) 	 AAR	 t (AAR) CAR t (CAR)
F ii	 1 • 1	
B	
:
L 
J•JJI
I: ::	 :"
 LId 1411
I...j* .	 fl*
.1	 .	 11	 ...	 i
-	 I	 I:	 :	 :	 :	 :	 8:8	 :9
Avrg 0.197	 0.96	 5.84*	 0.201	 0.98	 5.60*
Mean Beta = 0.9922
(Notes)
AAR: Average abnormal return.
t(AAR): t-stat jstjcs for AAR.
*: Significant at 5% level.
CAR: Cumulative abnormal return.
t(CAR): t-statistics for CAR.
*: Significant at 5% level.
Avrg: The average of absolute values.
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(Table 9.5) Performance of recommended list - Broker 2
CAPM Model	 Simple Model
Day AAR	 t (AAR) CAR t (CAR)	 AAR t (AAR) CAR t (CAR)
-10 0.182	 1.00	 0.188	 1.03
-9 0.003	 0.02	 -0.032 -0.18
-8 0.447	 2.45*	 0.382	 2.10*
-7 -0.097 -0.53	 -0.044 -0.24
-6 0.124	 0.68	 0.115	 0.63
-5 0.256	 1.40	 0.306	 1.68
-4 0.475	 2.60*	 0.507	 2.79*
-3 0.553	 3.03*	 0.525	 2.89*
-2 0.456	 2.50*	 0.495	 2.72*
-1 0.530	 2.90*	 0.506	 2.78*
0 0.421	 2.31* 0.421	 2.29*	 0.424	 2.33* 0.424	 2.29*
1 0.417	 2.28* 0.838	 4.55*	 0.411	 2.26* 0.835	 4.51*
2 0.577	 3.16* 1.416	 7.69*	 0.594	 3.27* 1.429	 7.72*
3 -0.412 -2.26* 1.003	 5.45*	 -0.403 -2.21* 1.026 	 554*
4 -0.145 -0.79 0.859
	 4.66*	 -0.120 -0.66 0.906
	 4.89*
5 -0.479 -2.62* 0.379	 2.06*	 -0.503 -2.77* 0.402
	 2.17*
6 -0.155 -0.85 0.224
	 1.22	 -0.143 -0.78 0.260	 1.40
7 0.113	 0.62 0.338	 1.84	 0.112	 0.62 0.372	 2.01
8 0.477	 2.61* 0.815	 443*	 0.439	 2.42* 0.812	 4.38*
9 0.201	 1.10 1.016	 5.52*	 0.250	 1.37 1.061	 5.73*
10 -0.264 -1.45 0.752
	 4.08*	 -0.300 -1.65 0.761	 4.11*
11 0.193	 1.06 0.945	 5.13*	 0.178	 0.98 0.939	 5.07*
12 -0.324 -1.77 0.621 	 3•37*	 -0.290 -1.60 0.649	 3.51*
13 -0.226 -1.24 0.394
	 2.14*	 -0.161 -0.89 0.488
	 2.64*
14 -0.240 -1.31 0.155 	 0.84	 -0.223 -1.23 0.265	 1.43
15 -0.058 -0.31 0.097 	 0.53	 -0.029 -0.16 0.236	 1.27
16 -0.389 -2.13*-0.292 -1.58
	 -0.340 -1.87 -0.104 -0.56
17 0.143	 0.78 -0.148 -0.81
	 0.125	 0.69 0.021	 0.11
18 -0.051 -0.28 -0.200 -1.09
	 -0.034 -0.19 -0.014 -0.07
19 0.096	 0.53 -0.103 -0.56
	
0.105	 0.58 0.092	 0.49
20 0.078	 0.43 -0.025 -0.14
	 0.102	 0.56 0.194	 1.05
21 -0.072 -0.40 -0.097 -0.53
	 -0.032 -0.18 0.162
	 0.87
22 -0.092 -0.50 -0.189 -1.03	 -0.127 -0.70 0.034
	 0.19
23 0.437	 2.39* 0.247	 1.34	 0.465	 2.56* 0.499	 2.70*
24 0.104	 0.57 0.351	 1.91	 0.133	 0.73 0.632	 3.41*
25 0.026	 0.14 0.377	 2.05*	 -0.006 -0.03 0.626	 3.38*
26 -0.510 -2.79*-0.133 -0.72	 -0.557 -3.06* 0.069	 0.38
27 0.013	 0.07 -0.120 -0.65	 0.021	 0.12 0.091	 0.49
28 -0.069 -0.38 -0.189 -1.02	 -0.110 -0.60 -0.019 -0.10
29 0.227	 1.24 0.038	 0.21	 0.185	 1.02 0.166	 0.90
30 0.110	 0.60 0.148	 0.80	 0.119	 0.66 0.286	 1.54
31 -0.177 -0.97 -0.030 -0.16	 -0.172 -0.94 0.114	 0.61
32 0.190	 1.04 0.161	 0.87	 0.211	 1.16 0.324	 1.75
33 0.221	 1.21 0.382	 2.08*	 0.227	 1.25 0.551	 2.98*
34 -0.234 -1.28 0.148	 0.81	 -0.286 -1.57 0.266 	 1.43
35 -0.259 -1.42 -0.111 -0.60	 -0.295 -1.62 -0.030 -0.16
36 -0.075 -0.41 -0.186 -1.01	 -0.125 -0.69 -0.155 -0.84
37 0.239	 1.31 0.053	 0.29	 0.235	 1.29 0.080	 0.43
38 -0.213 -1.17 -0.160 -0.87	 -0.244 -1.34 -0.164 -0.88
39 0.308	 1.69 0.148	 0.80	 0.295	 1.62 0.131	 0.71
40 -0.551	 3.02*-0.404 -2.19*	 -0.632 -3.48*-0.502 -2.71*
41 0.078	 0.42 -0.326 -1.77	 0.008	 0.04 -0.494 -2.67*
42 0.049	 0.27 -0.277 -1.51	 0.028	 0.15 -0.467 -2.52*
43 0.169	 0.92 -0.108 -0.59	 0.156	 0.86 -0.310 -1.67
44 0.276	 1.51 0.167	 0.91	 0.279	 1.54 -0.031 -0.17
45 0.224	 1.23 0.392	 2.13*	 0.218	 1.20 0.187	 1.01
46 0.241	 1.32 0.633	 3•44*	 0.233	 1.28 0.419	 2.26*
47 -0.448 -2.45* 0.185	 1.00	 -0.426 _2.34*-0.006 -0.03
Avrg 0.245	 1.34	 1.57	 0.245	 1.35	 1.69
Mean Beta = 0.9479
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(Table 9.6) Performance of recommended list - Broker 3
CAPM Model	 Simple Model
Day	 AAR t (AAR) CAR t (CAR)	 AAR t (AAR) CAR t (CAR)
-10 -0.626 -2.79*	 -0.636 -2.89*
-9 0.311	 1.39	 0.293	 1.33
-8 0.395	 1.76	 0.458	 2.08*
-7 0.188	 0.84	 0.171	 0.78
-6 -0.225 -1.00	 -0.285 -1.29
-5 0.480	 2.14*	 0.479	 2.18*
-4 0.056	 0.25	 0.109	 0.49
-3 0.127	 0.57	 0.113	 0.51
-2 0.692	 3.09*	 0.713	 3.24*
-1 0.419	 1.87	 0.444	 2.020 0.589	 2.63* 0.589	 2.60*	 0.544	 2.47* 0.544	 2.40*1 0.157	 0.70 0.746	 3.30*	 0.202	 0.92 0.746	 3.30*2 -0.299 -1.33 0.447	 1.97	 -0.257 -1.17 0.489	 2.16*3 0.733	 3.27* 1.180	 5.22*	 0.842	 3.82* 1.331
	 5.88*4 -0.296 -1.32 0.884	 3.91*	 -0.278 -1.26 1.053
	 4.66*5 0.116	 0.52 1.000	 4.42*	 0.190	 0.86 1.243	 5.50*6 -0.341 -1.52 0.659
	 2.91*	 -0.333 -1.51 0.910	 4.02*7 -0.092 -0.41 0.567	 2.50*	 -0.161 -0.73 0.749	 3.31*8 -0.411 -1.83 0.156	 0.69	 -0.443 -2.01 0.307	 1.369 0.310	 1.38 0.465	 2.06*	 0.351	 1.59 0.658	 2.91*10 0.174	 0.78 0.639	 2.83*	 0.185	 0.84 0.843	 3.73*11 -0.130 -0.58 0.510	 2.25*	 -0.067 -0.30 0.776
	
3•43*
12 -0.461 -2.05* 0.049	 0.22	 -0.479 -2.18* 0.297
	 1.3113 0.199	 0.89 0.248	 1.10	 0.277	 1.26 0.574	 2.54*14 0.377	 1.68 0.625	 2.76*	 0.334	 1.51 0.907	 4.01*15 -0.363 -1.62 0.263	 1.16	 -0.293 -1.33 0.614	 2.71*16 0.429	 1.91 0.692	 3.06*	 0.377	 1.71 0.991	 4.38*17 -0.340 -1.52 0.352	 1.56	 -0.341 -1.55 0.650
	 2.88*
	
18 -0.751 -3.35*-0.399 -1.76	 -0.711 -3.23*-0.061 -0.27
	
19 -0.201 -0.89 -0.599 -2.65*	 -0.193 -0.88 -0.254 -1.1220 0.560	 2.49*-0.039 -0.17	 0.596	 2.71* 0.342	 1.51
	
21 -0.089 -0.40 -0.129 -0.57
	 -0.061 -0.28 0.281	 1.2422 0.600	 2.68* 0.472	 2.08*	 0.646	 2.93* 0.927
	 4.10*23 -0.463 -2.06* 0.008	 0.04	 -0.466 -2.11* 0.461	 2.04*
	
24 -0.345 -1.54 -0.337 -1.49	 -0.330 -1.50 0.131	 0.58
	
25 -0.310 -1.38 -0.647 -2.86*	 -0.354 -1.61 -0.223 -0.98
26 0.496	 2.21*-0.152 -0.67	 0.496	 2.25* 0.273	 1.21
	
27 -0.273 -1.22 -0.425 -1.88	 -0.249 -1.13 0.025	 0.11
28 0.049	 0.22 -0.376 -1.66	 -0.036 -0.16 -0.011 -0.05
29 0.121	 0.54 -0.255 -1.13	 0.092	 0.42 0.081	 0.36
	
30 -0.322 -1.43 -0.577 -2.55*	 -0.368 -1.67 -0.287 -1.2731 0.323	 1.44 -0.254 -1.12	 0.330	 1.50 0.043	 0.19
32 0.172	 0.77 -0.082 -0.36	 0.185	 0.84 0.228	 1.01
	
33 -0.076 -0.34 -0.158 -0.70	 -0.091 -0.41 0.137	 0.60
34 0.102	 0.46 -0.056 -0.25	 0.041	 0.19 0.178	 0.78
	
35 -0.557 -2.48*-0.613 -2.71* 	 -0.558 -2.53*-0.381 -1.68
36 0.204	 0.91 -0.409 -1.81	 0.227	 1.03 -0.153 -0.68
37 0.088	 0.39 -0.321 -1.42	 0.129	 0.58 -0.025 -0.1138 0.175	 0.78 -0.146 -0.65	 0.192	 0.87 0.167	 0.7439 0.183	 0.82 0.037	 0.16	 0.184	 0.83 0.351	 1.55
	
40 -0.243 -1.08 -0.206 -0.91	 -0.286 -1.30 0.065	 0.29
	
41 -0.046 -0.21 -0.252 -1.11	 -0.002 -0.01 0.063	 0.28
	
42 -0.122 -0.54 -0.374 -1.65	 -0.112 -0.51 -0.050 -0.22
	
43 -0.055 -0.25 -0.430 -1.90	 -0.039 -0.18 -0.088 -0.39
	
44 -0.156 -0.70 -0.586 -2.59*	 -0.143 -0.65 -0.231 -1.02
45 -0.173 -0.77 -0.759 -3•35*	 -0.201 -0.91 -0.432 -1.91
46 0.238	 1.06 -0.521 -2.30*	 0.238	 1.08 -0.194 -0.86
	
47 -0.400 -1.78 -0.922 -4.07*	 -0.357 -1.62 -0.551 -2.44*
Avrg 0.297	 1.32	 1.57	 0.303	 1.37	 1.55
Mean Beta = 1.0114
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(Table 9.7) Performance of recommended list - Broker 4
CAPM Model	 Simple Model
Day	 AAR t (AAR) CAR t (CAR)
	 AAR	 t (AAR) CAR t (CAR)
-10 0.547	 2.57*	 0.507	 2.42*
-9 0.224	 1.05	 0.166	 0.79
-8 0.033	 0.16	 -0.024 -0.12
-7 0.349	 1.64	 0.330	 1.58
-6 -0.181 -0.85
	 -0.205 -0.98
-5 0.143	 0.67	 0.141	 0.68
-4 0.440	 2.07*	 0.503	 2.41*
-3 0.607	 2.85*	 0.593	 2.83*
-2 -0.144 -0.68	 -0.049 -0.23
-1 0.162	 0.76	 0.070	 0.33
	
0 -0.071 -0.33 -0.071 -0.31
	 -0.104 -0.50 -0.104 -0.46
	
1 -0.003 -0.02 -0.075 -0.32
	 -0.027 -0.13 -0.131 -0.582 0.030	 0.14 -0.044 -0.19
	 0.069	 0.33 -0.063 -0.283 0.037	 0.17 -0.007 -0.03
	 -0.032 -0.15 -0.095 -0.414 0.295	 1.39 0.288	 1.24	 0.289	 1.38 0.194	 0.855 -0.024 -0.11 0.264
	 1.13	 0.015	 0.07 0.210	 0.926 -0.016 -0.08 0.248	 1.06	 -0.058 -0.28 0.151	 0.667 0.413	 1.94 0.661	 2.84*	 0.410	 1.96 0.561	 2.46*8 -0.122 -0.57 0.539
	 2.32*	 -0.162 -0.78 0.399
	 1.759 -0.062 -0.29 0.477
	 2.05*	 -0.032 -0.16 0.367
	 1.6110 -0.025 -0.12 0.452	 1.94	 -0.045 -0.22 0.321	 1.4111 -0.076 -0.36 0.376	 1.61	 -0.104 -0.50 0.218
	 0.9612 0.082	 0.38 0.457	 1.96	 -0.008 -0.04 0.210
	 0.9213 0.175	 0.82 0.632	 2.72*	 0.238	 1.14 0.447	 1.9614 -0.049 -0.23 0.584	 2.51*	 -0.036 -0.17 0.411
	 1.8015 -0.178 -0.84 0.406
	 1.74	 -0.088 -0.42 0.323	 1.4216 0.142	 0.67 0.548	 2.36*	 0.168	 0.80 0.491	 2.16*17 -0.003 -0.02 0.545
	 2.34*	 -0.029 -0.14 0.462
	 2.0318 -0.121 -0.57 0.424
	 1.82	 -0.075 -0.36 0.387
	 1.7019 0.348	 1.63 0.772	 3.31*	 0.332	 1.59 0.720	 3.16*20 0.130	 0.61 0.902	 3.87*	 0.114	 0.54 0.833	 3.66*21 0.379	 1.78 1.281	 5.50*	 0.379	 1.81 1.212	 5.32*22 -0.432 -2.03 0.849	 3.65*	 -0.447 -2.14* 0.765	 3.36*23 -0.026 -0.12 0.823	 3•54*	 0.065	 0.31 0.830	 3.64*24 0.231	 1.09 1.054	 4•53*	 0.284	 1.36 1.114	 4.89*25 0.225	 1.06 1.279	 5•49*	 0.171	 0.82 1.285	 5.64*26 0.341	 1.60 1.620	 6.96*	 0.342	 1.64 1.627	 7.14*27 0.350	 1.65 1.971	 8.47*
	
0.340	 1.62 1.967	 8.63*28 -0.339 -1.59 1.632	 7.01*	 -0.311 -1.49 1.656	 7.27*29 0.061	 0.28 1.693	 7.27*	 0.059	 0.28 1.715	 7•53*30 0.044	 0.21 1.736	 7.46*	 0.059	 0.28 1.774	 7.78*31 0.162	 0.76 1.899	 8.16*	 0.135	 0.65 1.909	 8.38*32 0.359	 1.69 2.257	 9.70*	 0.428	 2.04* 2.336 10.26*33 -0.217 -1.02 2.041	 8.77*	 -0.216 -1.03 2.120	 9.31*34 0.463	 2.18* 2.504 10.76*	 0.442	 2.11* 2.562 11.25*35 -0.029 -0.14 2.475 10.63*	 -0.034 -0.16 2.528 11.10*
36 -0.247 -1.16 2.229	 9•57*	 -0.220 -1.05 2.308 10.13*37 0.133	 0.62 2.361 10.14*	 0.143	 0.68 2.451 10.76*38 0.028	 0.13 2.389 10.26*	 -0.030 -0.14 2.421 10.63*
39 -0.435 -2.04* 1.954	 8.40*	 -0.396 -1.89 2.024	 8.89*
40 -0.056 -0.26 1.898	 8.15*	 -0.117 -0.56 1.907	 8.37*41 0.323	 1.52 2.221	 9•54*	 0.327	 1.56 2.234	 9.81*
42 0.172	 0.81 2.394 10.28*	 0.179	 0.86 2.413 10.59*
43 0.240	 1.13 2.634 11.31*	 0.263	 1.26 2.676 11.75*
44 -0.032 -0.15 2.602 11.18* 	 -0.016 -0.08 2.660 11.67*
45 0.139	 0.65 2.741 11.77*	 0.166	 0.79 2.826 12.40*
46 -0.379 -1.78 2.362 10.15* 	 -0.364 -1.74 2.462 10.81*
47 0.579	 2.72* 2.941 12.63*	 0.587	 2.81* 3.050 13.39*
Avrg 0.201	 0.94	 4•33*	 0.199	 0.951	 4.69*
Mean Beta = 0.9459
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(Table 9.8) Performance of recommended list
(Total 467 samples)
CAPM Model	 Simple Model
iy AAR	 t (AAR) CAR t (CAR)	 AAR	 t (AAR) CAR t (CAR)
].0 0.081	 0.7].	 0.064	 0.57
-9 0.230	 2.01	 0.214	 1.90
-8 0.325	 2.85*	 0.298	 2.64*
-7 0.191	 1.67	 0.182	 1.61
-6 -0.076 -0.66	 -0.079 -0.70
-5 0.277	 2.43	 0.280	 2.48*
-4 0.287	 2.51*	 0.300	 2.65*
-3 0.403	 3,54*	 0.388	 3•44*
-2 0.414	 3.62*	 0.434	 3.84*
-1 0.341	 2.98*	 0.348	 3.08*0 0.319	 2.80* 0.319	 2.64*	 0.369	 3.26* 0.369	 3.05*1. 0.194	 1.70 0.513	 4.24*	 0.194	 1.72 0.563	 4.66*2 0.256	 2.24* 0.769	 6.36*	 0.222	 1.96 0.785	 6.50*3 0.121	 1.06 0.890	 7.36*	 0.134	 1.18 0.918	 7.61*4 0.043	 0.38 0.933	 7•7].*	 0.030	 0.26 0.948	 7.85*5 -0.006 -0.06 0.927	 7.66*	 0.004	 0.04 0.952	 7.89*6 -0.098 -0.86 0.829
	 6.85*	 -0.071 -0.63 0.881
	 7.30*7 0.071	 0.63 0.900	 744*	 0.079	 0.70 0.960	 7.96*8 -0.020 -0.17 0.881
	 7.28*	 -0.030 -0.27 0.930
	 7.70*9 0.066	 0.58 0.947	 7.83*	 0.080	 0.71 1.010	 8.37*10 -0.020 -0.18 0.926
	 7.66*	 -0.027 -0.24 0.984	 8.15*11 -0.020 -0.18 0.906
	
7,49*	
-0.038 -0.33 0.946	 7.84*12 -0.240 -2.10* 0.666	 5.51*	 -0.231 -2.04* 0.715	 5.93*13 0.015	 0.13 0.681	 5.63*	 0.012	 0.10 0.727	 6.02*14 -0.034 -0.30 0.648
	
5,35*	
-0.033 -0.29 0.694	 5.75*15 -0.054 -0.48 0.593	 4.90*	 -0.097 -0.86 0.597
	
4•95*
16 0.051	 0.45 0.645	 5,33*	 0.048	 0.43 0.645	 535*17 -0.058 -0.50 0.587	 4.85*	 -0.026 -0.23 0.619	 5.13*18 -0.220 -1.93 0.367
	 3.03*	 -0.214 -1.89 0.406
	 3.36*19 0.076	 0.66 0.443	 3.66*	 0.087	 0.77 0.493	 4.09*20 0.223	 1.95 0.665	 5.50*	 0.240	 2.13* 0.734	 6.08*21 -0.029 -0.25 0.636
	 5.26*	 -0.023 -0.20 0.711	 5.89*22 0.051	 0.45 0.688	 5.68*	 0.071	 0.63 0.782	 6.48*23 0.078	 0.68 0.766	 6.33*	 0.075	 0.66 0.857	 7.10*24 0.020	 0.18 0.786	 6.50*	 0.027	 0.24 0.883	 7.32*25 0.075	 0.65 0.861	 7.11*	 0.030	 0.27 0.914	 7.57*
26 0.058	 0.51 0.919	 7.60*	 0.071	 0.63 0.985	 8.16*27 0.054	 0.47 0.973	 8.04*	 0.050	 0.44 1.035	 8.58*28 -0.091 -0.80 0.882	 7.29*	 -0.101 -0.90 0.934	 7.74*29 0.090	 0.79 0.973	 8.04*	 0.079	 0.70 1.013	 8.39*30 -0.102 -0.89 0.871	 7.20*	 -0.111 -0.99 0.901	 7.47*
31 0.122	 1.07 0.993	 8.21*	 0.121	 1.07 1.022	 8.47*32 0.115	 1.01 1.108	 9.16*	 0.120	 1.06 1.142	 9.46*33 0.004	 0.03 1.112	 9.19*	 0.015	 0.13 1.157	 9.58*
34 0.000	 0.00 1.111	 9.19*	 -0.032 -0.28 1.125	 9.32*35 -0.279 -2.45* 0.832	 6.88*	 -0.279 -2.47* 0.846	 7.01*
36 0.004	 0.04 0.836	 6.91*	 -0.023 -0.20 0.823	 6.82*37 0.184	 1.61 1.020	 8.43*	 0.196	 1.74 1.020	 8.45*
38 -0.011 -0.10 1.009	 8.34*	 0.005	 0.04 1.024	 8.49*39 0.056	 0.49 1.066	 8.81*	 0.074	 0.65 1.098	 9.10*
40 -0.297 -2.61* 0.768	 6.35*	 -0.284 -2.51* 0.814	 6.75*41 0.037	 0.32 0.805	 6.65*	 0.024	 0.22 0.839	 6.95*
42 0.048	 0.42 0.853	 7.05*	 0.068	 0.60 0.907	 7.51*43 0.078	 0.69 0.931	 7.70*	 0.073	 0.64 0.980	 8.12*44 0.047	 0.41 0.978	 8.09*	 0.039	 0.35 1.019	 8.44*45 0.091	 0.79 1.069	 8.83*	 0.052	 0.46 1.071	 8.87*
46 0.051	 0.45 1.120	 9.26*	 0.052	 0.46 1.123	 9.30*47 0.000	 0.00 1.120	 9.26*	 -0.014 -0.13 1.108	 9.18*
Avrg 0.119	 1.04	 5.72*	 0.120	 1.06	 6.00*
Mean Beta = 0.9744
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CHAPTER X. CONCLUSIONS.
10.1. Summary and conclusions.
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the Korean capital
market internationalisation and to examine the efficiency of the
Korean stock market comprehensively. Hence, this research was
concentrated on the following three areas, as mentioned in the
abstract and in section 1.2.
(a) The evaluation of the capital market liberalisation by
examining the internal market mechanism and conducting geogra-
phical comparisons.
(b) The effects of inflation / real variables on stock returns.
(c) The ability of the Korean stock market to help investors to
'correctly price' the shares in the market.
The main results obtained can be summarised as the
following:
1. The internationalisation plan of the Korean capital market
should be gradual and balanced with general economic conditions.
Several measures were recommended to enhance the functions of the
domestic securities market. In that way, Korea would take
positive step towards establishing a strategic framework of
capital market liberalisation.
2. The market economies of the Far East - Korea, Japan, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong - have experienced rapid development and growth in
international trade flows. These four countries have all
experienced the nearest thing to an economic miracle in the post-
war period, emerging from being the lesser developed of the 1950s
to become industrial nations in the 1980s. And yet, they
illustrate a wide diversity of financial systems, ranging from a
high degree of centralisation and government control (Korea) to
economies where market mechanisms are the prevalent means of
allocating resources (Hong Kong). The undergoing fundamental
changes in the world financial system have forced policy makers
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in the Far East to review existing understandings and theories on
the issues related to financial liberalisation.
3. This thesis examined the relationship between the macro
economic activities and the capital market in Korea. 12 variables
were used in two different periods. One is the longer term period
of 173 months from January 1975 to June 1989, using three
different sets of monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual data. The
other is the recent short-term period of 66 months from January
1984 to June 1989, using monthly data. Using the interest rate
model in the period of January 1975 to June 1989, the expected
inflation was uniformly positively related to inflation as
measured by the CPI and the WPI. The relations between stock
returns and expected inflation, and between stock returns and
unexpected inflation showed negative. Also stock returns and the
changes in expected inflation were negatively related. These
results did not coincide with the Fisher Hypothesis that common
stocks, as claims against real assets, should be a good hedge
against inflation. The hypothesis regarding the real stock
return-real activity relations is that, given efficient capital
markets, these relations should be positive. • The results
indicated positive relations, with the current rate of change in
IPI explaining slightly more than the variations of past and
future changes in the industrial production index. The government
bond yield was negatively related to real; stock returns. The
money supply(M2) was not uniformly related to the real stock
returns among monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual data.
In another attempt, we examined whether real stock return-
inflation relations varied over time. For this purpose, the most
recent 66 months' data were examined, using the same model as for
the longer term data. There were some respects in which these
empirical results are less supportive. We found that these real
stock return - inflation relations varied over time. The results
of the most recent five and half years period show positive
relation or no relation between real stock returns and inflation.
M2 and the balance on the current account were found to be more
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powerful in explaining the stock return / inflation relation than
Ml. Some of the dissimilarity in the behavior of short-term
expected and unexpected inflation rates is probably due to
specific stock market structural changes in recent years.
4. This thesis examined the efficiency of the Korean stock market
at three different levels. They are weak form, semi-strong form,
and strong form empirical tests of the efficient market
hypothesis. For this research, the daily share price changes of
two different periods of January 1978-December 1980 and January
1986-December 1988 were examined. The KCSPIs at the same periods
analysed seperately. Also to check the effect of the daily price
limit system the trimmed data were examined, using same models.
The results of the Korean stock market efficiency tests
manifest mixed behavior. In the frequency distribution model
before doing empirical tests of the EMH, the average results of
two different set of data in each two different periods indicate
relatively fat tails combined with peakedness or leptokurtosis.
In the weak form empirical test, three different models were
used. In the serial correlation analysis, large numbers of
significant serial correlation coefficients for lags under four
were found. The significance levels of the standardised
variables in the runs test were larger and the market seemed to
have a tendency in price movements, not to follow a random walk.
Similar results were found in spectral analysis. Some samples
exhibited random walk behavior, but large numbers appeared to
deviate from a random walk. Their presence in the pattern of
dependence relationships is sufficient to reject the weak form
efficient market hypothesis. Comparing the two different sub-
periods, deviation from a random walk in 1986-1988 is smaller
than in 1978-1980. This can be interpreted as the effect of
relevant information in the stock market recently, which is
disseminated more rapidly due to the development of sophisticated
communication technology, hordes of analysts, large numbers of
business journals and market regulation favouring transparency.
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5. In the semi-strong form test, stock price behaviour around the
announcement dates of bonus issues was examined. Samples of 62
cases of the Korea Stock Exchange for 4 years during 1985-1988
were used in two stages. First, ex-right day opening prices were
compared with theoretical opening prices. In addition, the
magnitude of the overnight price adjustment was analysed using
the prior day closing to ex-day closing stock returns. Second,
announcement effects were examined using the closing prices
around the announcement dates and adjusting for the payment of
dividend. These returns were compared to the mean daily return of
a representative period around the event day for inference
purposes.
The valuation effects of bonus stock issue announcements were
found to react to share prices in a relatively short period.
Portfolio returns at the ex-date are significantly larger for
unadjusted data than those of adjusted data by KCSPI. The results
using adjusted data, however, were not found significant. The
Korean stock market could be said to be relatively efficient with
respect to the information of bonus issues. Thus, investors on
average could not get significant abnormal returns. However,
the family character of the most Korean corporations was found to
provide a limited numbers of market participants with the
opportunity to use internal information profitably.
6. In the strong form test, the excess returns from following the
467 recommendations made by the four Korean stockbrokers turned
out to be significant before deducting transaction costs. The
brokerage houses on average provided valuable services to their
clients in selecting stocks for superior returns. However,
amongst the brokers reviewed there were large differences of
predictive ability, Considering transactions costs of brokerage
commission and transaction tax, they on average did not provide
valuable services to their clients in selecting stocks, even some
brokerage houses showed large abnormal gains.
In summary, the results show that the Korean stock market in
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its early stages did not have the ability to help investors to
'relatively correctly price' the shares. More recent evidence
shows improved efficiency which is likely to continue as the
capital market expands.
10.2 Suggestions for further research.
Given the limited resources available for this research,
this work has to be ended at a more or less arbitrary point.
Clearly, many areas remain requiring further and better research.
Conditions in the market place change over time. Many
suggestions have emerged, which can be useful to both academic
researchers and government policy makers. This research has
identif led three general areas where it is thought that useful
further research may be carried out:
(a) Liberalisation effects on the capital markets.
The Korean capital market is undergoing a process of
expansion, liberalisation, and internationalisation. However,
many regulations and underdeveloped market segments remain.
Also, the changing world economic and financial environment
influences the market. The effects of opening the capital market
to international investors as well as the optimal degree of
openness of the stock market would be investigated. Also the
liberalisation policies on interest rates and foreign exchange
can be studied. The degree of openness of the Far Eastern four
countries is quite different, thus one could compare the real
effects to the economy. Comparisons with other countries, for
instance south America, could further broaden the number of
Country-specific case studies.
(b)Macro economic variables and the capital markets.
In this research the relationship between real stock
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returns and inflation / real variables was carried out for two
different periods: 173 months and 66 months. This can be extended
to the periods of 1975-1983. Also the results using quarterly or
yearly data can be compared to establish whether they are
consistent with this research. From the standpoint of stock price
behaviour, for instance, the adjustment patterns of the stock
market in relation to macro-information can be examined in Korea.
The actual changes of foreign interest rates, and foreign
exchange rates are good examples.
(C) Extending / modifying the efficient market tests.
With respect to micro-information specific to individual
firms, one can also investigate the reaction of stock prices to
accounting information, mergers and acquisitions, seasonality,
market performance of initial public offers or underwritings,
portfolio performance measurement etc.
Usually, EMil is a fairly limited concept. It says that the
prices of securities instantaneously and fully reflect all
available relevant information, but it does nQt imply that
product markets are perfectly competitive or that information is
costless. However, some recent papers have shown that a sensible
asset market equiliblium must have some room for analysis. These
articles make the alternative assumption that information
acquisitin costly (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 1976, 1980, Seyhun
1986, etc.). Also joint hypotheses with CAPM are tested.
Therefore, such empirical tests can be applied to the Korean
market.
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Appendix 7.3. Samples of stocks and adjustment factors used in
the weak-form tests.(1st January 1978 - 31st December 1980)
number company observations
	 acijustment ractors
aate	 - remark - ratio
	
2	 Cheil Sugar	 638
	
3	 Oriental Brewery	 813
	
4	 Haitai Confectionery 776
	
5	 Doosan Foods	 643
	
6	 Tongyang Nylon	 385
	
7	 Hanil Synthetic Fib. 806
	
8	 Hanyang Chemical	 870
	
9	 Lucky Ltd.	 839
	
10	 Pacific Chemical	 863
	
11	 Hankook Tire	 719
	
12	 Yuhan Corp.	 659
	
13	 Dong-A Pharmacy	 740
	
14	 Hankuk Glass	 656
	
15	 Asia Cement	 811
	
16	 Ssangyong Cement	 851
J.L/1/I - D9flUS	 -
31/12/78 - dividend - 0.2531/12/79 - b9nus - 0.12
31/12/79 - dividend - 0.2710/04/78 - r.ght
	 - 0.55555531/12/78 - dj.vidend - 0.2523/05/79 - rght
	 - 0.392857131/12/79 - dvdend - 0.2231/12/78 - dividend - 0.223/03/79 - right
	 - 0.22523/03/79 - bonus
	 - 0.531/12/79 - dvidend - 0.2424/04/80 - right
	 - 0.42830/06/78 - dvdend - 0.130/06/79 - dividend - 0.23
30/06/80 - dvdend - 0.231/12/78 - dividend - 0.2
22/03/79 - b9n1s
	 - 0.531/12/79 - dividend - 0.24
31/12/78 - bçnus
	 - 0.228731/12/78 - dividend - 0.23
01/06/79 - rvsp1t - 2 to 131/12/79 - dividend - 0.25
31/03/78 - bçniis 	 - 0.531/03/78 - dividend - 0.25
31/03/80 - dvdend - 0.25
31/03/78 - dividend - 0.1641
05/09/78 - right	 - 0.164437631/03/79 - dividend - 0.076
31/03/80 - dividend - 0.131/03/80 - bonus	 - 0.2517/06/78 - split 	 - 1 to 227/11/78 - bonus	 - 0.58
27/11/78 - rj.ght - 1.1731/12/78 - dividend - 0.25
31/12/79 - dpqdend - 0.2531/12/78 - dividend - 0.25
31/12/79 - d.vdend - 0.2531/12/78 - dividend - 0.22
31/12/79 - di.vidend - 0.2205/03/80 - right	 - 0.6
31/12/78 - dividend - 0.2
31/12/78 - b9nus - 0.2
31/12/79 - d.vidend - 0.308/05/78 - rght
	 - 0.331/12/78 - d.vidend - 0.3
04/06/79 - right - 0.3
31/12/79 - dvdend - 0.330/06/78 - di.vidend - 0.2530/06/78 - right
	 - 0.230/06/78 - bonus	 - 0.2831/01/79 - rj.ght	 - 0.13219130/06/79 - dividend - 0.2530/06/79 - 4gt
	 - 0.137357
30/06/80 - dividend - 0.2530/06/80 - right
	 - 0.22
10/06/78 - rj.ght
	 - 0.183432
31/12/78 - d.vdend - 0.2
31/12/79 - dividend - 0.2
29/09/78 - 4gt	 - 0.133333331/12/78 - dividend - 0.22
31/12/78 - bonus	 - 0.1764705
29/10/79 - rg1it	 - 0.25
31/12/79 - dividend - 0.23
31/12/79 - bonus	 - 0.125
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17	 Pusan Steel Pipe	 819
18	 Daewoo Heavy md.	 871
19	 Korea Machinery	 750
20	 Gold Star	 870
21	 Oriental Precision 869
22	 Kia Motors	 818
23	 Hyundai Motors	 872
24	 Samwhan Corp.	 851
25	 Dong-Ah Construction 861
26	 Samsung	 846
27	 Korean Air	 852
28	 The Commercial Bank 852
29	 Cho-Hung Bank	 847
30	 Dongsan Construction 824
91	 KCSPI	 880
31/12/78 - dividend - 0.22
31/12/78 - right	 - 0.2
31/12/79 - bonus	 - 0.1666
31/12/79 - dl.vldend - 0.106/10/78 - right - 0.3
31/12/78 - dv.dend - 0.231/12/79 - dividend - 0.18
07/04/78 - right	 - 0.62969907/04/78 - bonus	 - 0.25
31/12/78 - di.vidend - 0.2325/08/79 - rigit	 - 0.6
31/12/79 - dividend - 0.1
03/07/78 - bonus	 - 0.32625
03/07/78 - 4ght	 - 1.19731/12/78 - r.g1t	 - 0.4353
31/12/78 - d1.vdend - 0.2531/12/79 - dividend - 0.22
24/04/78 - rj.ght	 - 0.3
27/07/78 - right	 - 0.331/12/78 - dvdend - 0.25
31/12/79 - dividend - 0.22
20/06/78 - b9nus	 - 0.285714
20/06/78 - rglit	 - 0.385714
31/12/78 - dl.vldend - 0.25
30/10/79 - rg1it	 - 0.22531/12/79 - dividend - 0.25
17/05/78 - right	 - 0.45
22/09/78 - rgt - 0.63
31/12/78 - dividend - 0.22
31/12/79 - dividend - 0.2
23/11/78 - bonus	 - 0.12
23/11/78 - rgt	 - 0.1831/12/78 - dividend - 0.3
31/12/79 - dividend - 0.3
03/06/80 - right	 - 0.4
03/06/80 - bçnus	 - 0.29
20/06/78 - rgIit	 - 0.5873015
31/12/78 - dividend - 0.3
07/11/79 - b9niIs 	 - 0.3531/12/79 - dvder)d - 0.331/12/78 - dividend - 0.2
31/12/79 - dividend - 0.2
01/04/78 - right	 - 0.2399793
15/11/78 - rgIit	 - 0.34996831/12/78 - dividend - 0.25
31/12/79 - b9nl1s	 - 0.2531/12/79 - dividend - 0.2
31/12/78 - d.vidend - 0.23
04/08/79 - right - 0.35
31/12/79 - dv4.dend - 0.23
31/12/78 - dividend - 0.21
16/07/79 - rj.g1it 	 - 0.3531/12/79 - dividend - 0.21
28/07/78 - bonus	 - 0.666666731/12/78 - dividend - 0.2
07/04/79 - right	 - 0.07692307/04/79 - bonus 	 - 0.3
31/12/79 - rj.glit	 - 0.428531/12/79 - dividend - 0.24
31/12/78 - dividend - 0.132
31/12/79 - dividend - 0.194
(Notes)1)Adjistment fctors are adapted from 'The Securities Market'(daily) published by the Korea Stock Exchange.
Daily returns of adjusted day are calculated as in the
following examples (R for ratio).
a. Cash dividend:
U=log(P 1+R1) -1ogP,
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where P, is the cl9sing price at ex-rigt day,
P s the closing price at the previous day
R is the cash dividend ratio of par value,000 Won).
b. Right issue / bonus issue:
U=log (
	
(1+R2+R3) - R3A ] - logP
where R2 j.s the rati.o of b9nus jssue,
R3 is the ratio of ight i.ssue,
A is the right issuing price (par value of 5,000 Won
in 1978-1980 or l5-40 discounted level of market
price in 1986-1988.
c. stock split or rev-split:
Ulog(P^1
 x Rs) - logP
where Rs js 2 in the case of stock spljt,
Rs is 0.5 in the case of rev-split.
2) KCSPI : Korea Composite Stock Price Index.
3) observations : total. number of price changes or differences(Ut)
= trading days - 1.
Appendix 7.2 Samples of stocks and adjustment factors used in
the weak-form tests.
(1st January 1986 - 31st December 1988)
number Company observations
	 aajustment tactors
aate	 - remarK - ratio
51 Korea Tungsten
	 873	 31/12/86 - dividend - 0.11
31/12/87 - di.vidend - 0.0752 Cheil Sugar
	 811	 18/11/86 - right
	 - 0.25
31/12/86 - dvdend 0.1
31/12/87 - dividend - 0.1
31/08/88 - r.ght
	 - 0.2133353 Oriental Brewery
	 789	 17/05/86 - right
	 - 0.1333333
31/12/86 - dvidend - 0.1
16/11/87 - rglit
	 - 0.1058
31/12/87 - d.vidend - 0.1
30/06/88 - right
	 - 0.1052
15/11/88 - 4ght
	 - 0.03839
54 Haitai Confectionery 859 30/06/86 - dividend - 0.064
30/06/87 - dv.dend - 0.0938
30/06/88 - dividend - 0.1088
26/11/88 - right
	 - 0.33325355 Doosan Foods
	 696 31/12/86 - dividend - 0.05
24/07/87 - right
	 - 0.18
31/12/87 - dividend - 0.07
56 Tongyang Nylon
	 795 31/12/86 - d.vidend - 0.15
13/07/87 - right
	 - 0.09968985
28/10/87 - bornis
	 - 0.190424
31/12/87 - dividend - 0.15
10/06/88 - rjght
	 - 0.1166057
57 Hanil Synthetic Fib. 851 31/03/86 - dividend - 0.13
14/07/86 - r.ght - 0.18
31/03/87 - dividend - 0.16
31/03/88 - dI.v].dend - 0.231/08/88 - right
	 - 0.08888
58 Hanyang Chemical
	 876 31/12/86 - dividend - 0.12
30/11/87 - right
	 - 0.363157
31/12/87 - dvdend - 0.12
59 Lucky Ltd.
	
876 31/12/86 - dividend - 0.12
17/03/87 - right
	 - 0.09
24/08/87 - rj.glit	 - 0.09
31/12/87 - d.vidend - 0.12
31/03/88 - right 	 - 0.2
31/03/88 - bonus 	 - 0.1
31/08/88 - right	 - 0.187654
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72 Kia Motors	 876
73 Hyundai Motors	 873
60 Pacific Chemical 	 867
61 Hankook Tire	 778
62 Yuhan Corp.	 793
63 Dong-A Pharmacy 	 874
64 Hankuk Glass	 814
65 Asia Cement	 851
66 Ssangyong Cement	 873
67 Pusan Steel Pipe 	 866
68 Daewoo Heavy md. 	 876
69 Korea Machinery 	 852
70 Gold Star	 876
71 Oriental Precision 876
74 Saiuwhan Corp.
	
873
75 Dong-Ah Construction 852
11/11/86 - right
	 - 0.1531/12/86 - dividend - 0.1310/08/87 - bonus
	 - 0.23014510/08/87 - 4ght
	 - 0.11908631/12/87 - dividend - 0.1403/05/88 - right
	 - 0.09603/05/88 - bonus
	
- 0.156595705/08/88 - right
	 - 0.1214/08/86 - bonus
	 - 0.3240331/12/86 - dividend - 0.1217/11/87 - right
	 - 0.22473331/12/87 - dj.vj.dend - 0.12
31/12/86 - dividend - 0.12
31/12/87 - dividend - 0.1231/12/87 - bonus
	
- 0.066666731/03/86 - dividend - 0.101/04/86 - bonus
	 - 0.131/03/87 - di.vidend - 0.1225/06/87 - right - 0.27
31/03/88 - d.vjdend - 0.1330/06/86 - dividend - 0.1227/10/86 - right
	 - 0.1490797527/10/86 - bonus
	 - 0.1840490730/06/87 - dividend - 0.1330/09/87 - bonus
	 - 0.11363630/06/88 - dvi.dend - 0.1431/12/86 - dividend - 0.1501/01/87 - b9nus
	 - 0.14933301/01/87 - r.ght
	 - 0.28531/12/87 - dividend - 0.1517/09/86 - bonus
	 - 0.117/09/86 - r.ght - 0.2131/12/86 - dividend - 0.1531/12/87 - dl.vidend - 0.1531/03/88 - right
	 - 0.089413631/03/88 - bonus
	 - 0.05631/12/86 - dividend - 0.101/01/87 - b9nls
	 - 0.10638331/12/87 - dividend - 0.101/01/88 - b9nus
	 - 0.10576914/10/88 - right
	 0.1616131/12/86 - d.vidend - 0.0821/08/87 - rg1it
	 - 0.4531/12/87 - d 1.vidend - 0.0815/07/88 - right
	 - 0.2431/12/86 - dividend - 0.1202/07/87 - bonus
	 - 0.0502/07/87 - rj.ght
	 - 0.55531/12/87 - dividend - 0.13
03/09/86 - r.ght
	 - 0.2731/12/86 - dividend - 0.12
14/08/87 - rj.gt
	 - 0.331/12/87 - dividend - 0.12
09/05/88 - bçnus
	 - 0.109/05/88 - r.ght
	 - 0.2
20/11/86 - rgt
	 - 0.2731/12/86 - dividend - 0.1
25/11/87 - rj.gt	 - 0.1730831/12/87 - dividend - 0.1
27/10/86 - rjglit	 - 0.18055531/12/86 - dividend - 0.12
23/10/87 - r.gt	 - 0.318181931/12/87 - dividend - 0.12
22/11/86 - rgt
	 - 0.1626388431/12/86 - dividend - 0.12
31/12/87 - dvidend - 0.1230/06/88 - right
	 - 0.2192592531/12/86 - d.vj.dend - 0.1
31/12/87 - dividend - 0.08
30/06/88 - rj.glit	 - 0.3231/12/86 - dividend - 0.08
14/08/87 - r.gIit	 - 0.2731/12/87 - dividend - 0.1
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77 Korean Air	 876
82 Korea Inv't & Fin. 	 700
83 Dongsuh Securities 833
76 Samsung	 860
78 The Commercial Bank 870
79 Cho-Hung Bank	 873
80 Dongsan Construction 855
81 The Bank of Pusan	 739
84 Ankuk F & M Insuran 635
92 KCSPI	 876
27/10/86 - rjght	 - 0.252
31/12/86 - dv1.dend - 0.131/12/87 - dvidend - 0.12
25/04/88 - right	 - 0.125
20/10/86 - bonus	 - 0.2
20/10/86 - 4ght 	 - 0.111111131/12/86 - dividend - 0.1
25/09/87 - bçnus	 - 0.125
25/09/87 - r.ght	 - 0.112531/12/87 - d.vidend - 0.12
22/06/88 - right	 - 0.096
02/10/86 - rj.glit 	 - 0.216731/12/86 - dividend - 0.04
01/01/87 - b9nus 	 - 0.05882
29/07/87 - right	 - 0.35
31/12/87 - dividend - 0.03
14/03/88 - right 	 - 0.48
27/10/86 - r.ght	 - 0.240876
31/12/86 - dividend - 0.05
01/01/87 - b9nus	 - 0.058802/09/87 - right 	 - 0.35
31/12/87 - dl.vidend - 0.03
16/03/88 - right 	 - 0.48
31/12/86 - dvidend - 0.07
23/05/87 - right	 - 0.138431/12/87 - d.vidend - 0.08
25/09/86 - right	 - 0.5175
28/11/86 - b9nl1s 	 - 0.11111131/12/86 - dividend - 0.05
17/11/87 - 4gt	 - 0.3857131/12/87 - dividend - 0.03
30/06/88 - rj.glit - 0.4830/06/86 - dividend - 0.12
30/06/87 - dvj.dend - 0.12
30/06/88 - dividend - 0.15
31/03/86 - dividend - 0.05
31/03/86 - bonus	 - 0.03
23/06/86 - rjght	 - 0.5
12/01/87 - rglit	 - 0.26531/03/87 - dividend - 0.12
28/01/88 - rgit	 - 0.4531/03/88 - dvidend - 0.15
15/06/88 - right 	 - 0.4
31/03/86 - dividend - 0.1
30/09/86 - bonus	 - 0.5
30/09/86 - rg1it	 - 0.931/03/87 - dividend - 0.12
31/03/88 - bonus	 - 0.131/03/88 - 4glit 	 - 0.1631/03/88 - dividend - 0.13
31/12/86 - dvjdend - 0.037
31/12/87 - dividend - 0.024
(Notes)
1) Ratios of adjusted factors are calculated as in the same
methods as appendix 7.1 (see p.221 Notes).
bonus 0.2: 20% additional bonus stock issues to shareholders.
right 0.3: 30% additional right issues to shareholders at par
value or at 60%-85% of market price.
dividend 0.15: 15% cash dividend of par value.
2) KCSPI: the Korea Composite Stock Price Index.
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Appendix 7.3(1) Trading days, means, and standard deviations of
ECS P15
INDEX OBSRVN	 MEAN	 CHANGE POSIT CONST NEGAT
	 S.D.
91	 880	 0.000012	 422	 423	 2	 455 0.0114268
92	 876	 0.002155	 355	 515	 5	 356 0.0129627
(Notes)
91: Korea Composite Stock Price Index(KCSPI) in period of
1978-1980.
92: Korea Composite Stock Price Index(KCSPI) in period of
1986-1988.
OBSRVN: Observations = trading days - 1.
S.D.: Standard deviation.
MEAN: The mean of observations,
i.e., daily share price returns.
CHANGE: The number of runs.
POSIT: The number of positive share price changes.
CONST: The number of no share price change.
NEGAT: The number of negative share price changes.
Appendix 7.3(2) Frequency distributions of KCSPIs in two
different periods
INTERVALS
INDEX--------------------------------------------------------------
0.5SD 1.OSD 1.5SD 2.OSD 3.OSD	 4.OSD	 5.OSD	 >5.OSD
NORMAL 0.3830 0.6826 0.8664 0.9545 0.9973 0.999938 0.9999994 0.000000
91	 0.5455 0.8114 0.9148 0.9568 0.9875 0.990909 0.9931818 0.006818
92	 0.4224 0.7295 0.8881 0.9532 0.9920 0.998858 0.9988585 0.001141
AVRAGE 0.4839 0.7704 0.9015 0.9550 0.9898 0.994884 0.9960201 0.003979
(Note)
NORMAL: Normal distribution.
AVRAGE: Average.
SD: Standard deviation.
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Appendix 7.3(3) Trading days, means, and standard deviations of
samples in period of 1978-1980
COMPANY OBSRVN MEAN	 CHANGE POSIT CONST NEGAT 	 S.D.
-0 • 000143
0. 0003 32
0. 000701
0. 000818
0. 000744
0. 000311
0. 000320
-0 • 000312
0. 000962
0. 000116
-0.001358
0. 000257
0. 000492
0. 000337
-0 • 000924
-0. 000106
-0.000810
-0. 000734
-0. 001493
0. 000471
-0. 001088
-0. 001644
-0. 001228
-0.000766
-0 • 000690
-0. 000272
-0. 000880
0. 001025
0. 000877
-0.000936
0. 0166374
0.0206770
0. 0242374
0. 0172179
0. 0294132
0.0320772
0. 0139646
0.0293702
0. 0278803
0.0180209
0. 0278134
0.0196266
0. 0206205
0. 0238544
0. 0242588
0.0255596
0. 0245714
0.0285266
0.0292446
0. 0297156
0.0307717
0.0284650
0.0291683
0.0274045
0. 0249279
0. 0273525
0. 0296120
0. 0103376
0.0116786
0. 0317190
(Notes)
OBSRVN: The number of observations.
MEAN: The mean value of each sample.
CHANGE: The number of runs.
POSIT: The number of positive share price changes.
CONST: The number of no share price change.
NEGAT: The number of negative share price changes.
S.D.: Standard deviation.
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Appendix 7.3(4) Frequency distributions in periods Of 1978-1980
INTERVALS
CMPNY
0.5SD 1.OSD 1.5SD 2.OSD 3.OSD	 4.OSD	 5.OSD	 >5.OSD
NM 0. 3830
1 0. 5461
2 0.6411
3 0.5092
4 0. 6534
5 0. 5241
6 0. 7039
7 0. 7246
8 0. 4529
9 0. 4386
10 0. 5122
11 0. 5132
12 0. 6707
13 0. 5865
14 0. 5564
15 0. 5647
16 0. 5006
17 0. 5324
18 0. 4466
19 0. 5373
20 0. 3333
21 0. 4350
22 0. 4548
23 0. 4323
24 0. 4853
25 0. 4762
26 0. 4953
27 0.4225
28 0. 6268
29 0. 6541
30 0. 3835
0. 6826
0. 7760
0.8025
0. 7454
0. 8454
0. 7372
0. 8312
0. 8610
0. 7230
0. 6937
0. 7567
0. 7510
0. 8270
0. 7905
0. 7820
0. 7608
0. 7568
0. 7534
0. 7268
0. 7560
0. 7000
0.7054
0. 7066
0. 7282
0. 6733
0. 6794
0. 7530
0. 7289
0. 8122
0. 8335
0. 6857
0. 8664
0. 8798
0. 8762
0. 8475
0. 9098
0. 8476
0. 8831
0. 9342
0. 8368
0. 8343
0. 8737
0. 8623
0. 8983
0. 8932
0. 8643
0. 8816
0. 8696
0. 8730
0. 8542
0. 8787
0. 8644
0. 8596
0. 8716
0. 8681
0. 8543
0. 83 62
0. 8629
0. 8709
0. 9038
0. 9067
0. 8653
0. 9545
0. 9253
0. 9232
0. 9287
0. 9433
0. 9238
0. 9273
0. 9541
0. 9368
0. 9499
0. 9293
0. 9374
0. 9363
0. 9270
0. 9405
0. 9285
0. 9318
0. 9206
0. 9311
0. 9400
0. 9632
0. 9344
0. 9462
0. 9335
0.9471
0. 9640
0. 9385
0. 93 19
0. 9484
0. 9410
0. 9515
0. 9973
0. 9778
0. 9687
0. 9951
0. 9639
0. 9953
0. 9792
0. 9814
0. 9989
0. 9988
0. 9838
0. 9903
0. 9712
0. 9730
0. 9817
0. 9790
0. 9871
0. 9902
0. 9954
0. 9813
0. 9989
0. 9988
0. 9939
0. 9966
0. 9988
0. 9954
0. 9835
0. 9977
0. 9859
0. 9752
0. 9951
0. 999938
0. 997666
0. 995298
1. 000000
0. 99 6134
1.000000
0. 987013
0. 98 6352
1.000000
0. 998808
0. 99 6524
0. 9972 18
0. 990895
0. 997297
0. 995427
0. 998767
1.000000
0. 997558
1. 000000
0. 996000
0. 998851
1.000000
1. 000000
1.000000
0. 998825
1. 000000
1. 000000
1. 000000
0. 992958
0. 990555
1. 000000
0 • 9999994
1.0000000
0. 9984326
1.0000000
0. 9974227
1. 0000000
0. 9974026
0.9913151
1.0000000
1.0000000
1. 0000000
0.9986092
0. 9969651
1.0000000
0.9969512
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
0.9986666
0. 9988506
1.0000000
1.0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
0.9953052
0.9964581
1. 0000000
0 • 0000006
0.
0. 0015674
0.
0.0025773
0.
0.0025974
0. 0086849
0.
0.
0.
0.0013908
0.0030349
0.
0.0030488
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.0013333
0.0011494
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.0046948
0.0035419
0.
AV 0.5271 0.7561 0.8721 0.9378 0.9871 0.997072 0.9988797 0.0011207
CP 0.5455 0.8114 0.9148 0.9568 0.9875 0.990909 0.9931818 0.0068182
(Notes)
AV: Average.
CP: Korea Composite Stock Price Index.
NM: Normal distribution.
SD: Standard deviation.
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51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
873
811
789
859
696
795
851
876
876
867
778
793
874
814
851
873
866
876
852
876
876
876
873
873
852
860
876
870
873
855
739
700
833
635
382
323
320
380
289
326
357
380
389
348
286
198
353
315
103
366
111
406
359
392
419
414
394
391
398
354
391
99
375
115
344
135
430
309
383
324
321
381
290
327
358
418
410
384
306
302
360
316
402
419
373
399
379
416
397
391
395
397
397
386
416
394
400
377
345
299
431
310
93
187
209
122
166
147
127
77
76
134
185
199
160
213
104
87
112
70
113
67
59
70
83
84
56
119
68
100
97
116
75
136
43
87
397
300
259
356
240
321
366
381
390
349
287
292
354
285
345
367
381
407
360
393
420
415
395
392
399
355
392
376
376
362
319
265
359
238
Appendix 7.3(5) Trading days, means, and standard deviations
of samples in period of 1986-1988
COMPANY OBSRVN	 MEAN	 CHANGE POSIT CONST NEGAT 	 S.D.
0. 001797
0. 0014 15
0. 001339
0. 001764
0. 001115
0. 001978
0. 001663
0. 001373
0. 001867
0. 001861
0. 001740
0.000955
0. 001251
0. 001345
0. 001735
0. 002019
0. 002258
0. 001331
0. 000906
0. 001678
0. 001289
0. 000951
0. 000715
0. 0014 69
0. 002430
0. 002035
0. 002457
0. 002490
0. 002526
0. 002206
0. 003581
0. 002632
0. 004252
0. 005119
0. 0241518
0.0172607
0. 0177062
0. 0201257
0. 0219439
0.0213737
0. 0227345
0.0221289
0. 0209633
0. 0206938
0. 0217869
0. 0202961
0.0198090
0. 0171720
0.0237323
0. 0226176
0. 0249386
0. 023 63 61
0.0206816
0. 0208615
0. 0244977
0.0206568
0. 0202203
0. 0240491
0.0289029
0 • 0227196
0. 0238672
0.0244884
0.0256094
0.0277466
0.0286471
0. 0258844
0.0276136
0. 0270792
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Appendix 7.3(6) Frequency distributions in period of 1986-1988
INTERVALS
CMPNY-----------------------------------------------------------
0.55D 1.OSD 1.5SD 2.OSD 3.OSD 	 4.OSD	 5.OSD	 >5.OSD
NM 0. 3830
51 0. 4330
52 0. 53 14
53 0. 5475
54 0. 4761
55 0.5057
56 0. 4855
57 0. 4548
58 0.4 178
59 0. 4178
60 0. 4625
61 0. 5283
62 0. 4943
63 0. 4462
64 0. 5160
65 0. 4501
66 0. 4570
67 0. 4376
68 0. 4441
69 0. 4272
70 0. 4110
71 0. 4 007
72 0. 4155
73 0. 4570
74 0. 4250
75 0. 4366
76 0. 4209
77 0. 4521
78 0. 4644
79 0. 4903
80 0. 4363
81 0. 3992
82 0. 4686
83 0. 3974
84 0. 4 189
0. 6826
0. 7079
0. 7411
0. 7440
0. 7113
0. 7457
0. 7057
0. 7286
0. 7112
0. 7112
0. 7232
0. 7314
0. 7491
0. 7323
0. 7396
0. 7227
0. 6953
0. 6963
0. 7226
0. 7183
0. 6952
0. 68 15
0. 7180
0. 7056
0. 6816
0. 6890
0. 7023
0. 7032
0. 7080
0. 7033
0. 6865
0. 6468
0. 6986
p.6639
0. 6724
0. 8664
0. 8534
0. 8434
0. 8606
0. 8591
0. 8592
0. 8453
0. 8449
0. 8584
0. 8596
0. 8593
0. 8368
0. 8562
0. 8501
0. 8649
0. 8531
0. 8442
0. 8360
0. 8413
0. 8568
0. 8447
0. 8607
0. 8379
0. 8305
0. 8270
0. 8486
0. 84 65
0. 8470
0. 8391
0. 8431
0. 8409
0. 8525
0. 8243
0. 8727
0. 9071
0. 9545
0. 9462
0. 9174
0. 9265
0. 9290
0. 9325
0. 9447
0. 9553
0. 9441
0. 9338
0. 9285
0. 9473
0. 9243
0. 9233
0. 9324
0. 9448
0. 9370
0. 9446
0. 9406
0. 9272
0. 9498
0. 9498
0. 9372
0. 9336
0. 9622
0. 9660
0. 9384
0. 9463
0. 9391
0. 9301
0. 9544
0. 9689
0. 9743
0. 9604
0. 9748
0. 9973
0. 9966
0. 9951
0. 9937
0. 9977
0. 9899
0. 9975
0. 9953
1. 0000
0. 9989
0. 9988
0. 9936
0. 9937
0. 9989
0. 9889
0.9941
0. 9989
0. 9965
0. 9966
1. 0000
1.0000
0. 9966
1. 0000
1.000Q
0. 9989
0. 9953
0. 9988
0. 9989
0. 9989
0. 9966
0. 9977
0. 9973
0. 9929
0. 9976
0. 9906
0. 999938
1.000000
1.000000
1. 000000
1. 000000
0. 998563
0. 998742
0. 998825
1. 000000
1. 000000
1. 000000
0. 996144
0. 997478
1. 000000
1. 000000
0. 998825
1. 000000
1. 000000
0.998858
1. 000000
1. 000000
1. 000000
1. 000000
1. 000000
1. 000000
1. 000000
1.000000
1. 000000
1. 000000
1. 000000
1. 000000
0. 998647
0. 997143
0. 998800
0. 99 6850
0. 9999994
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1. 0000000
0. 9987422
0. 9988249
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
0.9987146
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1.0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1.0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1. 0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1. 0000000
0. 9987995
0. 9984252
0.0000006
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0 • 0012579
0. 0011751
0.
0.
0.
0. 0012853
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.0012005
0.0015748
AVRO.4537 0.7086 0.8502 0.9431 0.9966 0.999379 0.9998094 0.0001910
CP 0.4224 0.7295 0.8881 0.9532 0.9920 0.998858 0.9988585 0.0011416
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Appendix 7.3(7) Comparison of empirical frequency distributions
with normal distribution
INTERVALS
INDEX
0.5SD 1.OSD l.5SD 2.OSD 3.OSD
	 4.OSD	 5.OSD	 >5.OSD
91 -0.1625-0.1288-0.0484-0.0023 0.0098 0.009029 0.0068175-0.0068176
92 -0.0394-0.0469-0.0217 0.0013 0.0053 0.001079 0.0011409-0.0011410
AVRG-0.1009-0.0878-0.0351-0.0005 0.0075 0.005054 0.0039792-0.0039793
Appendix 7.3(8) Comparison of empirical frequency distributions with
normal distribution in period of 1978-1980
INTERVALS
CMPNY
0.5SD 1.OSD 1.5SD 2.OSD 3.OSD
	 4.OSD	 5.OSD	 >5.OSD
1 -0.1631-0.0934-0.0134 0.0292 0.0195 0.002272-0.0000007 0.0000006
2 -0.2581-0.1199-0.0098 0.0313 0.0286 0.004640 0.0015668-0.0015668
3 -0.1262-0.0628 0.0189 0.0258 0.0022-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
4 -0.2704-0.1628-0.0434 0.0112 0.0334 0.003804 0.0025766-0.0025767
5 -0.1411-0.0546-0.0188-0.0307 0.0020-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
6 -0.3209-0.1486-0.0167 0.0272 0.0181 0.012925 0.0025967-0.0025968
7 -0.3416-0.1784-0.0678 0.0004 0.0159 0.013586 0.0086842-0.0086843
8 -0.0699-0.0404 0.0296 0.0177-0.0016-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
9 -0.0556-0.0111 0.0321 0.0046-0.0015 0.001130-0.0000007 0.0000006
10 -0.1292-0.0741-0.0073 0.0252 0.0135 0.003414-0.0000007 0.0000006
11 -0.1302-0.0684 0.0041 0.0171 0.0070 0.002720 0.0013902-0.0013902
12 -0.2877-0.1444-0.0319 0.0182 0.0261 0.009043 0.0030342-0.0030343
13 -0.2035-0.1079-0.0268 0.0275 0.0243 0.002641-0.0000007 0.0000006
14 -0.1734-0.0994 0.0021 0.0140 0.0156 0.004511 0.0030481-0.0030482
15 -0.1817-0.0782-0.0152 0.0260 0.0183 0.001171-0.0000007 0.0000006
16 -0.1176-0.0742-0.0032 0.0227 0.0102-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
17 -0.1494-0.0708-0.0066 0.0339 0.0071 0.002380-0.0000007 0.0000006
18 -0.0636-0.0442 0.0122 0.0234 0.0019-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
19 -0.1543-0.0734-0.0123 0.0145 0.0160 0.003938 0.0013327-0.0013327
20 0.0497-0.0174 0.0020-0.0087-0.0016 0.001087 0.0011488-0.0011488
21 -0.0520-0.0228 0.0068 0.0201-O.0015-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
22 -0.0718-0.0240-0.0052 0.0083 0.0034-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
23 -0.0493-0.0456-0.0017 0.0210 0.0007-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
24 -0.1023 0.0093 0.0121 0.0074-0.0015 0.001113-0.0000007 0.0000006
25 -0.0932 0.0032 0.0302-0.0095 0.0019-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
26 -0.1123-0.0704 0.0035 0.0160 0.0138-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
27 -0.0395-0.0463-0.0045 0.0226-0.0004-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
28 -0.2438-0.1296-0.0374 0.0061 0.0114 0.006980 0.0046942-0.0046942
29 -0.2711-0.1509-0.0403-0.0135 0.0221 0.009383 0.0035412-0.0035413
30 -0.0005-0.0031 0.0011 0.0030 0.0022-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
AVRG-O.1441-O.0735-O.0057 0.0167 0.0102 0.002866 0.0011200-0.0011201
KCSP-O.l625-O.1288-O0484-0.0023 0.0098 0.009029 0.0068176 0.0068176
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Appendix 7.3(9) Comparison of empirical frequency distributions
with normal distribution in period of 1986-1988
INTERVALS
CNPNY
0.5SD l.OSD l.5SD 2.OSD 3.OSD
	 4.OSD	 5.OSD	 >5.OSD
51 -0.0500-0.0253 0.0130 0.0083 0.0007-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
52 -0.1484-0.0585 0.0230 0.0371 0.0022-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
53 -0.1645-0.0614 0.0058 0.0280 0.0036-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
54 -0.0931-0.0287 0.0073 O.0255-0.0004-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
55 -0.1227-0.0631 0.0072 0.0220 0.0074 0.001375-0.0000007 0.0000006
56 -0.1025-0.0231 0.0211 0.0098-0.0002 0.001196 0.0012572-0.0012573
57 -0.0718-0.0460 0.0215-0.0008 0.0020 0.001113 0.0011744-0.0011745
58 -0.0348-0.0286 0.0080 0.0104-0.0027-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
59 -0.0348-0.0286 0.0068 0.0207-0.0016-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
60 -0.0795-0.0406 0.0071 0.0260-0.0015-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
61 -0.1453-0.0488 0.0296 0.0072 0.0037 0.003794 0.0012847-0.0012847
62 -0.1113-0.0665 0.0102 0.0302 0.0036 0.002460-0.0000007 0.0000006
63 -0.0632-0.0497 0.0163 0.0312-0.0016-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
64 -0.1330-0.0570 0.0015 0.0221 0.0084-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
65 -0.0671-0.0401 0.0133 0.0097 0.0032 0.001113-0.0000007 0.0000006
66 -0.0740-0.0127 0.0222 0.0175-0.0016-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
67 -0.0546-0.0137 0.0304 0.0099 0.0008-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
68 -0.0611-0.0400 0.0251 0.0139 0.0007 0.001079-0.0000007 0.0000006
69 -0.0442-0.0357 0.0096 0.0273-0.0027-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
70 -0.0280-0.0126-0.0217 0.0047-0.0027-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
71 -0.0177 0.0011 0.0057 0.0047 0.0007-0.000062-0.000007 0.0000006
72 -0.0325-0.0354 0.0285 0.0173-0.0027-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
73 -0.0740-0.0230 0.0359 0.0209-0.0027-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
74 -0.0420 0.0010 0.0394-0.0077-0.0016-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
75 -0.0536-0.0064 0.0178-0.0115 0.0020-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
76 -0.0379-0.0197 0.0199 0.0161-0.0015-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
77 -0.0691-0.0206 0.0194 0.0082-0.0016-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
78 -0.0814-0.0254 0.0273 0.0154-0.0016-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
79 -0.1073-0.0207 0.0233 0.0244 0.0007-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
80 -0.0533-0.0039 0.0255 0.0001-0.0004-0.000062-0.0000007 0.0000006
81 -0.0162 0.0358 0.0139-0.0144 0.0000 0.001291-0.0000007 0.0000006
82 -0.0856-0.0160 0.0421-0.0198 0.0044 0.002795-0.0000007 0.0000006
83 -0.0144 0.0187-0.0063-0.0059-0.0003 0.001138 0.0011998-0.0011999
84 -0.0359 0.0102-0.0407-0.0203 0.0067 0.003088 0.0015742-0.0015742
AVRG-O.0707-o.0260 0.0162 0.0114 0.0007 0.000559 0.0001903-0.0001904
KCSP-0.0394-0.0469-0.0217 0.0013 0.0053 0.001080 0.0011409 0.0011410
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Appendix 7.3(10) Analysis of extreme tail areas in terws of number
of observations rather than relative frequencies(KCSPIs)
INTERVALS
INDX OBSRN	 >2SD	 >3SD	 >4SD	 >5SD
	
EN	 AN	 EN	 AN	 EN AN	 EN	 AN
91	 880	 40.0	 38	 2.4	 11	 0.06	 8	 0.0005	 6
92	 876	 39.9	 41	 2.4	 7	 0.06	 1	 0.0005
TOTALS	 79.9	 79	 4.7	 18	 0.11	 9	 0.0011	 7
(Notes)
OBSRN: The number of observations.
EN: Expected numbers.
AN: Actual numbeçs.
SD: Standard deviation.
Appendix 7.3(11) Analysis of extreme tail areas in terms of number
of observations rather than relative frequencies in period
of 1978-1980
INTERVALS
	
CNPY	 OBSRN	 >2SD	 >3SD	 >4SD	 >5SD -
EN	 AN EN AN EN AN	 EN AN
	
1	 857	 39.0	 64	 2.3	 19	 0.05	 2	 0.0005	 0
	
2	 638	 29.0	 49	 1.7	 20	 0.04	 3	 0.0004	 1
	
3	 813	 37.0	 58	 2.2	 4	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
4	 776	 35.3	 44	 2.1	 28	 0.05	 3	 0.0005	 2
	
5	 643	 29.3	 49	 1.7	 3	 0.04	 0	 0.0004	 0
	
6	 385	 17.5	 28	 1.0	 8	 0.02	 5	 0.0002	 1
	
7	 806	 36.7	 37	 2.2	 15	 0.05 11	 0.0005	 7
	
8	 870	 39.6	 55	 2.3	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
9	 839	 38.2	 42	 2.3	 1	 0.05	 1	 0.0005	 0
	
10	 863	 39.3	 61	 2.3	 14	 0.05	 3	 0.0005	 0
	
11	 719	 32.7	 45	 1.9	 7	 0.05	 2	 0.0004	 1
	
12	 659	 30.0	 42	 1.8	 19	 0.04	 6	 0.0004	 2
	
13	 740	 33.7	 54	 2.0	 20	 0.05	 2	 0.0004	 0
	
14	 656	 29.8	 39	 1.8	 12	 0.04	 3	 0.0004	 2
	
15	 811	 36.9	 58	 2.2	 17	 0.05	 1	 0.0005	 0
	
16	 851	 38.7	 58	 2.3	 11	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
17	 819	 37.3	 65	 2.2	 8	 0.05	 2	 0.0005	 0
	
18	 871	 39.6	 60	 2.4	 4	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
19	 750	 34.1	 45	 2.0	 14	 0.05	 3	 0.0004	 1
	
20	 870	 39.6	 32	 2.3	 1	 0.05	 1	 0.0005	 1
	
21	 869	 39.5	 57	 2.3	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
22	 818	 37.2	 44	 2.2	 5	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
23	 872	 39.7	 58	 2.4	 3	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
24	 851	 38.7	 45	 2.3	 1	 0.05	 1	 0.0005	 0
	
25	 861	 39.2	 31	 2.3	 4	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
26	 846	 38.5	 52	 2.3	 14	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
27	 852	 38.8	 58	 2.3	 2	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
28	 852	 38.8	 44	 2.3	 12	 0.05	 6	 0.0005	 4
	
29	 847	 38.5	 50	 2.3	 21	 0.05	 8	 0.0005	 3
	
30	 824	 37.5	 40	 2.2	 4	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
TOTALS	 1079.6	 1464 64.1 293	 1.49 63	 0.0142 25
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Appendix 7.3(12) Analysis of extreme tail areas in terms of number
of observations rather than relative frequencies in period
of 1986-1988
INTERVALS
CNPY OBSRN	 >2SD	 >3SD	 >4SD	 >5SD
EN	 AN EN	 AN	 EN AN	 EN	 AN
51	 873	 39.7	 47	 2.4	 3	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
52	 811	 36.9	 67	 2.2	 4	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
53	 789	 35.9	 58	 2.1	 5	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
54	 859	 39.1	 61	 2.3	 2	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
55	 696	 31.7	 47	 1.9	 7	 0.04	 1	 0.0004	 0
56	 795	 36.2	 44	 2.1	 2	 0.05	 1	 0.0005	 1
57	 851	 38.7	 38	 2.3	 4	 0.05	 1	 0.0005	 1
58	 876	 39.9	 49	 2.4	 0	 0.06	 0	 0.0005	 0
59	 876	 39.9	 58	 2.4	 1	 0.06	 0	 0.0005	 0
60	 867	 39.4	 62	 2.3	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
61	 778	 35.4	 41	 2.1	 5	 0.05	 3	 0.0005	 1
62	 793	 36.1	 60	 2.1	 5	 0.05	 2	 0.0005	 0
63	 874	 39.8	 67	 2.4	 1	 0.06	 0	 0.0005	 0
64	 814	 37.0	 55	 2.2	 9	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
65	 851	 38.7	 47	 2.3	 5	 0.05	 1	 0.0005	 0
66	 873	 39.7	 55	 2.4	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
67	 866	 39.4	 48	 2.3	 3	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
68	 876	 39.9	 52	 2.4	 3	 0.06	 1	 0.0005	 0
69	 852	 38.8	 62	 2.3	 0	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
70	 876	 39.9	 44	 2.4	 0	 0.06	 0	 0.0005	 0
71	 876	 39.9	 44	 2.4	 3	 0.06	 0	 0.0005	 0
72	 876	 39.9	 55	 2.4	 0	 0.06	 0	 0.0005	 0
73	 873	 39.7	 58	 2.4	 0	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
74	 873	 39.7	 33	 2.4	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
75	 852	 38.8	 29	 2.3	 4	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
76	 860	 39.1	 53	 2.3	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
77	 876	 39.9	 47	 2.4	 1	 0.06	 0	 0.0005	 0
78	 870	 39.6	 53	 2.3	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
79	 873	 39.7	 61	 2.4	 3	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
80	 855	 38.9	 39	 2.3	 2	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
81	 739	 33.6	 23	 2.0	 2	 0.05	 1	 0.0004	 0
82	 700	 31.8	 18	 1.9	 5	 0.04	 2	 0.0004	 0
83	 833	 37.9	 33	 2.2	 2	 0.05	 1	 0.0005	 1
84	 635	 28.9	 16	 1.7	 6	 0.04	 2	 0.0004	 1
TOTALS	 1289.3	 1624 76.5	 92	 1.79 16	 0.0170	 5
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Appendix 7.3(13) Analysis of extreme tail areas in terms of
number of observations rather than relative frequencies
in period of 1978-1980 (trimmed data)
>2SD	 >3SD	 >4SD	 >5SD
COMPANYN* --------------------------------------------------
	
EN	 AN EN	 AN	 EN AN	 EN	 AN
	
1	 857	 39.0	 64	 2.3	 19	 0.05	 2	 0.0005	 0 -
	
2	 637	 29.0	 51	 1.7	 19	 0.04	 3	 0.0004	 0
	
3	 813	 37.0	 58	 2.2	 4	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
4	 776	 35.3	 44	 2.1	 28	 0.05	 3	 0.0005	 2
	
5	 642	 29.2	 51	 1.7	 2	 0.04	 0	 0.0004	 0
	
6	 377	 17.2	 33	 1.0	 7	 0.02	 0	 0.0002	 0
	
7	 804	 36.6	 42	 2.2	 17	 0.05 12	 0.0005	 7
	
8	 870	 39.6	 55	 2.3	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
9	 838	 38.1	 45	 2.3	 0	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
10	 863	 39.3	 61	 2.3	 14	 0.05	 3	 0.0005	 0
	
11	 715	 32.5	 48	 1.9	 4	 0.05	 0	 0.0004	 0
	
12	 658	 29.9	 46	 1.8	 19	 0.04	 5	 0.0004	 4
	
13	 740	 33.7	 54	 2.0	 20	 0.05	 2	 0.0004	 0
	
14	 654	 29.8	 42	 1.8	 11	 0.04	 2	 0.0004	 0
	
15	 811	 36.9	 58	 2.2	 17	 0.05	 1	 0.0005	 0
	
16	 851	 38.7	 58	 2.3	 11	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
17	 818	 37.2	 65	 2.2	 7	 0.05	 1	 0.0005	 0
	
18	 871	 39.6	 60	 2.4	 4	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
19	 746	 33.9	 50	 2.0	 1].	 0.05	 0	 0.0004	 0
	
20	 869	 39.5	 35	 2.3	 0	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
21	 868	 39.5	 56	 2.3	 0	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
22	 818	 37.2	 44	 2.2	 5	 0.05	 0	 0:0005	 0
	
23	 872	 39.7	 58	 2.4	 3	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
24	 850	 38.7	 45	 2.3	 0	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
25	 861	 39.2	 31	 2.3	 4	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
26	 846	 38.5	 52	 2.3	 14	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
27	 852	 38.8	 58	 2.3	 2	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
	
28	 851	 38.7	 51	 2.3	 12	 0.05	 7	 0.0005	 3
	
29	 847	 38.5	 50	 2.3	 21	 0.05	 8	 0.0005	 3
	
30	 823	 37.4	 42	 2.2	 3	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
TOTALS	 1078.3	 1507 64.0 279	 1.49 49	 0.0142 19
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Appendix 7.3(14) Analysis of extreme tail aresa in terms of
number of observations rather than relative frequencies
in period of 1986-1988 (trimmed data)
>2SD	 >3SD >4SD	 >5SD
COMPANYN* --------------------------------------------
EN	 AN EN	 AN	 EN AN	 EN	 AN
51	 873	 39.7	 47	 2.4	 3	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
52	 811	 36.9	 67	 2.2	 4	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
53	 789	 35.9	 58	 2.1	 5	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
54	 859	 39.1	 61	 2.3	 2	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
55	 696	 31.7	 47	 1.9	 7	 0.04	 1	 0.0004	 0
56	 794	 36.1	 47	 2.1	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
57	 850	 38.7	 44	 2.3	 3	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
58	 876	 39.9	 49	 2.4	 0	 0.06	 0	 0.0005	 0
59	 876	 39.9	 58	 2.4	 1	 0.06	 0	 0.0005	 0
60	 867	 39.4	 62	 2.3	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
61	 776	 35.3	 49	 2.1	 4	 0.05	 1	 0.0005	 0
62	 793	 36.1	 60	 2.1	 5	 0.05	 2	 0.0005	 0
63	 874	 39.8	 67	 2.4	 1	 0.06	 0	 0.0005	 0
64	 814	 37.0	 55	 2.2	 9	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
65	 850	 38.7	 51	 2.3	 4	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
66	 873	 39.7	 55	 2.4	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
67	 866	 39.4	 48	 2.3	 3	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
68	 876	 39.9	 52	 2.4	 3	 0.06	 1	 0.0005	 0
69	 852	 38.8	 62	 2.3	 0	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
70	 876	 39.9	 44	 2.4	 0	 0.06	 0	 0.0005	 0
71	 876	 39.9	 44	 2.4	 3	 0.06	 0	 0,0005	 0
72	 876	 39.9	 55	 2.4	 0	 0.06	 0	 0.0005	 0
73	 873	 39.7	 58	 2.4	 0	 0.05	 0	 0.0005
	 0
74	 873	 39.7	 33	 2.4	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
75	 851	 38.7	 32	 2.3	 6	 0.05	 0	 0.0005
	 0
76	 860	 39.1	 53	 2.3	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
77	 876	 39.9	 47	 2.4	 1	 0.06	 0	 0.0005
	 0
78	 870	 39.6	 53	 2.3	 1	 0.05	 0	 0.0005
	 0
79	 873	 39.7	 61	 2.4	 3	 0.05	 0	 0.0005
	 0
80	 855	 38.9	 39	 2.3	 2	 0.05	 0	 0.0005	 0
81	 737	 33.5	 25	 2.0	 0	 0.05	 0	 0.0004	 0
82	 698	 31.8	 18	 1.9	 3	 0.04	 1	 0.0004
	 0
83	 833	 37.9	 33	 2.2	 2	 0.05	 1	 0.0005
	 1
84	 633	 28.8	 23	 1.7	 5	 0.04	 1	 0.0004
	 0
TOTALS	 1288.8	 1657 76.5	 85	 1.78	 8	 0.0170
	 1
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Appendix 7.4(1) Daily Serial Correlation Coefficients
for lag k=1,2,3,...10 in period of 1978-1980
LAG
CMPY------------------------------------------------------------------
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
1 0.128* 0.013 -0.067 -0.036 -0.033 -O.078*-O.029 -0.019 0.022 -0.024
2 O.096*0.l03* 0.018 -0.032 0.036 0.049 -0.012 -0.094*-0.011 -0.015
3 O.162*_0.046 -0.027 -0.014 -0.061 -0.018 0.029 0.029 -0.034 -0.028
4 0.035 0.031 0.006 -0.054 0.010 -0.010 0.016 0.037 0.066 -0.020
5 O.153*-O.069 -0.063 -0.044 0.015 -0.031 -0.035 0.039 0.035 0.038
6 0.067 -0.050 -0.021 -0.051 -0.006 -0.099 -0.032 0.013 -0.073 0.007
7 0.124* 0.024 0.036 0.044 -0.035 -0.069 -0.041 -0.028 0.010 -0.036
8 0.097*0.007 -0.104*-0.072*-0.074*_0.002 -0.034 -0.018 0.081 0.094*
9 0.216* 0.051 -0.062 -0.051 -0.046 0.009 0.050 -0.007 0.029 0.000
10 0.002 -0.099*-0.018 -0.032 0.001 0.027 -0.057 -0.004 0.027 -0.029
11 0.146*0.057 -0.124*-0.097*-0.077 -0.001 -0.003 0.007 0.009 0.012
12 0.083* 0.025 0.069 -0.061 0.021 0.036 0.016 0.026 0.061 0.034
13 0.058 -0.070 -0.037 -0.040 0.042 -0.022 -0.008 -0.083*-0.037 -0.001
14 0.193*-0.046 -0.094*-0.101*-0.020 0.048 0.023 -0.038 -0.022 -0.039
15-0.095*-0.022 -0.015 -0.052 0.015 -0.012 -0.021 -0.003 0.012 -0.089*
16-0.020 -0.094* 0.020 -0.007 -0.032 0.015 0.028 0.005 0.004 0.059
17 0.086*_0.126*_0.075*_0.079*_0.065 -0.050 0.014 0.011 -0.013 0.018
18 0.067 -0.093*-0.027 -0.003 -0.025 -0.013 -0.008 0.013 0.051 0.045
19 0.064 -0.049 -0.041 -0.013 -0.001 -0.093*-0.094* 0.010 0.040 0.004
20 0.206* 0.032 -0.036 -0.050 -0.055 -0.003 -0.045 0.033 0.068 0.056
21 0.099*-0.120*-0.066 -0.071*-0.035 0.008 -0.019 -0.010 0.029 0.062
22 0.101*-0.093*-0.100*-0.016 -0.021 0.009 0.005 0.026 0.104*-0.009
23 0.055 -0.106*-0.069*-0.016 -0.024 0.019 -0.022 -0.017 0.061 0.055
24 0.140* 0.050 0.011 0.017 -0.029 -0.042 0.003 -0.057 0.023 -0.072
25 0.181*_0.010 -0.039 0.011 -0.043 -0.030 -0.010 -0.053 -0.019 -0.049
26 0.113*0.138*_0.l32*-0.049 -0.026 0.097* 0.028 0.015 -0.032 -0.013
27 0.089*0.088*-0.036 0.002 -0.030 0.007 -0.017 -0.010 0.045 0.002
28-0.017 -0.081* 0.031 -0.015 -0.053 0.014 0.018 -0.026 -0.038 -0.036
29 0.060*0.053 -0.130*-0.054 -0.018 0.002 0.003 -0.019 -0.020 -0.039
30 0.241* 0.075* 0.022 0.024 -0.031 -0.021 0.049 0.007 0.024 -0.019
N20	 12	 8	 5	 2	 3	 1	 2	 2	 3
% 66.667 40.000 26.667 16.667 6.667 10.000 3.333 6.667 6.667 10.000
AV 0.098*-0.044 -0.039 -0.034 -0.023 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 0.017 -0.00].
CP-0.008 0.003 -0.062 -0.035 -0.014 -0.027 -0.037 -0.004 0.031 0.054
(Notes)
* : More than twice their standard error.
N : Numbers of *.
% : Percentage of serial correlation coefficients more than twice
their standard error.
CP: Korea composite Stock Price Index.
AV: Average value.
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Appendix 7.4(2) Daily Serial Correlation Coefficients
for lag k=1,2,3,...10 in period of 1986-1988
LG
CMPY-------------------------------------------------------------------
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
51 O.078*-0.035 -0.003 -0.003 0.055 0.010 -0.093*-0.019 0.034 0.009
52 0.125* 0.048 -0.052 0.026 -0.014 0.029 -0.004 0.013 0.028 -0.055
53 O.083*-O.070 -0.030 -0.016 -O.093*-0.035 -0.047 0.039 0.000 -0.021
54 0.051 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 0.010 0.017 -0.050 0.049 0.049 0.015
55 0.138*0.029 -0.018 0.006 -0.007 0.060 -0.003 -0.080*-0.069 -0.031
56 0.329* 0.138* 0.069 0.022 -0.097*-0.090*-0.088*-0.046 -0.024 -0.006
57 0.176*-0.029 -0.074* 0.052 0.045 0.007 -0.010 0.024 0.031 0.020
58 0.082*-0.016 -0.099*-0.018 -0.006 -0.022 -0.003 -0.010 0.059 -0.004
59 0.052 -0.074*-0.082*-0.010 0.013 -0.007 -0.018 -0.003 0.047 -0.029
60 0.161*-0.009 -0.037 -0.086*-0.051 -0.039 -0.023 0.026 0.026 0.012
61 0.151*-0.011 -0.001 -0.021 -0.075*-0.017 -0.015 -0.051 0.031 -0.011
62 0.097*-0.061 -0.022 -0.053 -0.061 -0.011 0.006 -0.076*-0.008 0.036
63 0.109*-0.100*-0.103*-0.042 -0.034 0.029 0.024 -0.015 0.105* 0.032
64 0.142* 0.011 -0.046 -0.024 -0.036 -0.019 -0.064 -0.032 -0.012 0.033
65 0.051 -0.064 -0.084*-0.002 -0.033 -0.066 0.011 0.061 0.033 0.017
66 0.000 -0.087* 0.025 0.003 -0.050 0.008 -0.005 0.017 0.048 0.003
67 0.058 -0.006 0.023 0.021 0.027 0.047 -0.021 0.023 0.049 -0.048
68 0.049 -0.046 -0.017 -0.013 0.004 -0.019 0.015 -0.006 0.007 -0.081*
69 0.069*_0.025 0.022 -0.017 -0.079*-0.037 -0.017 0.026 0.047 0.006
70 0.070*-0.065 -0.048 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.010 -0.054 0.010 -0.036
71-0.027 -0.049 0.022 -0.010 -0.075* 0.045 -0.025 0.009 0.078*-0.049
72 0.083*-0.072*-0.049 -0.065 -0.002 0.005 0.005 -0.039 0.015 -0.037
73 0.].18*_0.042 -0.044 -0.024 -0.028 0.008 0.002 -0.017 -0.004 -0.037
74 0.115*_0.009 -0.026 -0.073*-0.013 0.017 -0.037 -0.003 0.028 0.016
75 0.050 0.068 0.040 -0.049 0.024 0.013 0.013 -0.014 -0.046 0.003
76 0.134*0.019 -0.041 -0.035 0.030 -0.015 -0.019 -0.013 0.066 0.002
77 0.047 -0.034 -0.045 -0.031 0.013 0.080* 0.016 -0.009 0.109*-0.029
78 0.057 0.029 0.000 -0.042 -0.050 0.016 0.024 0.062 0.019 -0.058
79 0.093*-0.008 0.014 -0.012 -0.026 0.001 -0.020 0.062 0.042 -0.056
80 0.101* 0.046 0.027 -0.010 -0.018 -0.006 0.009 -0.008 0.001 0.001
81 0.104* 0.128* 0.025 0.075*-0.006 0.012 -0.031 0.027 0.041 0.002
82 0.211* 0.056 -0.015 -0.070 0.020 0.049 0.007 0.035 -0.025 -0.030
83 0.265* 0.136* 0.015 0.026 0.009 0.025 -0.020 -0.016 0.021 0.026
84 0.323* 0.200* 0.144* 0.095* 0.101* 0.077 0.059 0.0** 0.052 0.116*
N24	 8	 6	 4	 6	 2	 2	 3	 3	 2
% 70.588 23.529 17.647 11.765 17.647 5.882 5.882 8.824 8.824 5.882
AV 0.110*_0.004 -0.016 -0.013 -0.015 0.005 -0.012 0.001 0.026 -0.008
CP 0.100 0.029 0.010 0.046 0.008 0.035 0.008 0.012 0.043 -0.032
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Appendix 7.4(3) Daily serial correlation coefficients for
lags k=l,2,3,...,10 in period of 1978-1980
(trimmed data)
tAG
CMPY------------------------------------------------------------------
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
1 0.128* 0.013 -0.067 -0.036 -0.033 -0.078*-0.029
2 0.090*_0.105* 0.018 -0.035 0.037 0.074 -0.011
3 0.162*-0.046 -0.027 -0.014 -0.061 -0.018 0.029
4 0.035 0.031 0.006 -0.054 0.010 -0.010 0.016
5 0.150*-0.071 -0.057 -0.040 0.017 -0.043 -0.054
6 0.101 0.036 _0.123*-0.089 -0.004 -0.032 0.013
7 0.168* 0.042 0.037 0.068 -0.054 -0.105*-0.050
8 0.097*-0.007 _0.104*_0.072*-0.074*-0.002 -0.034
9 0.219* 0.056 -0.060 -0.054 -0.051 0.006 0.045
10 0.002 _0.099*-0.018 -0.032 0.001 0.027 -0.057
11 0.].86*-0.035 _0.140*-0.092*-0.074 -0.037 -0.027
12 0.053 0.007 0.085*-0.078 -0.004 0.039 0.019
13 0.058 -0.070 -0.037 -0.040 0.042 -0.022 -0.008
14 0.221* 0.004 _0.108*-0.061 -0.002 0.031 0.019
15_0.095*-0.022 -0.015 -0.052 0.015 -0.012 -0.021
16-0.020 .0.094* 0.020 -0.007 -0.032 0.015 0.028
17 0.084*_0.131*_0.081*_0.076*_0.062 -0.053 0.006
18 0.067 -0.093*-0.027 -0.003 -0.025 -0.013 -0.008
19 0.081*-0.022 -0.035 -0.047 -0.023 -0.100-0.091
20 0.213* 0.040 -0.038 -0.050 -0.041 0.004 -0.055
21 0.093*_0.122*-0.064 -0.069*-0.038 0.005 -0.014
22 0.101*_0.093*_0.100*_0.016 -0.021 0.009 0.005
23 0.055 _0.106*_0.069*-0.016 -0.024 0.019 -0.022
24 0.146* 0.054 0.018 0.019 -0.025 -0.034 -0.006
25 0.181*-0.010 -0.039 0.011 -0.043 -0.030 -0.010
26 0.113*_0.138*_0.132*-0.049 -0.026 0.097* 0.028
27 0.089*_0.088*-0.036 0.002 -0.030 0.007 -0.017
28 0.045 _0.093*-0.055 -0.041 -0.050 0.013 0.021
29 0.060 -0.053 _0.130*-0.054 -0.018 0.002 0.003
30 0.244* 0.074* 0.022 0.027 -0.020 -0.012 0.048
-0.019 0.022 -0.024
-0.084*-U. 007 -0.002
0.029 -0.034 -0.028
0.037 0.066 -0.020
0.033 0.033 0.032
-0.008 -0.011 -0.034
-0.030 0.013 -0. 054
-0.018 0.081* 0. 094*
-0.007 0.034 0.008
-0.004 0.027 -0.029
0.034 -0.014 0.024
0.030 0.072 0.048
-0. 083*-0. 037 -0.001
-0.041 -0.033 -0.043
-0.003 0.012 -0. 089*
0.005 0.004 0.059
0.011 -0.021 0.013
0.013 0.051 0.045
0.017 0.046 -0.028
0.029 0.076* 0.055
-0.013 0.023 0.063
0.026 0.104*_0.009
-0.017 0.061 0.055
-0.060 0.017 -0.059
-0.053 -0.019 -0.049
0.015 -0.032 -0.013
-0.010 0.045 0.002
-0.030 -0.035 -0.041
-0.019 -0.020 -0.039
-0.010 0.016 -0.007
N20	 12	 10	 4	 1	 4	 1	 2	 3	 2
% 66.667 40.000 33.333 13.333 3.333 13.333 3.333 6.667 10.000 6.667
AV 0.104 -0.038 -0.045 -0.035 -0.024 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 0.018 -0.002
CP-0.008 0.003 -0.062 -0.035 -0.014 -0.027 -0.037 -0.004 0.031 0.054
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Appendix 7.4(4) Daily serial correlation coefficients for
lags k=1,2,3,...10 in period of 1986-1988
(trimmed data)
LAG
CMPY------------------------------------------------------------------
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
51 0.078*-0.035 -0.003 -0.003 0.055 0.010 -0.093*-0.019 0.034 0.009
52 0.125* 0.048 -0.052 0.026 -0.014 0.029 -0.004 0.013 0.028 -0.055
53 0.083*-0.070 -0.030 -0.016 -0.093*-0.035 -0.047 0.039 0.000 -0.021
54 0.051 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 0.010 0.017 -0.050 0.049 0.049 0.015
55 0.138*-0.029 -0.018 0.006 -0.007 0.060 -0.003 -0.080*-0.069 -0.031
56 0.328* 0.144* 0.074* 0.034 -0.061 -0.068 -0.072*-0.020 0.001 0.015
57 0.201*-0.024 -0.065 0.031 0.039 -0.011 -0.010 0.022 0.049 0.008
58 0.082*-0.016 -0.099*-0.018 -0.006 -0.022 -0.003 -0.010 0.059 -0.004
59 0.052 -0.074*-0.082*-0.010 0.013 -0.007 -0.018 -0.003 0.047 -0.029
60 0.161*-0.009 -0.037 -0.086*-0.051 -0.039 -0.023 0.026 0.026 0.012
61 0.166*-0.012 0.006 -0.041 -0.090*-0.022 -0.012 -0.056 0.028 -0.010
62 0.097*-0.061 -0.022 -0.053 -0.061 -0.011 0.006 -0.076*_0.008 0.036
63 0.109*-0.100*_0.103*_0.042 -0.034 0.029 0.024 -0.015 0.105* 0.032
64 0.142* 0.011 -0.046 -0.024 -0.036 -0.019 -0.064 -0.032 -0.012 0.033
65 0.082*-0.065 -0.087*-0.011 -0.020 -0.090*-0.003 0.068 0.039 0.008
66 0.000 -0.087* 0.025 0.003 -0.050 0.008 -0.005 0.017 0.048 0.003
67 0.058 -0.006 0.023 0.021 0.027 0.047 -0.021 0.023 0.049 -0.048
68 0.049 -0.046 -0.017 -0.013 0.004 -0.019 0.015 -0.006 0.007 -0.081*
69 0.069*-0.025 0.022 -0.017 -0.079*-0.037 -0.017 0.026 0.047 0.006
70 0.070*-0.065 -0.048 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.010 -0.054 0.010 -0.036
71-0.027 -0.049 0.022 -0.010 -0.075* 0.045 -0.025 0.009 0.078*-0.049
72 0.083*-0.072*_0.049 -0.065 -0.002 0.005 0.005 -0.039 0.015 -0.037
73 0.118*-0.042 -0.044 -0.024 -0.028 0.008 0.002 -0.017 -0.004 -0.037
74 0.115*-0.009 -0.026 -0.073*-0.013 0.017 -0.037 -0.003 0.028 0.016
75 0.068 0.067 0.032 -0.059 0.009 0.008 0.032 -0.022 -0.053 -0.007
76 0.134*-0.019 -0.041 -0.035 0.030 -0.015 -0.019 -0.013 0.066 0.002
77 0.047 -0.034 -0.045 -0.031 0.013 0.080* 0.016 -0.009 0.109*-0.029
78 0.057 0.029 0.000 -0.042 -0.050 0.016 0.024 0.062 0.019 -0.058
79 0.093*-0.008 0.014 -0.012 -0.026 0.001 -0.020 0.062 0.042 -0.056
80 0.101* 0.046 0.027 -0.010 -0.018 -0.006 0.009 -0.008 0.001 0.001
81 0.136* 0.136* 0.035 0.071 -0.017 0.005 -0.040 0.043 0.046 0.014
82 0.201* 0.043 -0.013 -0.063 0.030 0.043 0.000 0.046 -0.034 -0.036
83 0.265* 0.136* 0.015 0.026 0.009 0.025 -0.020 -0.016 0.021 0.026
84 0.320* 0.154* 0.115* 0.079 0.066 0.059 0.044 0.081* 0.067 0.086*
N25	 8	 6	 2	 4	 2	 2	 3	 3	 2
% 73.529 23.529 17.647 5.882 11.765 5.882 5.882 8.824 8.824 5.882
AV 0.113 -0.005 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 0.003 -0.012 0.003 0.028 -0.009
CP 0.100 0.029 0.010 0.046 0.008 0.035 0.008 -0.012 0.043 -0.054
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
444
323
420
393
326
209
391
456
397
506
367
342
409
309
476
493
449
460
393
408
448
418
474
391
384
459
448
463
435
372
Appendix 7.5(1) Runs Analysis in period of 1978-1980
CMPY	 RA	 RE STNDRD ERR (RA-RE)/RE STNDSD VARBL
559.78
424.42
511.78
506.69
402 • 19
257.20
506.65
494.39
485.86
548.17
439.09
436.86
490.41
420.64
523.36
486.06
516.22
486.92
467.73
465.21
475.00
470.89
476.01
464.50
473.02
504.72
473.34
547.75
556.57
463.59
13 • 684
11. 860
13.254
12.949
11. 792
9.217
13. 070
13.930
13.625
13,670
12.376
12.029
12. 765
11. 916
13.278
13.655
13.285
13.809
12.712
14.289
13.991
13.305
13.890
14.015
14. 027
13.568
13.749
13.487
13.592
13.581
-0.205
-0.237
-0.177
-0.222
-0.187
-0.184
-0.226
-0.076
-0.181
-0.075
-0.162
-0.215
-0.164
-0.263
-0.089
0.016
-0.128
-0.053
-0.158
-0.12 1
-0.055
-0.110
-0.002
-0.156
-0.186
-0.089
-0.051
-0.153
-0.2 17
-0.195
-8.352*
-8.42 6*
-6. 811*
-8.664*
-6. 334*
-5.067*
-8.734*
-2.648*
-6. 412*
-2.975*
-5.704*
-7.761*
-6.2 61*
-9.243*
-3453*
0.618
-4. 947*
-1.841
-5.761*
-3. 899*
-1.823
-3.862*
-0.037
-5.137*
-6. 239*
-3.259*
-1.734
-6. 173*
-8.834*
-6. 634*
AVRG	 393	 477.83	 13.146	 -0.144	 -5.214*
KCSPI	 363	 442.41	 14.771	 -0.177	 -5.275*
(Notes)
PA : The actual number of runs.
RE : The expected number of runs.
STNDRD ERR : Standard error.
(RA-RE)/RE : Fractional difference.
STNDSD VARBL : Standardised variable.
* : Over the critical value at the 5% level.
AVRG: The average value.
KCSPI: The Korea Composite Stock Price Index.
cNPY: the sample company.
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Appendix 7.5(2) Runs Analysis in period of 1986-1988
CNPY	 RA	 RE STNDRD ERR (RA-RE)/RE STNDSD VARBL
515.53
528.47
519.02
526.15
453.82
504.71
525.03
505.07
504.88
536.73
508.78
521.53
554 • 04
536.81
509.53
509.95
524.24
500.57
517.31
498.01
491.74
500.28
508.66
509.36
477.48
524.74
498.75
518.57
518 • 00
520.76
433.63
446.54
454 • 06
383.54
13. 840
13.297
13,122
13.642
12.291
13.124
13.580
13. 922
13. 945
13. 685
13. 036
13.184
13.761
13.362
13.564
13.821
13.726
13.988
13 • 603
14.000
14.059
13. 979
13. 889
13. 883
13. 886
13. 648
13.992
13.788
13. 818
13,625
12.736
12. 297
13.732
11. 599
-0.011
-0.124
-0.127
-0.061
-0.167
-0.205
-0.152
-0.022
-0.033
-0.126
-0.096
-0.083
-0.067
-0.139
-0.046
0.008
-0.031
-0.085
-0.049
-0.050
0.031
-0.063
-0.074
-0.03 6
-0.014
-0.064
-0.018
-0.055
-0.079
-0.067
-0.054
-0.106
-0.156
-0.218
-0.3 63
-4.886*
-4,993*
-2.320*
-6. 128*
-7.864*
-5. 856*
-0.759
-1.175
-4.912*
-3•7Ø4*
-3.264*
-2.656*
-5.561*
-1.698
0.329
-1.146
-3.008*
-1.824
-1.751
1.121
-2.202*
-2.676*
-1.287
-0.43 0
-2.436*
-0.590
-2.036*
-2.931*
-2.515*
-1.816
-3. 825*
-5. 138*
-7.159*
AVRG	 447	 502.54	 13.513	 -0.078	 -2.866*
KCSPI	 384	 429.53	 14.220	 -0.104	 -3.096*
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Appendix 7.5(3) Runs analysis in period of 1978-1980
(trimmed data)
CMPY	 RA	 RE	 STNDRD ERR (RA-RE) /RE STNDSD VARBL
559.78
423.84
511.78
506.69
401.64
251.80
504.97
494.39
485.32
548.17
437.32
436.11
490.41
419.52
523.36
486.06
515.73
486.92
465.66
464169
474.59
470.89
476.01
463.99
473.02
504.72
473.34
547.29
556.57
463.14
131684
11. 851
13.254
12.949
11. 783
9.119
13. 049
13.930
13.616
13.670
12.352
12.018
12.765
11. 899
13.278
13. 655
13.278
13.809
12. 681
14.279
13.985
13.305
13. 890
14. 006
14. 027
13.568
13.749
13.482
13.592
13.574
-0.205
-0.236
-0.177
-0.222
-0.186
-0.178
-0.228
-0.076
-0.180
-0.075
-0.168
-0.2 14
-0.164
-0.2 66
-0.089
0.016
-0.127
-0.053
-0.156
-0.120
-0.054
-0.110
-0.002
-0.159
-0.186
-0.089
-0.051
-0.152
-0.217
-0.195
-8.352*
-8.382*
-6. 811*
-8.664*
-6. 292*
-4.858*
-8.772*
-2.648*
-6. 376*
-2.975*
-5.896*
-7.706*
-6. 261*
-9. 33 0*
-3 . 453*
0.618
-4.912*
-1.841
-5. 691*
-3.865*
-1.794
-3. 862*
-0.037
-5.247*
-6.239*
-3.259*
-1.734
-6. 141*
-8. 834*
-6. 604*
Avrg	 391	 477.26	 13.137	 -0.144	 -5.207
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83
84
509
462
452
493
377
400
444
493
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Appendix 7.5(4) Runs analysis in period of 1986-1988
(trimmed data)
CMPY	 RA	 RE	 STNDRD ERR (RA-RE)/RE STNDSD VARBL
515.53
528.47
519.02
526.15
453.82
504.15
524.51
505.07
504.88
536.73
507.56
521.53
554.04
536.81
509.07
509.95
524.24
500.57
517.31
498.01
491.74
500.28
508 • 66
509.36
476.97
524.74
498.75
518.57
518.00
520.76
432.66
445.42
454.06
382.69
13. 840
13. 297
13. 122
13. 642
12.291
13.116
13. 572
13. 922
13. 945
13.685
13. 019
13. 184
13.761
13. 362
13. 558
13. 821
13. 726
13. 988
13.603
14.000
14.059
13.979
13.889
13.883
13.877
13. 648
13.992
13. 788
13.818
13. 625
12.72 0
12. 279
13.732
11. 587
-0.011
-0.124
-0.127
-0.061
-0.167
-0.205
-0.152
-0.022
-0.033
-0.126
-0.094
-0.083
-0.067
-0.139
-0.049
0.008
-0.03 1
-0.085
-0.049
-0.050
0.031
-0.063
-0.074
-0.036
-0.017
-0.064
-0.018
-0.055
-0.079
-0.067
-0.057
-0.104
-0.156
-0.216
-0.363
-4.886*
-4 • 993*
-2.320*
-6.128*
-7.82 6*
-5.821*
-0.759
-1.175
-4.912*
-3. 615*
-3.264*
-2 • 656*
-5. 561*
-1.812
0.329
-1.146
-3. 008*
-1.824
-1.751
1.121
-2.202*
-2.676*
-1.287
-0..538
-2.43 6*
-0.590
-2.036*
-2.931*
-2.515*
-1.899
-3.740*
-5. 138*
-7.093*
-2.866Avrg	 446	 502.35	 13.510	 -0.078
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Appendix 7.6(1) Results of Spectral Analysis.
(1978-1980, 5% significance level)
Sample N Autocovar Upper Lim. Lower Lim. Out
0. 00027680
0. 00042754
0.00058745
0.00029646
0.00208018
0 • 00102894
0. 00019501
0.00121151
0.00077731
0.00032475
0. 00081210
0. 0003 8520
0.00042521
0.00056903
0.00058849
0. 00065330
0 • 00060375
0. 00081377
0.00090522
0 • 00088302
0.00094689
0. 00081026
0 • 00085079
0. 00098049
0.00062140
0. 00074816
0.00087687
0.00010687
0. 00082956
0. 00100609
0. 00007443
0.00012267
0. 00015974
0 • 00008158
0 • 00059687
0.00034613
0.00005303
0. 00032576
0. 00020901
0. 00008732
0.00022638
0. 00011053
0 • 00011853
0. 00016327
0. 00016002
0. 00017566
0 • 00016417
0.00021881
0 • 00025234
0. 00023743
0. 00025461
0. 00022032
0 • 00022877
0.00026364
0 • 00016709
0.00020117
0.00023578
0.00002874
0. 00022306
0 • 00027357
0.00002157
0. 00002938
0. 00004484
0. 00002212
0.00014293
0. 00004914
0. 00001488
0. 00009442
0. 00006058
0.00002531
0. 00005910
0.00002647
0 • 00003094
0.00003910
0.00004491
0.00005091
0. 00004608
0 • 00006342
0.00006588
0. 00006882
0. 00007379
0.00006184
0.00006630
0.00007641
0. 00004843
0.00005831
0.00006834
0.00000833
0.00006465
0. 00007679
13
18
21
12
7
9
11
11
27
10
17
16
12
14
15
14
23
8
7
19
16
18
10
12
28
28
11
11
52
31
KCSPI 880 0.00013057 0. 00003474 0.00001037 	 6
(Notes)
N: The number of observations.
Autocovar: The value of autocovarience.
Upper Lim.: The spectral value of upper limit.
Lower Lim.: The spectral value of lower limit.
Out: The number of observations outside of both limits.
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Appendix 7.6(2) Results of Spectral Analysis.
(1986-1988, 5% significance level)
Sample N Autocovar Upper Lim. Lower Lim. Out
13
12
20
7
19
45
23
12
13
21
13
11
27
19
16
9
5
11
7
11
14
19
14
9
11
16
22
12
8
7
12
19
34
13
0.00058331
0. 00029793
0. 00031351
0.00040504
0. 00048153
0. 00045683
0 • 00051686
0. 00048969
0.00043946
0. 00042823
0.00047467
0 • 00041193
0. 00039240
0. 00029488
0.00078466
0. 00051156
0 • 00062194
0.00055866
0. 00042773
0. 00053 026
0. 00060014
0.00042670
0.00040886
0.00061257
0.00087720
0.00051618
0.00056964
0.00059968
0. 00065584
0. 00076987
0 • 00082066
0.00067000
0. 00076251
0.00198111
0.00015521
0.00008101
0 • 00008627
0.00010891
0 • 00013611
0.00012422
0. 00013898
0. 00013030
0. 00011693
0.00011515
0.00013062
0 • 00011201
0 • 00010441
0 • 00008018
0.00021098
0.00013612
0 • 00016723
0. 00014865
0.00011501
0 • 00014109
0. 00015969
0 • 00011354
0.00010879
0. 00016299
0. 00023587
0 • 00013879
0.00015157
0. 00016125
0. 00017451
0. 00020701
0. 00022876
0.00018938
0.00020503
0. 00056844
0 • 00004634
0. 00002274
0. 00002339
0, 00003157
0 • 00003410
0 • 00003487
0 • 00004028
0. 00003891
0. 00003491
0. 00003337
0.00003541
0.00003144
0 • 00003118
0 • 00002251
0. 00006115
0 • 00004064
0. 00004847
0. 00004439
0.00003333
0. 00004213
0.00004768
0. 00003390
0. 00003248
0. 00004867
0.00006836
0.00004023
0.00004526
0 • 00004673
0.00005211
0. 00006000
0. 00005972
0. 00004745
0. 00005942
0.00013613
KCSPI 876 0.00016803 0.00004471 0.00001335 	 11
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Appendix 7.6(3) Results of Spectral Analysis
(1978-1980, 10% significance level)
Sample N Autocovar Upper Lim. Lower Lim. Out
0.00027680
0. 00042754
0. 00058745
0. 00029646
0. 00208018
0. 00102894
0. 00019501
0.00121151
0.00077731
0.00032475
0. 00081210
0.00038520
0.00042521
0.00056903
0. 00058849
0.00065330
0. 00060375
0. 00081377
0. 00090522
0.00088302
0 • 00094689
0. 00081026
0. 00085079
0. 00098049
0. 00062140
0.00074816
0. 00087687
0. 00010687
0. 00082956
0. 00100609
0 • 00006854
0. 00011183
0 • 00014684
0 • 00007485
0.00054412
0.00030785
0.00004874
0. 00029997
0.00019246
0 • 00008041
0. 00020730
0. 00010076
0. 00010854
0 • 00014884
0.00014710
0. 00016176
0.00015091
0.00020149
0 • 00023107
0. 00021864
0.00023445
0.00020253
0 • 00021066
0. 00024277
0. 00015386
0. 00018525
0.00021712
0. 00002646
0. 00020540
0.00025148
0. 00002432
0.00003386
0. 00005073
0. 00002512
0.00016474
0. 00006050
0. 00001684
0. 00010643
0.00006829
0.00002853
0 • 00006743
0.00003051
0.00003530
0. 00004506
0.00005081
0 • 00005739
0 • 00005213
0. 00007149
0.00007516
0. 00007757
0.00008318
0 • 00006996
0. 00007474
0.00008613
0. 00005459
0. 00006572
0.00007703
0 • 00000939
0.00007288
0.00008687
21
31
34
25
15
18
20
23
40
15
26
21
23
25
23
29
37
15
16
30
24
31
20
16
37
45
23
21
68
36
KCSPI	 880 0.00013057 0.00003205 0.00001165 	 10
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789
859
696
795
851
876
876
867
778
793
874
814
851
873
866
876
852
876
876
876
873
873
852
860
876
870
873
855
739
700
833
635
Appendix 7.6(4) Results of Spectral Analysis
(1986-1988, 10% significance level)
Sample N Autocovar Upper Lim. Lower Lim. Out
19
23
28
10
25
65
34
25
29
28
22
25
42
27
23
17
15
19
16
18
23
33
25
21
16
28
29
20
19
12
22
36
45
25
0.00058331
0. 00029793
0.00031351
0.00040504
0.00048153
0. 00045683
0.00051686
0.00048969
0.00043946
0. 00042823
0 • 00047467
0.00041193
0 • 00039240
0. 00029488
0.00078466
0.00051156
0.00062194
0.00055866
0. 00042773
0. 00053 026
0.00060014
0. 00042670
0.00040886
0. 00061257
0 • 00087720
0.00051618
0 • 00056964
0 • 00059968
0. 00065584
0 • 00076987
0.00082066
0.00067000
0.00076251
0.00198111
0. 00014316
0 • 00007447
0 • 00007916
0.00010029
0 • 00012437
0 • 00011419
0. 00012798
0.00012018
0. 00010785
0 • 00010603
0.00011985
0. 00010296
0. 00009630
0. 00007371
0 • 00019428
0. 00012555
0. 00015399
0.00013711
0.00010591
0.00013014
0. 00014729
0. 00010472
0. 00010034
0. 00015034
0. 00021720
0.00012781
0. 00013980
0 • 00014848
0.00016096
0 • 00019062
0.00020948
0.00017304
0. 00018880
0 • 00051821
0 • 00005206
0 • 00002573
0.00002657
0.00003558
0. 00003909
0. 00003945
0. 00004541
0. 00004371
0. 00003922
0 • 00003762
0. 00004023
0. 00003557
0.00003502
0.00002546
0.00006893
0.00004566
0.00005464
0.00004986
0. 00003758
0 • 00004733
0.00005357
0. 00003809
0.00003649
0.00005468
0.00007706
0. 00004535
0. 00005084
0.00005268
0. 00005854
0.00006763
0.00006814
0 • 00005439
0. 00006699
0.00015690
KCSPI	 876 0.00016803 0.00004124 0.00001500 	 23
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Appendix 8.1 Samples used for semi-strong form efficiency tests
No	 Company	 Announcement-date Ex-date Ratio
1 Samhwa Crown & Closure 02/03/85 13/03/85 0.5
2 Sampyo Foods
	 28/08/85 29/09/85
	 0.3
3 Chunil Express	 05/12/85	 20/12/85	 0.336
4 Jeil Mool San	 30/04/86	 01/06/86	 0.5
5 Hankook Tire
	 26/07/86 13/08/86
	 0.33
6 Dongil Textile	 20/08/86	 11/09/86	 0.33333
7 Gwangduk Moolsan
	 11/10/86 30/10/86 0.296849
	
8 Saniyoung Electronics 17/11/86 28/11/86
	 0.7
9 Korea Electronics	 08/12/86 21/12/86
	 0.35
10 Taechang Enterprise
	 26/01/87 09/02/87
	 0.3
11 Samhwa Crown & Closure 30/05/87 15/06/87 0.3
12 Chonbang	 02/07/87	 13/07/87	 0.288244
13 Choheung Chemical md 19/09/87 14/10/87 0.5
14 Korea Cast Iron Pipe 23/11/87
	 13/12/87	 0.33779
15 Jinyung	 05/01/88	 14/02/88	 0.9
16 Samyoung Electronics 22/01/88 14/02/88
	 0.5
17 Ilshin spinning
	 09/03/88	 24/03/88	 0.5
18 Paik Kwang Chemical
	 03/05/88 30/05/88
	 0.5
19 Dongil Textile
	 28/07/88	 31/08/88	 0.25
20 Youlchon Chemical
	 09/11/88 29/11/88
	 0.5
21 Sam A Alminium	 12/10/88 30/10/88
	 0.5
22 Shinpoong Paper
	 03/12/88	 01/01/89	 0.25
23 Ilyang Pharmacy
	 08/03/85 31/03/85
	 0.2
24 Ildong Pharmacy
	 13/03/85 31/03/85
	 0.2
25 Hanhl Pharmacy
	 13/03/85 31/03/85
	 0.15
26 Korea Green Cross	 20/03/85 31/03/85 0.15
27 Miwon	 25/09/85	 14/10/85	 0.231527
28 Hanil Development	 20/11/85 01/01/86 0.2
29 Maxon Electronics 	 11/12/85 01/01/86	 0.2
30 Samhwa Crown & Closure 05/03/86 14/03/86 0.2
31 Namyeung	 03/09/87	 29/09/87	 0.17647
32 Tongyang Nylon
	 13/10/87 27/10/87	 0.190424374
33 Kyungbang	 02/12/87 20/12/87	 0.2
34 Jindo	 26/03/88	 10/04/88	 0.24
35 Ilyang Pharmacy
	 09/06/88 29/06/88 0.1904
36 Sam Mi Steel	 23/08/88	 14/09/88	 0.15
37 Samik Musical Instrume 12/11/88 15/12/88 0.2
38 Choongnam spinning
	 05/03/86 29/04/86 0.2
39 Mando Machinery	 23/11/88	 01/01/89	 0.201923
40 Kolon Chemical
	 03/12/88	 01/01/89	 0.2
41 Saehan Media
	 12/12/88	 01/01/89	 0.2157
42 Tong Yang Cement 	 08/03/85 31/05/85 0.1
43 Dong-A Pharmacy
	 13/03/85 31/03/85 0.1
44 Youngjin Pharmacy
	 18/05/85 28/06/85 0.1454
45 Samsung Electron Devic 21/09/85 	 31/10/85	 0.].
46 Korea Iron & Steel Wor 19/12/85 	 01/01/86	 0.14285
47 Shinpoong Paper
	 19/12/85 01/01/86	 0.1
48 Korea Green Cross	 11/03/86	 31/03/86	 0.065217
49 Dong-A Pharmacy
	 14/03/86 31/03/86 0.1
50 Samsung Electro-Mechan 17/04/86 25/05/86	 0.090909
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distribution
stock issue.
5]. Han Dok Reniedia md
52 Pusan Steel Pipe
53 Dongwha Pharmacy
54 Hankuk Glass
55 Yukong
56 Santhwa Capacitor
57 Hanhl Development
58 Samyang
59 Yuhan
60 Pusan Steel Pipe
61 Ildong Pharmacy
62 Yuhan
08/12/86
08/12/86
09/02/87
03/09/87
05/09/87
21/10/87
02/11/8 7
10/11/87
15/ 12/8 7
15/12/87
09/06/88
12/12/88
31/12/86
01/01/87
31/03/87
29/09/87
14/10/87
12/11/87
29/11/87
25/11/87
01/01/88
01/01/88
28/06/88
01/01/89
0.1428571
0.1063821
0.064516
0. 113 65636
0 • 082170971
0. 13037037
0.05
0.1
0. 105769
0.105769
0.1
0.05
(Note)
Ratio: the ratio of bonus stock issue or har
0.336, for instance, - means the bonus stock
of 0.336 shares per each holding share.
Announcement-data: The announcement date of bonus
Ex-date: The ex-right date.
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Appendix 8.2 PDR,	 than zero
ED	 P D R	 C P D R
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	 O.(
Std. Dev.	 O.(
(Notes)
ED : Event date.
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CPDR : Cuinmulat
% returns>O : PE
4
4
1
i
;04(
O3
da
ye
rCE
.1
r
-a
I
I
4
il
urr
I
I
A
: :
I
I
31
p
I
I
I
z
)
:1
C
a
I
I
- :.
.1
.
.
.
r	 •
:
.
.
.
.(
n
SI
•.
•I
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.%
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.4
return.
rtfolio dE
age of ret
4
4
1
4
I
2
I
eturn.
greater U
I
.
.1
C
F
ro.
250
-:::
-.
-:
-.
S
:
:
S.
:	 j
•
:	 :
.
•
•
'I
4
'C
S
I
I
I
1'
'I
1
S
'I
1
C
rg
I
11
I
I.
II
I
I
I
L
p.
:
J1
•75
.582
Ii
I
Appendix 8 3 PDR, (C Rt%dratrs1e greater than zero
ED	 P D R	 C P D R	 % returns>O
:	 RRR	 R92
- .
S
Mean Avr.	 O.(
Std. Dev.	 O.0
L.___
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Appendix 8.4 Standardised portfolio returns.
ED	 Unadjusted Data
	
-40	 -1. 0771364
	
-39	 -0. 9246482
	
-30	 -0. 2340945
	
-37	 -0. 1600288
	
-36	 -0. 4345076
	
-35	 -0. 6567047
	
-34	 -1. 2448734
	
-33	 -0. 1317096
	
-32	 0. 3366471
	
-31	 0.3911071
	
-30	 -0. 4236156
	
-29	 -0. 6305639
	
-28	 -0. 3473715
	
-27	 0. 3213982
	
-26	 -0. 5869958
	
-25	 -0. 5107517
	
-24	 -0. 4933245
	
-23	 0. 2712950
	
-22	 -0. 0532871
	
-21	 0. 1667316
	
-20	 0. 7788627
	
-19	 0. 6939051
	
-18	 0. 7505436
	
-17	 0. 0839523
	
-16	 1. 2210786
	
-15	 0. 5893418
	
-14	 -0. 1709209
	
-13	 1. 0830373
	
-12	 1. 1622617
	
-11	 -0. 0118974
	
-10	 -0. 1077472
	
-9	 -0. 3277659
	
-8	 1. 3757453
	
-7	 1. 0424496
	
-6	 1. 0359143
	
-5	 0. 4041775
	
-4	 0. 5588441
	
-3	 1. 4084213
	
-2	 1. 1687969
	
-1	 1. 9377732
	
0	 2. 4998012
	
1	 2. 6806085
	
2	 1. 8005337
	
3	 0. 3649662
	
4	 -0. 6109582
	
S	 -0. 9202914
	
6	 -0. 3408363
	
7	 0. 3475390
	
8	 1. 3234636
	
9	 -0. 0511087
	
10	 -0. 3865827
	
11	 -0. 0206110
	
12	 -0. 1317096
	
13	 0. 0142434
	
14	 -0. 5957094
	
15	 -0. 3321227
	
16	 -0. 0598223
	
17	 0. 3562526
	
18	 0. 3105062
	
19	 -0. 5325357
	
20	 0. 5610225
	
21	 0. 1079147
	
22	 1. 2406843
23	 0. 7309379
24	 0. 6982619
25	 0. 4433888
26	 -0. 2384513
27	 -0. 5826390
20	 -1. 0553523
29	 0. 9400646
30	 -1 1183260
CPFA	 0. 003003
Std 0ev	 0. 004591
Adjusted Data
-0. 6617337
-1. 0559646
0. 1494516
-0. 4912546
0. 0304299
-0. 2845450
-0. 8983602
-0. 1678616
0. 4237393
0. 0344051
-0. 4171271
-0. 3334164
0. 2535079
0. 5404227
-0. 9173008
-0. 5101951
-0. 4741847
-0. 0848504
0. 1115704
0. 9712553
0. 1050231
0. 7471323
0. 9870464
-0. 1257714
1. 0038824
0. 9914892
-0. 6172913
0. 8310788
0. 7433909
0. 5109596
-0. 0179738
0. 0086833
0. 9924246
1. 0148727
1. 6642307
0. 2780605
0. 6468173
0. 5404227
1.7091268
2. 1875520
2. 6449320
2. 9367573
1. 2674137
0. 8105014
-0. 3328246
-1. 0763081
-0. 6638243
0. 0975404
0. 8144765
0. 1120381
0. 1777456
0. 3430665
-0. 5394244
-0. 1566376
-0. 6488589
-0. 4903193
0. 1735365
-0. 1077662
0. 3157078
-1. 0957165
0. 0449277
1. 0759035
0. 4784566
0. 2436869
0. 3030808
0. 9016967
-0. 4517365
-0. 5570973
-1. 0075608
0. 3023506
-0. 7009753
0. 001297
0. 004277
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Appendix 9.1 Average return of recommended stocks.
(Naive results)
1. Broker 1.
Day	 AR	 t (AR)	 CAR	 t (CAR)
	
-10	 0.5844	 2.7456
	
-9	 0.5960	 2.8001
	
-8	 0.8053	 3.7834
	
-7	 0.7439	 3.4953
	
-6	 0.3412	 1.6033
	
-5	 0.0783	 0.3677
	
-4	 0.3672	 1.7253
	
-3	 0.7031	 3.3037
	
-2	 0.8952	 4.2062
	
-1	 0.6147	 2.8882
	
0	 0.1758	 0.8260	 0.1758	 0.3013
	
1	 0.3646	 1.7129	 0.5404	 0.9260
	
2	 1.0199	 4.7918	 1.5602	 2.6736
	
3	 0.2842	 1.3355	 1.8445	 3.1607
	
4	 0.5506	 2.5871	 2.3951	 4.1042
	
5	 0.4518	 2.1229	 2.8469	 4.8784
	
6	 -0.0213	 -0.1002	 2.8256	 4.8419
	
7	 0.1574	 0.7394	 2.9830	 5.1116
	
8	 0.6605	 3.1034	 3.6435	 6.2434
	
9	 -0.0300	 -0.1410	 3.6135	 6.1920
	
10	 0.3322	 1.5610	 3.9457	 6.7613
	
11	 -0.0752	 -0.3534	 3.8705	 6.6324
	
12	 -0.0418	 -0.1965	 3.8287	 6.5607
	
13	 -0.0284	 -0.1333	 3.8003	 6.5121
	
14	 0.2003	 0.9410	 4.0006	 6.8553
	
15	 0.5008	 2.3527	 4.5014	 7.7134
	
16	 0.2514	 1.1811	 4.7528	 8.1442
	
17	 0.0732	 0.3438	 4.8259	 8.2696
	
18	 0.4486	 2.1077	 5.2745	 9.0382
	
19	 0.2551	 1.1986	 5.5296	 9.4754
	
20	 -0.0791	 -0.3718	 5.4505	 9.3398
	
21	 -0.1120	 -0.5264	 5.3385	 9.1478
	
22	 0.0051	 0.0238	 5.3435	 9.1565
	
23	 0.4563	 2.1438	 5.7998	 9.9383
	
24	 0.3645	 1.7126	 6.1643	 10.5630
	
25	 0.7991	 3.7544	 6.9634	 11.9322
	
26	 0.0244	 0.1148	 6.9878	 11.9741
	
27	 0.0737	 0.3464	 7.0615	 12.1004
	
28	 0.2769	 1.3010	 7.3384	 12.5749
	
29	 -0.0396	 -0.1860	 7.2988	 12.5071
	
30	 -0.0574	 -0.2695	 7.2415	 12.4088
	
31	 0.3988	 1.8739	 7.6403	 13.0922
	
32	 -0.4725	 -2.2198	 7.1679	 12.2826
	
33	 0.2288	 1.0749	 7.3966	 12.6746
	
34	 -0.5020	 -2.3585	 6.8947	 11.8145
	
35	 -0.1750	 -0.8223	 6.7196	 11.5146
	
36	 0.0193	 0.0909	 6.7390	 11.5477
	
37	 0.3481	 1.6355	 7.0871	 12.1442
	
38	 -0.2057	 -0.9663	 6.8814	 11.7918
	
39	 -0.0792	 -0.3720	 6.8022	 11.6561
	
40	 -0.1518	 -0.7134	 6.6504	 11.3959
	
41	 -0.1325	 -0.6225	 6.5179	 11.1689
	
42	 0.5546	 2.6059	 7.0726	 12.1193
	
43	 0.1737	 0.8161	 7.2462	 12.4169
	
44	 -0.0370	 -0.1740	 7.2092	 12.3535
	
45	 0.2266	 1.0648	 7.4358	 12.7418
	
46	 -0.1356	 -0.6372	 7.3002	 12.5094
	
47	 0.3513	 1.6503	 7.6515	 13.1113
Average	 0.3126	 1.4689	 4.4510	 7.6271
(Notes) AR: Average total return. t(AR): t-statistics for ARs.
CAR: Cumulative average total return.
t(CAR): t-statistics for CARs.
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2. Broker 2.
Day	 AR	 t (AR)	 CAR	 t (CAR)
	
-10	 0.6749	 3.6536
	
-9	 0.3230	 1.7486
	
-8	 0.9591	 5.1920
	
-7	 0.4210	 2.2789
	
-6	 0.5337	 2.8891
	
-5	 0.1969	 1.0661
	
-4	 0.6995	 3.7866
	
-3	 1.0644	 5.7619
	
-2	 0.6865	 3.7163
	
-1	 0.8495	 4.5986
	
0	 0.4687	 2.5371	 0.4687	 1.4405
	
1	 0.9545	 5.1669	 1.4231	 4.3740
	
2	 1.0604	 5.7403	 2.4836	 7.6332
	
3	 -0.1135	 -0.6142	 2.3701	 7.2845
	
4	 0.0722	 0.3909	 2.4423	 7.5064
	
5	 -0.5774	 -3.1258	 1.8649	 5.7317
	
6	 -0.1788	 -0.9677	 1.6861	 5.1823
	
7	 -0.1515	 -0.8202	 1.5346	 4.7166
	
8	 0.8338	 4.5137	 2.3684	 7.2794
	
9	 0.0253	 0.1368	 2.3937	 7.3570
	
10	 -0.3052	 -1.6519	 2.0885	 6.4191
	
11	 0.3669	 1.9864	 2.4555	 7.5469
	
12	 0.0748	 0.4050	 2.5303	 7.7769
	
13	 0.0272	 0.1473	 2.5575	 7.8605
	
14	 -0.0466	 -0.2522	 2.5109	 7.7173
	
15	 0.2880	 1.5590	 2.7989	 8.6025
	
16	 -0.2064	 -1.1171	 2.5926	 7.9682
	
17	 0.1152	 0.6238	 2.7078	 8.3224
	
18	 0.2906	 1.5731	 2.9984	 9.2155
	
19	 -0.0141	 -0.0763	 2.9843	 9.1722
	
20	 -0.0715	 -0.3870	 2.9128	 8.9525
	
21	 0.0834	 0.4513	 2.9962	 9.2087
	
22	 -0.2098	 -1.1356	 2.7864	 8.5640
	
23	 0.5183	 2.8055	 3.3046	 10.L568
	
24	 0.2980	 1.6134	 3.6027	 11.0728
	
25	 0.4596	 2.4878	 4.0622	 12.4853
	
26	 -0.7319	 -3.9620	 3.3304	 10.2358
	
27	 -0.0766	 -0.4145	 3.2538	 10.0005
	
28	 -0.1340	 -0.7256	 3.1197	 9.5885
	
29	 0.2275	 1.2315	 3.3472	 10.2877
	
30	 0.2392	 1.2947	 3.5864	 11.0228
	
31	 0.1713	 0.9275	 3.7577	 11.5494
	
32	 0.0244	 0.1319	 3.7821	 11.6243
	
33	 0.2802	 1.5166	 4.0623	 12.4854
	
34	 -0.1827	 -0.9890	 3.8796	 11.9239
	
35	 -0.0159	 -0.0858	 3.8637	 11.8752
	
36	 0.0456	 0.2466	 3.9093	 12.0152
	
37	 0.3728	 2.0179	 4.2821	 13.1609
	
38	 -0.4203	 -2.2752	 3.8618	 11.8691
	
39	 0.1700	 0.9205	 4.0318	 12.3918
	
40	 -0.5131	 -2.7776	 3.5187	 10.8147
	
41	 0.1518	 0.8217	 3.6705	 11.2813
	
42	 0.3033	 1.6420	 3.9738	 12.2136
	
43	 0.1236	 0.6692	 4.0975	 12.5935
	
44	 0.2670	 1.4451	 4.3644	 13.4140
	
45	 0.2471	 1.3376	 4.6115	 14.1735
	
46	 0.1069	 0.5785	 4.7184	 14.5019
	
47	 -0.0738	 -0.3996	 4.6445	 14.2750
Average	 0.3293	 1.7826	 2.5964	 7.9801
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3. Broker 3.
Day	 AR	 t (AR)	 CAR	 t (CAR)
	
-10	 -0.1695	 -0.8448
	
-9	 0.5318	 2.6509
	
-8	 0.6492	 3.2360
	
-7	 0.5029	 2.5066
	
-6	 0.1489	 0.7424
	
-5	 0.4167	 2.0769
	
-4	 0.2386	 1.1895
	
-3	 0.5974	 2.9779
	
-2	 0.9415	 4.6928
	
-1	 0.6634	 3.3069
	
0	 0.4599	 2.2925	 0.4599	 1.3126
	
1	 0.2114	 1.0537	 0.6713	 1.9159
	
2	 0.1297	 0.6463	 0.8010	 2.2859
	
3	 0.7941	 3.9580	 1.5950	 4.5521
	
4	 -0.1131	 -0.5640	 1.4819	 4.2292
	
5	 0.1307	 0.6513	 1.6125	 4.6021
	
6	 -0.1973	 -0.9835	 1.4152	 4.0390
	
7	 -0.0775	 -0.3861	 1.3378	 3.8179
	
8	 0.0071	 0.0355	 1.3449	 3.8382
	
9	 0.4764	 2.3744	 1.8212	 5.1977
	
10	 0.1553	 0.7741	 1.9765	 5.6409
	
11	 0.0512	 0.2553	 2.0278	 5.7871
	
12	 -0.1391	 -0.6935	 1.8886	 5.3900
	
13	 0.3349	 1.6693	 2.2235	 6.3458
	
14	 0.5448	 2.7157	 2.7683	 7.9006
	
15	 -0.0506	 -0.2524	 2.7177	 7.7561
	
16	 0.6224	 3.1024	 3.3401	 9.5324
	
17	 -0.4039	 -2.0131	 2.9362	 8.3798
	
18	 -0.1993	 -0.9933	 2.7369	 7.8111
	
19	 -0.0659	 -0.3286	 2.6710	 7.6229
	
20	 0.6412	 3.1959	 3.3122	 9.4528
	
21	 -0.0676	 -0.3369	 3.2446	 9.2598
	
22	 0.4052	 2.0198	 3.6498	 10.4163
	
23	 -0.2396	 -1.1944	 3.4102	 9.7325
	
24	 -0.0456	 -0.2271	 3.3646	 9.6024
	
25	 0.1834	 0.9141	 3.5480	 10.1258
	
26	 0.4724	 2.3548	 4.0204	 11.4741
	
27	 -0.3115	 -1.5526	 3.7089	 10.5851
	
28	 0.2120	 1.0565	 3.9209	 11.1900
	
29	 0.0844	 0.4207	 4.0053	 11.4309
	
30	 -0.0476	 -0.2371	 3.9577	 11.2951
	
31	 0.3616	 1.8024	 4.3193	 12.3271
	
32	 0.1139	 0.5676	 4.4332	 12.6521
	
33	 0.0048	 0.0239	 4.4380	 12.6658
	
34	 -0.0752	 -0.3748	 4.3628	 12.4511
	
35	 -0.3538	 -1.7635	 4.0090	 11.4414
	
36	 0.1581	 0.7882	 4.1671	 11.8927
	
37	 0.1184	 0.5900	 4.2855	 12.2305
	
38	 0.0118	 0.0589	 4.2973	 12.2643
	
39	 -0.0365	 -0.1818	 4.2608	 12.1602
	
40	 -0.2624	 -1.3078	 3.9985	 11.4114
	
41	 0.0560	 0.2792	 4.0545	 11.5712
	
42	 0.1352	 0.6737	 4.1896	 11.9569
	
43	 0.0899	 0.4482	 4.2795	 12.2135
	
44	 -0.2025	 -1.0093	 4.0770	 11.6357
	
45	 -0.0326	 -0.1627	 4.0444	 11.5425
	
46	 0.2018	 1.0059	 4.2462	 12.1184
	
47	 -0.0955	 -0.4763	 4.1507	 11.8457
Average	 0.2594	 1.2930	 2.5790	 7.3604
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4. Broker 4
Day	 AR	 t (AR)	 CAR	 t (CAR)
	
-10	 0.9039	 4.5012
	
-9	 0.4107	 2.0454
	
-8	 0.5231	 2.6050
	
-7	 0.7081	 3.5262
	
-6	 0.1169	 0.5819
	
-5	 0.1490	 0.7419
	
-4	 0.7796	 3.8823
	
-3	 1.1608	 5.7808
	
-2	 0.2146	 1.0687
	
-1	 0.2345	 1.1678
	
0	 -0.0278	 -0.1386	 -0.0278	 -0.0594
	
1	 0.2021	 1.0064	 0.1743	 0.3722
	
2	 0.6404	 3.1892	 0.8147	 1.7401
	
3	 0.2651	 1.3199	 1.0797	 2.3062
	
4	 0.4794	 2.3874	 1.5591	 3.3301
	
5	 0.2470	 1.2299	 1.8061	 3.8576
	
6	 0.1432	 0.7132	 1.9493	 4.1635
	
7	 0.4949	 2.4646	 2.4443	 5.2206
	
8	 0.2867	 1.4280	 2.7310	 5.8330
	
9	 0.1045	 0.5205	 2.8355	 6.0563
	
10	 0.0576	 0.2866	 2.8931	 6.1792
	
11	 0.0389	 0.1936	 2.9319	 6.2622
	
12	 0.3920	 1.9520	 3.3239	 7.0994
	
13	 0.2629	 1.3093	 3.5868	 7.6609
	
14	 0.0993	 0.4945	 3.6861	 7.8730
	
15	 0.3436	 1.7113	 4.0298	 8.6070
	
16	 0.0755	 0.3759	 4.1052	 8.7682
	
17	 -0.2197	 -1.0939	 3.8856	 8.2991
	
18	 0.2050	 1.0206	 4.0905	 8.7368
	
19	 0.4553	 2.2671	 4.5458	 9.7092
	
20	 -0.2359	 -1.1750	 4.3099	 9.2052
	
21	 0.1236	 06153	 4.4334	 9.4691
	
22	 -0.3034	 -1.5111	 4.1300	 8.8210
	
23	 0.3609	 1.7973	 4.4909	 9.5919
	
24	 0.7017	 3.4945	 5.1926	 11.0906
	
25	 0.5199	 2.5891	 5.7125	 12.2011
	
26	 0.1334	 0.6642	 5.8459	 12.4859
	
27	 0.1955	 0.9733	 6.0413	 12.9034
	
28	 -0.0746	 -0.3713	 5.9668	 12.7442
	
29	 -0.0606	 -0.3020	 5.9061	 12.6146
	
30	 0.1279	 0.6369	 6.0340	 12.8878
	
31	 0.2637	 1.3134	 6.2978	 13.4511
	
32	 0.2836	 1.4121	 6.5813	 14.0568
	
33	 -0.2912	 -1.4499	 6.2902	 13.4349
	
34	 0.1486	 0.7401	 6.4388	 13.7524
	
35	 0.1742	 0.8675	 6.6130	 14.1244
	
36	 -0.1678	 -0.8355	 6.4452	 13.7661
	
37	 0.1913	 0.9526	 6.6365	 14.1746
	
38	 -0.2751	 -1.3698	 6.3615	 13.5871
	
39	 -0.2028	 -1.0102	 6.1586	 13.1539
	
40	 -0.1404	 -0.6990	 6.0182	 12.8541
	
41	 0.4345	 2.1637	 6.4527	 13.7821
	
42	 0.3923	 1.9534	 6.8450	 14.6199
	
43	 0.3037	 1.5125	 7.1487	 15.2686
	
44	 0.1654	 0.8236	 7.3141	 15.6219
	
45	 0.2455	 1.2225	 7.5596	 16.1462
	
46	 -0.4581	 -2.2812	 7.1015	 15.1678
	
47	 0.7566	 3.7678	 7.8581	 16.7838
Average	 0.3099	 1.5432	 3.8739	 8.2740
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5. Total samples (467 recommendations).
Day	 AR	 t (AR)	 CAR	 t (CAR)
	
-10	 0.4978	 4.9679
	
-9	 0.4573	 4.5636
	
-8	 0.7394	 7.3789
	
-7	 0.5764	 5.7520
	
-6	 0.2979	 2.9731
	
-5	 0.2148	 2.1433
	
-4	 0.5298	 5.2877
	
-3	 0.8909	 8.8909
	
-2	 0.6803	 6.7894
	
-1	 0.5992	 5.9802
	
0	 0.2798	 2.7926	 0.2798	 1.3434
	
1	 0.4515	 4.5061	 0.7313	 3.5111
	
2	 0.7122	 7.1078	 1.4435	 6.9303
	
3	 0.2968	 2.9621	 1.7403	 8.3552
	
4	 0.2305	 2.3002	 1.9708	 9.4617
	
5	 0.0306	 0.3055	 2.0014	 9.6086
	
6	 -0.0695	 -0.6940	 1.9319	 9.2748
	
7	 0.0819	 0.8171	 2.0138	 9.6679
	
8	 0.4519	 4.5104	 2.4657	 11.8376
	
9	 0.1473	 1.4703	 2.6131	 12.5449
	
10	 0.0408	 0.4074	 2.6539	 12.7409
	
11	 0.1096	 1.0937	 2.7635	 13.2670
	
12	 0.0920	 0.9186	 2.8555	 13.7089
	
13	 0.1299	 1.2965	 2.9854	 14.3326
	
14	 0.1785	 1.7811	 3.1639	 15.1894
	
15	 0.2628	 2.6226	 3.4267	 16.4510
	
16	 0.1734	 1.7302	 3.6000	 17.2833
	
17	 -0.1087	 -1.0849	 3.4913	 16.7614
	
18	 0.1798	 1.7945	 3.6711	 17.6247
	
19	 0.1475	 1.4725	 3.8187	 18.3330
	
20	 0.0726	 0.7246	 3.8913	 18.6816
	
21	 0.0067	 0.0667	 3.8980	 18.7137
	
22	 -0.0306	 -0.3055	 3.8674	 18.5667
	
23	 0.2743	 2.7371	 4.1416	 19.8834
	
24	 0.3251	 3.2446	 4.4667	 21.4442
	
25	 0.4791	 4.7815	 4.9459	 23.7444
	
26	 -0.0478	 -0.4768	 4.8981	 23.5150
	
27	 -0.0362	 -0.3613	 4.8619	 23.3412
	
28	 0.0583	 0.5822	 4.9202	 23.6213
	
29	 0.0623	 0.6216	 4.9825	 23.9203
	
30	 0.0739	 0.7380	 5.0565	 24.2753
	
31	 0.2921	 2.9155	 5.3486	 25.6778
	
32	 0.0020	 0.0201	 5.3506	 25.6875
	
33	 0.0580	 0.5786	 5.4086	 25.9658
	
34	 -0.1440	 -1.4372	 5.2646	 25.2745
	
35	 -0.0891	 -0.8890	 5.1755	 24.8468
	
36	 0.0156	 0.1560	 5.1911	 24.9219
	
37	 0.2577	 2.5718	 5.4488	 26.1591
	
38	 -0.2189	 -2.1846	 5.2299	 25.1081
	
39	 -0.0344	 -0.3432	 5.1955	 24.9431
	
40	 -0.2855	 -2.8497	 4.9100	 23.5722
	
41	 0.1132	 1.1295	 5.0232	 24.1156
	
42	 0.3315	 3.3081	 5.3546	 25.7069
	
43	 0.1293	 1.2903	 5.4839	 26.3276
	
44	 0.0506	 0.5051	 5.5345	 26.5706
	
45	 0.1682	 1.6784	 5.7027	 27.3780
	
46	 -0.0668	 -0.6670	 5.6359	 27.0571
	
47	 0.2288	 2.2837	 5.8647	 28.1556
Average	 0.2347	 2.3421	 3.2875	 15.7828
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18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
136.
137.
(5).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
(6)
45.
46.
APPENDIX 9.2 SAMPLES OF STRONG FORM EMPIRICAL TESTS.
I. General lists of recommended stocks.
(1). Foods and Beverages.
1. Dong Banq
 Oil & Flour Mills
2. Nhonq
 Shim
3. Hai Pal Confectionery.
4. TQng Yang Confectionery.5. Mi Won.
6. Oriental Brewery.
132. Miwon Foods.
133. Sun Hill Glucose.
134. Lotte Chilsung Beverage.
(2). Textile, Wearing apparel and Leather industries.
7. Choong Nam Spinning.
8. Cheil Wool Textile.
9. Korea Hapsum.
10. Sun Kyong Industries.
11. Che Ii Synthetic Textile
12. Ssang Bang Wool
13. Tae Jon Leather
135. Tongyang Nylon.
(3). Wood and Paper
14. Sun Chang md.
15. Chon Ju Paper
16. Se Poong
17. Dong Shin Paper
(4). Chemical Petroleum and Pharmacy
Korea Pacific Chemical
Lucky
Sae Han Medi
Han Nam Cheml.cal
Cho Kwang Pal.nt
Pacific Chemical
Lucky Advanced Materials
Yu Kong
Sam Chully md.
STC Inc.
Ssang Yong Oil refining
Korea Titanum
Kyung In Energy
Kum Ho Petroleum & Chemical
Kuni Ho
Dong-A harm.
Young Jin Pharm
Ii Sung Corp.
Korea Chemical.
Hanil Pharmacy.
Nonmetallic Mineral Products
Ch9 Sun Refractories
Asia Cement
S sang Y9ng Cement
Hyun Dai. Cement
Tong Yang Cement
Byuck San
Kçum Kang
Jindo
Tong Yang Lithography
Basic Metal Industry
Kang Won md.
Dong Bu Steel
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47. Pusan Steel Pipe
48. Korea Steel Pipe
49. In Ch?on Iron & Steel
50. Sam Mi $tel
51. Lucky Mining & Smelting
52. Dae Han Alminum
(7). Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery & Equipment
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
138.
139.
140.
Daewoo Heavy md.
Sam Sung Aro Space md.
Mando Machinery
Gold Star Instrument & Electric
Gold Star
Sam Sunq Electr9nics
Daewoo Electronics
A-Nam Ind.
Orion Electric
Tal Han Electric Wire
Gold Star Wire
Yeon Hab Electric Cable
Gold Star Electr.c Machinery
Gold Star Electric
Sunny-EMI
Dewoo Telecom
Ki-A Motors
Hyun Dai Motor
Dae Won Kang Up
Ssangyong Motors
Tong Il
Han Dock
Inkel
Nawoo Precision
Samsung Telecom.
(8). General Construction
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
141.
142.
Sam Sung Construction
Sam Whan Corporaion
Dong-A Construction
Da Lini Ind.
Shin Sung
Kuk Dong Construction
Han Il Development
Poong Lu md.
Lucky Deve.opinent
Kwang Jii Highway Lines
Hyin Dai Eng. & Const.
Shinwha Construction
Pacific Development
Miryung Construct.on
Dongsan Construction
(9). Wholesale and Retail
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
143.
144.
Sam Mi
Daewoo
Lucky Gold Star Int'l
Ssang Yong
Sun Kyung
Hyun Dai Corp.
Hyo Sung
Dong Bu md.
Dae Sung md.
K9lon International
Midopa Department Store
Saipsung Corp.
Shinsaehae Department Store
(10). Banking, Finance and Insurance
146. Long-term Credit Bank
99. The first Bank of Korea
100. Bank of Seoul
259
01/02/88
08/02/88
15/02/88
22/02/88
29/02/89
07/03/88
14/03/88
21/03 / 88
28/03/88
04/04/88
12 33,40,72
7 124 63,69
18,10
6 26 42,52,
13 é5
33
12
49,59,105
44 72 129
6, 4,2,98
91,43,49,29,
33,53
77,88,105,51
50, 57, 32
71, 129, 114, 61
16 24 83 94ioô 110,114
43, 120
53, 129, 95, 59
5 96 62,32,
3,3é
75,88 111 25
70,12 11,
26 59,17,34
12
129,20,79,	 132 17 103,
120	 19,.9,144
57,73,81,92
99,13
1 18 66 78,
86,169 0
46, 57 , 2 , 101
10, 25, 73, 2,
21,48
50,57 99,118
5 49 18
2 19 106,
ii ioi 86
76, 0, 118 , 89
5 57 104 112
4,7ô,11',124
9 26,48,49
5 141 43,
ioô,ii
133 38,46,
78
13
21, 138, 89
4 9 19,31 48
6A,142 iol,
106 1110,h, 38, 145
50
9 19,46,138,
19
48 49,88,107
11, 148
134 19 139
49,6,0,85,
Hanil Bnk
commercial Bank of Korea
Cho Hung Bank
Pusan Bank
Kvunqgi Bank
Chunook Bank
DaegoO Bank
Kyungnam Bank
Kwangjoo Bank
Choongbook Bank
kangwon Bank
Korea Investment & Finance
Dae Han Investment & Finance
Daewoo Investment & Finance
Kum Sl1ng Investment & Finance
Kwangjoo Inmvestment & Finance
Choong Ang Investhent & Finance
Dong Suh Securities
Daewoo Securities
Daishin Securities
Corvo Securities
Lucky Securities
Hanshin Securities
Ssangyong Securities
Shinyoung Securities
Hyundai Securities
First Fire and Marine Insurance
Seoul Investment and Finance
Haedong Fire and Marine Insurance
(11). Transport and Others
128.The Korea Express
129.Korean Air
130.Oyang Fisheries
131.Korea Tungsten Mining
149. Hanjin Corp.
II. Weekly recoimnended stocks.
WeeR:	 troKer I	 Uroier 2	 I3roler 3	 i3roRer 4
	
11/U1/.8 19,25,81,95	 92,59,49,121	 13U,S	 TI	 11,19 37 57
	53,59 69,75
	 81,85 25,106	 101,11L2
	
81 iol,iii,
89 10	 99 10	 125
	
18/01/88 12,9 48,83
	 loé,109,113	 41 72,85,19	 9 145 50 68
118,116	 73,60	 ll	 l52,9é,l2,
147
25/01/88	 -	 --
10]..
102.
103.
O4.
105.
O6.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
147.
148.
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11/04/88
18/04/88
25/04/88
02/05/88
09/05/88
16/05/88
24/05/88
30/05/88
07/06/88
13/06/88
20/06/88
27/06/88
451, 65, 68
59,60,54,100
18 53,69,83,1015 45 57,88,9á 8131,38,59
12 30 50,5310 599, 7, 36, 59825 16 74,64,
12 , 18, 69, 89
19,43,53,99
3,57,101
18 42,58,75106
69, 70, 16, 4915,28 59 76,99,11 816, 96, 7 , 68,72,74,98,63
50 69 76 89ioi 13,i295 2 41,46,61,91
36 73 79 93io us 10359, 108, 3, 9485, 100
,99,49,95,
5 6,28,54,115 8614,4 57 6369,12á 1910, 19, 3, 6067
25,77,85,56
15,129,119
6 18 70,74,16 95 31 25,55,118 127,853 76 77,89,117 12251é, 37, 49,
50, 69,85,99
25,57, 101,1220,6185, 113,119
49,72,89
18,22,38,5775
109 14728,].
132,42,55
3, 49, 66, 53
129,101
5,33,38,49,
35, 46, 93
3, 12, 136, 751405,38 114,77140 12919,5,59,146111, 101
18,137,38,48106,110
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